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Abstract: This article has two goals. The first is to assess, in the face of accruing reports on the ingenuity of great ape tool use, whether
and in what sense human tool use still evidences unique, higher cognitive ability. To that effect, I offer a systematic comparison between
humans and nonhuman primates with respect to nine cognitive capacities deemed crucial to tool use: enhanced hand-eye coordination,
body schema plasticity, causal reasoning, function representation, executive control, social learning, teaching, social intelligence, and
language. Since striking differences between humans and great apes stand firm in eight out of nine of these domains, I conclude
that human tool use still marks a major cognitive discontinuity between us and our closest relatives. As a second goal of the paper, I
address the evolution of human technologies. In particular, I show how the cognitive traits reviewed help to explain why
technological accumulation evolved so markedly in humans, and so modestly in apes.
Keywords: cognition; evolution; great apes; technology; tool use; cumulative culture
1. Introduction
Ever since Jane Goodall’s observations of ant-dipping chim-
panzees some 50 years ago, the idea that human tool use evi-
dences “humanique” cognitive ability has lost popularity. To
date, chimpanzees have been demonstrated to use “complex
toolkits” (Fowler & Sommer 2007; Sanz & Morgan 2007),
“complex toolsets” (Sanz et al. 2009; Boesch et al. 2009),
and “composite technologies” (Carvalho et al. 2009) – beha-
viors that, according to many, indicate that chimpanzees
share with humans at least the cognitive machinery for
dealing with their physical world (see, e.g., Hrdy 2009;
Tomasello & Hermann 2010). To the extent that human
tool use still evidences cognitive superiority, that superiority
is said to be found in the social domain: The remarkable
complexity of human technologies attests to more sophisti-
cation in matters of imitation, teaching, and participation
in collaborative activities. It is these capacities (rather than
individual brainpower) that, through cumulative evolution,
gave rise to our astonishing technological achievements
(see e.g., Boyd & Richerson 1996; Herrmann et al. 2007;
Richerson & Boyd 2005; Tomasello et al. 2005).
In this paper, I show that it is a mistake to discard tool
use as a hallmark of human cognition. Human tool use
reflects higher social intelligence (indeed), but just as
much greater non-social wit. In support of my argument,
I offer a systematic comparison between humans and non-
human primates with respect to nine cognitive capacities
(both social and non-social) deemed crucial to tool use:
enhanced hand-eye coordination (sect. 2), body schema
plasticity (sect. 3), causal reasoning (sect. 4), function rep-
resentation (sect. 5), executive control (sect. 6), social
learning (sect. 7), teaching (sect. 8), social intelligence
(sect. 9), and language (sect. 10).1 Because striking differ-
ences between humans and great apes stand firm in eight
out of nine of these domains (see Table 2, for a more
detailed and balanced overview), I conclude that human
tool use still marks a major cognitive discontinuity
between us and our closest relatives; and relatedly, that
no individual cognitive trait can be singled out as the key
trait differentiating humans from other animals.2
As a second aim of the paper, I make clear how several of
the cognitive traits reviewed help to explain our unique
ability for cumulative culture, as well as the astonishing
technological complexity this has produced (sect. 12). I
show how some traits enable high-fidelity cultural trans-
mission, yielding preservation of traits across successive gen-
erations; and how others, by facilitating individual learning,
further the introduction of new cultural variants, necessary
for incremental change. Given that chimpanzees lack many
of these traits, much of the vast discrepancy between human
and chimp technologies is thereby explained.
2. Hand-eye coordination
Chimpanzees display quite complex manual skills. Byrne
(2004), for example, notes that chimpanzees share with
humans the use of precision grips, asymmetrical and
bimanual tool use, and even strong individual lateralities
(preference for one hand to perform the same task).
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Three lines of evidence, however, support the idea of
superior hand-eye coordination in humans.3 First, more
neural tissue is devoted to the human hand than to the
hand of chimpanzees; chimpanzees have much smaller
amounts of gray matter controlling their limb movements
(MacLarnon 1996) than humans do. This means they face
more difficulties in inhibiting the contraction of muscle
fibers. Instead of a successive and orderly recruitment of
their motor units, chimpanzees are forced to recruit larger
numbers of units at once. As Walker (2009) notes, this lack
of cerebral inhibition endows chimpanzees with a remark-
able strength, at the expense, however, of finemotor control.
The second line of evidence comes from two strands of
brain research. First, Orban and colleagues (2006) identi-
fied a set of functional regions in the dorsal intraparietal
sulcus (IPS) of the human brain that is involved in rep-
resentations of the central visual field and in the extraction
of three-dimensional form from motion. Crucially, these
brain regions were not found in the brains of monkeys.
The regions subserve, the authors conjectured, the
enhanced visual analysis necessary for the precision with
which humans manipulate tools. Second, Stout and Cha-
minade (2007) found that parts of these regions were
indeed recruited when modern human subjects engaged
in Oldowan-like tool making. Importantly, no increased
activation was observed when the human subjects were
asked just to strike cobbles together without intending to
produce flakes. Human dorsal IPS, thus, may allow for
better identification of suitable targets on the core, and
as such, explain in part why humans outperform other
primates in matters of tool use.4
The third line of evidence relates to handedness – a
population-wide preference for one hand, such as the
85–90% right-handedness in the human population (e.g.,
Raymond & Pontier 2004). Although it is true that chim-
panzees exhibit individual and population-level hand
biases for some tasks,5 the fact remains that, in the light
of current evidence, the ratio of right- to left-handedness
is much lower in great apes compared with humans; and
that ambidextrousness is much more common in chimpan-
zee than human populations.6
How do handedness and enhanced hand-eye coordi-
nation relate? There are two plausible ways. First, lateraliza-
tion enhances manual precision. McGrew and Marchant
(1999), for example, observe that exclusively lateralized
chimpanzees are more able termite fishers than are weakly
handed or ambidextrous individuals. Second, handedness
probably facilitates motor coordination in social learning
tasks. When all individuals in a population are handed
alike, a learner can directly copy the model’s hand configur-
ation (i.e., without having to project it to the opposing hand)
(e.g., Michel & Harkins 1985; Uomini 2009).
Summary: Enhanced hand-eye coordination relates to the
fact that (1) in humans, more neural tissue is devoted to the
hands; (2) humans possess brain structures for higher-order
visual analysis, involved in affordance discovery and exploi-
tation; and (3) our species’ handedness makes for higher
manual precision and smoother social learning.
3. Body schema plasticity
To guide actions in space, the brain needs to keep track of
any changes in body shape and posture, and it does so by
updating its representation of the body – aka the body
schema. It long has been suggested that the body
schema is plastic, in the sense that it can incorporate exter-
nal objects.7 A hand-held tool, for example, may become
so familiar to the user that it at least feels as if it is a
natural extension of the hand. The ramifications for tool
use are evident: Better tool assimilations should yield
more fluent tool use. Body schema plasticity, then, might
be another factor making human tool use unique.
Now there is strong evidence that the human brain
indeed can and does represent external aids as belonging
to the body. The evidence comes from (1) crossmodal
interference tasks in healthy humans and from (2)
studies on patients with unilateral spatial neglect or (3)
extinction.8 In all these experiments, subjects were asked
to operate simple tools, such as canes, rakes, and golf
clubs. Interestingly, it appears that tool assimilation is con-
tingent on the functional properties of the tool. Farne` and
colleagues (2005), for example, show that only the effective
length of a tool gets incorporated, not its absolute length.
So, if a 60-cm-long tool has its functional part (say, a hook
for grasping) at 20 cm (making the other 40 cm of the tool
functionally redundant), only the first 20 cm of the tool
gets incorporated.9
Although all of these experiments are fascinating (and in
many cases extraordinarily ingenious), I will not detail
them any further, mainly because body schema plasticity
does not appear to be a distinctively human trait. That is,
tool-using monkeys have also been shown to extend their
body schema when using simple tools. The evidence in
monkeys is in fact even more direct than in humans:
Recordings of neuronal activity in Japanese macaques
indicate that neurons originally picking out stimuli near
the hand may, after just 5 minutes of tool use, come to
respond to stimuli near the tool (Iriki et al. 1996).10
Of course, it still might be that humans outperform
monkeys. For example, the capacity for tool assimilation
might be inborn in humans, whereas a period of training
might be needed to get it expressed in monkeys. In their
review paper, Maravita and Iriki (2004) put forward this
idea as a conjecture; but to the best of my knowledge,
there is no direct evidence confirming it.
Summary: Body schema plasticity might be an important
cognitive trait, even so important that without it, fluent tool
use is not possible. We share the trait with our closest
relatives, however. By implication, we cannot invoke it
to explain what makes human technological abilities
unique.
4. Causal reasoning
Causal understanding involves more than just noticing
(e.g., through trial and error) the covariance between a
cause (e.g., an action with a tool) and an effect (e.g., retrie-
val of a food item). One also needs to infer a mechanism
relating the two – a causal relation explaining the occur-
rence of the covariance (e.g., Ahn et al. 1995; Ahn &
Kalish 2000). Typically, such relations hold more generally
than just in the context of discovery, and they can, there-
fore, once discovered, be exploited more widely. Knowl-
edge that objects always fall under gravity, for example,
is just as applicable to the manufacture and usage of dead-
falls as of water butts and gallows. Are chimpanzees
Vaesen: The cognitive bases of human tool use
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capable of discerning and flexibly putting to use such
general causal principles?
Seminal experiments by Povinelli (2000) and colleagues
suggest that they are not. In one of Povinelli’s experiments,
chimpanzees that were trained to use rakes for food retrie-
val failed to differentiate between functional rakes (made
of stiff tubing) and nonfunctional ones (with their tops
made of a thin strip of flimsy rubber) (see Fig. 1a). In
another, the chimpanzees failed to appreciate that the
food item would fall into a trap before being pulled to
within reach (see Fig. 1b).11 Finally, the animals failed
to see that rakes with tines down were ineffective for
capturing the reward (see Fig. 1c).
An important note: The chimpanzees could learn to avoid
the causally unfavorable conditions. For example, after 25–
125 (!) trials, all but one chimpanzee avoided the table-trap
(in Fig. 1b). Hence, Povinelli’s experiments suggest that
chimpanzees learn about causality (or rather, about cause-
effect covariances) through associative learning (dependent
on contiguity and repetition) rather than through causal
reasoning (i.e., inferring from the presence of a trap that
the table containing the trap should be avoided).
Martin-Ordas and Call (2009) and Seed and colleagues
(2009) qualified and refined these observations. Both
groups of researchers found that chimpanzees could avoid
(often already at the first trial) causally unfavorable con-
ditions in tasks without tools, suggesting that the cognitive
load associatedwith tool use is too high and blocks chimpan-
zees’ ability to properly assess a task’s causal set-up.
Furthermore, Martin-Ordas and colleagues (2008;
2009) examined the extent to which chimpanzees could
transfer their causal knowledge across tasks. Their subjects
consecutively completed different, but functionally equiv-
alent trap tasks (involving a tube-trap, a table-trap, a plat-
form-trap, and a gap-trap). It appeared that performances
across tasks were not robustly correlated, which indicates
that the apes did not make broad generalizations about
the principles governing traps – an intuitive “trap
physics” that can be applied to all kinds of traps.
Interestingly, transfer of causal knowledge across
tasks plausibly depends on two related, yet distinct
cognitive mechanisms.12 The first is inferential causal
reasoning: inferring the cause responsible for an observed
cause-effect covariance (e.g., that this particular kind of
trap causes food rewards to fall beyond reach). The
second is analogical causal reasoning: appreciating that
the causal principles governing this particular kind of
trap are analogous to the principles governing other
kinds of traps. Chimpanzees, the studies above suggest,
face substantial difficulties in both inferential and analogi-
cal causal reasoning tests (although in the case of the
former, only when tools are involved).
Humans, in contrast, are not just very proficient at, but,
in fact, very fond of figuring out how things work.13 From
early on in their lives, they exhibit a remarkable drive for
explanation (e.g., Gopnik 2000; Penn & Povinelli 2007a;
Povinelli & Dunphy-Lelii 2001; Premack & Premack
1994; Visalberghi & Tomasello 1998). If a novel object
behaves somewhat unexpectedly, for example, human
children (from age 3 onward) seek causal explanations;
whereas apes will explore the object in a way identical to
that when exploring any other novel object they come
across (Povinelli & Dunphy-Lelii 2001).
In many cases, humans establish causal inferences by
diagnosing the unexpected outcomes of their goal-directed
actions. Humans intervene nonrandomly in a situation to
find out why anomalies occur; they run “tests” to confirm
or disconfirm their initial hypotheses and updates
thereof (Lagnado et al. 2007). Schulz and colleagues
(2007) ran tests demonstrating that even preschool chil-
dren (mean age: 56 months) can use information from
interventions to distinguish between causal chains
(A B C), common causes (A B C), and inter-
active causal structures (A B C and A C). This
kind of diagnostic learning is, in light of current scientific
evidence, a uniquely human trait.
Intuitively, it is evident in what sense a grasp of causality
has helped Homo faber. The more one knows about the
causes of an event, the more likely that one can intervene
and change the course of nature in one’s own favor. Argu-
ably, no light bulbs, phones, or spacecraft would exist
without the causal relations established in science and
engineering. For the moment, though, I leave the impact
of causal reasoning on the evolution of human technol-
ogies intuitive, discussing it more fully in section 12.1.
What neural mechanisms are responsible for our
capacity for causal reasoning in tool use contexts? In a
short review, Frey (2003) remarks that neuroscience has
largely ignored the question. The author mentions that
to date there are some clues that processing of causal
relations between self, tool, and goal object depends on
higher-level temporal cortex, whereas the use of unfami-
liar tools seems to involve parietal and/or joint parietotem-
poral mechanisms. On a more general level, for contexts
without tools, Roser and colleagues (2005) found that
causal inferential reasoning is likely left-lateralized. Analo-
gical causal reasoning, by comparison, has not been
studied as such. Inasmuch as it is a subtype of a more
general capacity for analogical reasoning, research by
Figure 1. Three tasks used by Povinelli (2000) and colleagues to
test causal reasoning in chimpanzees in the context of tool use. (a)
The flimsy-tool problem, wherein chimpanzees had to choose
between an ineffective rake (tines made of flimsy rubber) and
an effective one (tines made of stiff tubing) to retrieve a food
item. (b) The table-trap problem, in which the chimpanzees
had to choose between pulling a rake that would cause the
food item to fall into a trap (left) or one with which the food
item could be successfully retrieved (right). (c) The inverted-
rake problem, wherein chimpanzees had to choose between an
upright rake and one that had been inverted, making the latter
ineffective for food retrieval. (By permission of Oxford
University Press, Inc.)
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Morrison and colleagues (2004) suggests that it implicates
brain regions related to working memory, inhibitory
control, and semantic memory.
Summary: Causal thought involves both the ability to
infer causal mechanisms relating cause-effect covariances
(i.e., inferential causal reasoning) and the ability to recog-
nize that such mechanisms underpin causally analogous
events (i.e., analogical causal reasoning). Current evidence
suggests that chimpanzees perform rather modestly in
both respects. Humans, in contrast, have a drive for
seeking and generalizing causal explanations, and often
learn about causality through their own diagnostic inter-
ventions – a behavior not yet observed in the great apes.
5. Function representation
Primates do not attach particular functions to particular
objects. For example, when trained to use a certain rake
for food retrieval, a monkey will not stick to it when
alternatives become available (e.g., Cummins-Sebree &
Fragaszy 2005; Hauser 1997). The monkey switches
opportunistically, using for food retrieval whatever it
comes across. Likewise, there is no evidence for perma-
nent function attribution in primates in the wild. After pro-
duction and a one-time usage, chimpanzees typically
discard their tools.14 So instead of creating more perma-
nent function-bearers, primates always manufacture tools
anew and on the fly.
Humans, in contrast, use hammers for hammering, nut-
crackers for nutcracking, cherry pitters for cherry pitting;
and during their lifespan, these tools typically remain for
what they originally were for. Once having conceptualized
a tool as being for a particular purpose, humans find it
even difficult to use a tool for something other than its
designated function – a phenomenon called functional
fixedness.15
A traditional explanation of this phenomenon relies on
associative learning. Repeated exposure to a tool’s design
function causes motor programs associated with that func-
tion to be activated whenever the tool is encountered,
blocking alternative, more creative uses (e.g., Kaplan &
Simon 1990; Smith 1995). As chimps are capable of associ-
ative learning, the fact that functional fixedness occurs in
us and (presumably) not in them just attests to our much
more frequent engagement with technologies.
However, this traditional explanation has difficulties
explaining the observation of Defeyter and German
(2003) that functional fixedness in humans also occurs
without repeated exposure to a tool. Being informed just
once about a tool’s conventional usage is sufficient to
hinder non-conventional usage. From this, the authors
infer the existence of a conceptual system – presumably
unique to humans – for organizing and storing functional
information.16
Additional evidence for such a conceptual system comes
from neuropsychological observations of brain-injured
patients suffering from apraxia – a disorder affecting the
purposeful execution of learned behaviors.17 Fluent tool
use in apraxics may be disrupted in two ways: conceptual
and motoric errors. In the case of conceptual errors,
apraxics perform tool use actions skillfully, but out of
context. A patient may, for example, eat with a toothbrush
and brush his teeth with a spoon (Ochipa et al. 1992). So
although the patient’s relevant motor programs are
intact, he is unable to associate them with the correct func-
tions of toothbrush and spoon. Inversely, in the case of
motoric errors, the patient knows about the function of a
tool, but cannot activate the associated motor program to
use it. For example, she may know that a spoon is for
eating soup yet, when asked to use it for that purpose,
grasp the spoon with the entire hand, instead of exhibiting
the learned finger position associated with spoon use
(Sirigu et al. 1995; also Buxbaum et al. 2003). In con-
clusion, fluent tool use relies on the intactness of two sep-
arate systems: (1) a conceptual system, which stores
information about familiar tools and their usage; and (2)
a production system, representing learned tool use skills.18
It is important to appreciate the relationship between
functional knowledge and causal reasoning (as discussed
in the previous section). Functional knowledge regulates
usage of familiar tools (however causally opaque). If one
encounters a familiar tool – say, a hammer – one can
afford to stop reasoning about its possible uses and
straightforwardly grasp it by its shaft. By so favoring a par-
ticular kind of usage, a functional representation may
hinder causal assessments of situations in which the tool
should be deployed in an atypical way (cf. functional fixed-
ness). The point generalizes: Whenever conditions are
unfamiliar (the tool or the task), the importance of
causal reasoning increases.
Stable function representations plausibly facilitate ease
of (re)use of a much wider diversity of specialized tools.
Furthermore, given that it is general-purpose, functional
knowledge may inform both tool production and usage,
allowing alignment of the two in case they, as is common
nowadays, are divorced.
Summary: There is converging evidence that human
tool use depends on a conceptual system representing
functional knowledge. Nonhuman primates, in contrast,
do not attach particular functions to particular objects,
which hinders (re)use of complex technologies.
6. Executive control
In outline, executive control refers to the voluntary control
over actions. More specifically, executive systems subserve
(1) inhibition, the capacity to suppress current drives (e.g.,
sex) for the attainment of long-term goals (e.g., a nullipar-
ous life); (2) autocuing, the capacity to trigger certain beha-
viors autonomously; that is, in the absence of external
stimuli (e.g., daily taking a contraceptive pill); (3) foresight,
the capacity to form long-term goals (e.g., a nulliparous
life), by prospecting needs other than those experienced
in the immediate present; and (4) monitoring ongoing
action, the capacity to monitor whether actions are
indeed leading to the desired long-term goal (e.g., directing
my attention to the contraceptives on the pharmacy shelf,
away from distractors such as annoying background
music).19 Let me first consider how these four features
bear on human tool use, and then assess the extent to
which nonhuman primates display similar capacities.
According to Wynn (1981; 2002), monitoring ongoing
action must have been present to allow for the emergence
of Acheulean industries, some 1.5 million years ago. An
exemplar of this industry is the Acheulean hand ax, which
is produced by removing several flakes from a core so as
Vaesen: The cognitive bases of human tool use
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to yield a sharpened, standardized, teardrop shape (see
Fig. 2). In a first stage, the basic shape of the tool is achieved
by detaching flakes using a hammer stone. Next, the artifact
is finished by using a soft hammer (from antler, wood, or
bone). While removing the flakes, Wynn argues, early tool-
makers needed to keep in mind the desired end shape and
monitor whether flake removal properly affected the overall
shape of the tool.
A recent neuro-imaging study by Stout and colleagues
(2008) lends some support to Wynn’s hypothesis. Stout
and colleagues found that when modern humans, after
the requisite training, engaged in Acheulean hand ax pro-
duction, regions of ventrolateral prefrontal cortex were
recruited. Increase of activation in these regions was
observed during Acheulean-style, but not Oldowan-style,
tool manufacture, reflecting the higher cognitive
demands of the former. Importantly, these regions of
prefrontal cortex are thought to indeed be involved in
the coordination of ongoing hierarchical action sequences
that are directed toward a higher-order goal (such as flake
removal toward a standardized tool form).
Foresight (and inhibition; see below) is often linked to
the advent of multi-component tools, such as the Levallois
spears of 250,000 years ago (Coolidge & Wynn 2005;
Wynn & Coolidge 2007). The thought is that intermediate
goals (associated with each individual component) have to
be brought into accord prospectively; the stone blade
needs to fit the future wooden handle (or vice versa),
and the binding material needs to fit both. One task (say,
handle production) is put in abeyance (in working
memory) until another (say, blade production) is com-
pleted (Aunger 2010).
If these sorts of multi-step action indeed depend on an
ability for off-line planning, one can expect impairments of
the human executive system to result in an inability to
perform multi-step action. But that does not appear to
hold unambiguously.
Goldenberg and colleagues (2007a), for example,
studied multi-step action in patients with dysexecutive
syndrome, involving the disruption of executive functions
following damage to the frontal lobe. Dysexecutive
patients may exhibit disinhibition of behavior (hence,
produce inappropriate aggression, sexual behavior, and
the like), attentional deficits, perseveration and utilization
behavior, or lack of drive and initiative. The patients,
when given the required items and a set of distractor
items (teabags, a fork, and a bottle of milk), could take
perfectly all steps needed to make coffee with a drip cof-
feemaker. So they managed to bring into alignment
several items (water, water container, coffee, filter, coffee-
pot), each item having its own functional goal. Put differ-
ently, they managed to properly sequence actions with the
relevant items, all to the attainment of an overall goal. The
patients were able to “foresee,” for example, that pouring
in coffee before inserting a filter would not make the plan
work.
On the other hand, the patients did perform poorly on
two other multi-step action tasks. First, they failed on a
pure problem-solving task (i.e., the Tower of London task;
see Fig. 3) – where they had to work out a novel solution
for themselves, rather than falling back on an established
action routine (as in the coffee-making task). The default
way of solving Tower of London problems is not through
trial and error, but by mental planning ahead, indeed a
capacity typically associated with executive function.
Second, patients faced substantial difficulties when
asked to pack both a lunch box and a schoolbag with
items specified by an instruction. Some of the items were
lying on a table; others needed to be retrieved from a
drawer, which also contained distractor items. The chal-
lenge was to keep both assignments in mind while switch-
ing between table and drawer, and while being distracted
by unnecessary items such as toothbrushes and screwdri-
vers. Moreover, in contrast to the coffee-making assign-
ment, the equipment here did not provide an external
reminder of the goal of the task, so that the goal had to
be maintained internally in working memory.
The upshot of Goldenberg’s study is that executive func-
tions are involved in preplanning innovative multi-step
action and in monitoring ongoing action in the absence
of external reminders, but not in the case of routine activi-
ties. Whether the advent of multi-component technologies
really required a capacity for foresight, then, seems to
Figure 2. The production of an Acheulean hand ax. (1), (2) A hard hammer is used to achieve the basic shape of the ax by removing
flakes from both sides of the core. (3) A soft hammer (made of bone, antler, or wood) is used to remove “thinning” flakes to achieve the
final form of the ax. (Figure redrawn from Mithen 1996; courtesy of Lies Mertens.)
Figure 3. The Tower of London task: two initial configurations
(a) and (b) with corresponding target configurations. Two moves
are needed to get from initial configuration (a) to target
configuration (a); four moves are needed to get from initial
configuration (b) to target configuration (b).
Vaesen: The cognitive bases of human tool use
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depend on whether we conceive the event as one of inno-
vation or of slow, haphazard adjustments to a set of estab-
lished tool-making routines (more on this in sect. 12.2).
More convincing evidence of foresight are technologies
such as traps and deadfalls. There one needs to predict
how current actions will affect future events, without the
environment providing immediate cues about how these
events will unfold and without the environment serving
as a reminder about which purposes the actions are sup-
posed to serve (Coolidge & Wynn 2005). Unfortunately,
traps and deadfalls do not preserve well in the archaeolo-
gical record; some authors estimate their occurrence some
12,000 years ago (Bar-Yosef 2002; Moore et al. 2000; both
cited in Coolidge & Wynn 2005).
Usually, planning ahead is successful on the condition
that current drives are ignored. In trap building, for
example, the delay in the reward is compensated for by
the reward’s higher nutritional value. So the trap-builder
must inhibit actions on current appetite and postpone
nourishment until the trap is filled. Likewise, in agricul-
ture, it requires considerable inhibition to not consume
the whole harvest, but save a portion for future planting
instead (Coolidge & Wynn 2005). And finally, the more
time and labor it costs to produce a certain tool, the
more demands put on the inhibitory system (Coolidge &
Wynn 2005).
According to Donald (1993; 1999), just as crucial as inhi-
bition is its inverse: autocuing. Humans can “cue them-
selves” to act in certain ways, ways for which the
environment does not provide any direct stimuli.
Humans can voluntarily activate action schemes, for
example, to engage in deliberate practice. Doing so leads
to greater skill, which in turn allows for more complex
tool use. Rossano (2003) conjectures that because skilled
Acheulean toolmaking requires considerable practice,
the Acheulean industry might provide us with the first
evidence of an early form of autocuing.
How do apes fare with respect to (1) inhibition, (2) auto-
cuing (3) foresight, and (4) monitoring ongoing action? To
start with (2), autocuing has received little attention in the
comparative psychology literature. None of the great apes
has been reported to exhibit deliberate training in the wild,
and no experiments have been conducted to test autocuing
in captive nonhuman primates. So for now, we do not
really know whether nonhuman primates can cue them-
selves to activate learned motor programs, offering them
much broader windows of opportunity for improving skill.
Much more literature is available for (1), (3), and (4).
Regarding (4), Stokes and Byrne (2001) have argued that
chimpanzees engage in complex, flexible hierarchical
action patterns, in a non–tool use context; namely, when
processing leaves of the tree Broussonettia papyrifera.
The authors document that while processing the foods,
the chimpanzees need to monitor the progress they are
making, as different intermediate results may require
different types of follow-up action. The process is best
represented bymeans of a standard decision tree, withmul-
tiple pathways and loops leading to and serving the overall
goal (viz., processed food). In a tool use context, Boesch and
colleagues (2009) have observed something similar: They
found that chimpanzees used five different objects – in
the correct functional order – to obtain honey.
Quite a few studies have recently attempted to find evi-
dence for (1) and (3). The study coming closest to proving
something like inhibition and foresight is by Osvath and
Osvath (2008).20 The authors report on two chimpanzees
and an orangutan that seemed to select a tool (viz., a drink-
ing straw) to retrieve a larger delayed reward (half a liter of
highly favored fruit soup), instead of selecting an instant
smaller reward (a grape). But, as Suddendorf and Corballis
(2009) remark, because the apes went through a substan-
tial training phase, the results can still be explained in
terms of simple associative learning, with the apes’
repeated experience with straw and fruit soup forging a
strong connection between the two. What is more, Sud-
dendorf and Corballis (2009; also, e.g., 1997; 2007)
rightly point out that human foresight and inhibition are
not just a matter of “sitting out” a current desire, biting
the bullet until satiation; human forethought also involves
foreseeing and acting on a future drive, which might be
qualitatively different from current ones (e.g., not drinking
too much wine now, to be fit tomorrow). Because grapes
and fruit soup tap the same desire (viz., hunger), Osvath
and Osvath’s study – supposing for a moment that associ-
ative learning can be excluded – gives at best evidence of
apes being in control of a current drive, not of planning a
future one.
In fact, to have current and future goals diverge, one
must be able to entertain more than two qualitatively
different goals to begin with. Although chimpanzees
certainly have more than one drive (food, mating,
shelter, territorial protection), it is uncontroversial that
the range of goals that chimps pursue pales in comparison
with the range of human goals (e.g., Csibra & Gergely
2007; McGrew 1993). Humans even may take as a goal
the satisfaction of someone else’s anticipated goals –
as happens when one individual produces a tool for
another (often thereby tapping theory of mind abilities;
see sect. 9).
Summary: Executive control is the capacity for (1) inhi-
bition; (2) autocuing; (3) foresight; and (4) monitoring
hierarchically structured, ongoing action. Comparative
evidence for (2) is lacking; humans and chimpanzees
both seem to perform well on (4). In light of current
evidence, however, humans still appear to have unique
abilities for (1) and (3).
7. Social learning
In 1987, Tomasello and colleagues observed that chimps
were able to learn from a model that a T-shaped rake
affords food retrieval, yet ignored the exact way in which
the model operated the rake. Tomasello (1990) took this
to be the characteristic difference in social learning
between apes and humans. Apes are capable of emulation,
reproducing the goal achieved by the model; humans, in
contrast, are imitators, copying not just goals, but also
the means towards them.
Tomasello’s proposal remains controversial (although it
is often presented as settled). The most systematic chal-
lenge comes from a series of experiments conducted by
Whiten and colleagues, three of which are particularly
forceful.
First, Whiten and colleagues (2005; also Horner et al.
2006; Whiten et al. 2007) showed that chimpanzees can
sustain technologies within the population through mech-
anisms of social transmission.21 For example, Whiten et al.
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(2005; 2007) experimentally introduced two different fora-
ging techniques into two different captive groups, by train-
ing one individual of each group then reintroducing it to its
respective group. Under the influence of their local expert,
most chimpanzees adopted the method seeded in their
group. Moreover, even if a chimpanzee individually
learned the alternative foraging technique, it nevertheless
continued to deploy the technique used by most of its
peers; as such, conforming to the cultural norm of the
group.
If emulation is default among chimpanzees, and they
learn about results (emulation) rather than about actions
(imitation), one could expect them to be able to learn
also in the absence of action-information. In a second
study, Whiten and colleagues (Hopper et al. 2007) tested
this hypothesis using ghost conditions; that is, conditions
in which the tool task was not demonstrated by a model,
but rather was performed automatically/mechanically. If
environmental effects are sufficient to learn about a task,
then chimpanzees should be able to perform the task
also after having been exposed to the ghost condition.
This, however, was not observed. Chimpanzees appeared
not to learn in the ghost condition, although they got
skilled after having observed another chimpanzee per-
forming the task. This suggests that the model’s actions
are needed for transmission to ensue.
In a third study, Horner and Whiten (2005) found that
chimpanzees are able to switch between emulative and
imitative strategies. When causal information regarding
the operation of a tool remains opaque, chimpanzees
tend to imitate, as well as copy the causally irrelevant
actions performed by the model. When this causal
information becomes available, though, they emulate,
omitting causally irrelevant behaviors, individually devis-
ing a suitable – and more straightforward – method to
attain the goal attained by the model.
In light of these studies, Tomasello (2009) has recently
qualified his original position. He grants that apes
indeed appear responsive to both goals and means. None-
theless, Tomasello (also Whiten and colleagues, for that
matter) still notes remarkable differences between
chimps and humans, be it in degree rather than in kind.
He rightly notes, for example, that Horner and Whiten’s
observation of imitation/emulation switching in chimpan-
zees contrasts starkly with their observations in human
infants. In particular, Horner and Whiten (2005) report
that infants imitate in the causally opaque condition (like
the chimps), but also in the causally transparent condition
(unlike the chimps). So even when given information
about the irrelevance of an action, human infants copy it;
as such, engaging in what is often called overimitation
(e.g., Hernik & Csibra 2009; Lyons et al. 2007; McGuigan
et al. 2007; Whiten et al. 2009). Given their relative ignor-
ance, it apparently pays children to faithfully copy by
default, correcting errors later in life, once they are
capable of reading the minds of models (see sect. 9), of
being receptive to instruction, and/or of understanding
the causal structure of tool use tasks.22
Two other features are characteristic of human social
learning – although they are more intuitive than corrobo-
rated experimentally. First, humans can socially acquire
not just means, but also a remarkably wide variety of non-
basic goals; that is, goals that are not directly linked to
drives such as food and sex and shelter (piety, a healthy
old age, a unique collection of stamps).23 Social learning
in chimps, in contrast, is typically triggered by the prospect
of one of the not-too-distant goals in the ape’s innate goal
repertoire – usually a food reward. At present, there is
little evidence suggesting that chimps can extend that
repertoire by copying parts of someone else’s.
Second, humans are not just better imitators, they plau-
sibly are better at emulating, too.24 As long as problems are
not too complex, a chimp may try-and-err its way to an
emulated goal state. Higher complexity, however,
increases the range of possibilities for reaching the goal,
making random trial and error ineffective. Humans are
fairly good emulators also in these circumstances. For
many of us, for example, the default way of learning how
to put to use new and complex electronic devices is
through emulation. Instead of carefully carrying out all
steps described in the manual, we are able to infer
proper usage from function – perhaps because our grasp
of causality constrains the range of possible actions we
consider and try out or because we notice analogies with
the usage of other devices (see also sect. 12.1).
Summary: Human social learning is special in three
respects. First, humans start as faithful, nonselective,
default imitators, developing more selective modes of imi-
tation over the years. Second, humans commonly acquire
through social learning not just means, but also a remark-
ably wide variety of nonbasic goals. Third, emulation
learning, too, is plausibly much more powerful in
humans than in the great apes.
8. Teaching
Social learning can moreover be facilitated by a trait not so
much of the imitator as of the model being imitated. More
specifically, learning proceeds more smoothly if the model
has the willingness and a capacity to teach. For example, if
the model actively shows which actions are relevant and
which ones can safely be ignored, the imitator does not
need a causal grasp of the situation to be successful. The
imitator may be ignorant because she is too young, or
because the ultimate causal effects of the action are
opaque. For example, as Csibra and Gergely (2006;
2009) point out, if there is a divorce between the pro-
duction and use of a tool, as in making a tool for a tool,
there are no perceptual rewards that can be used as
immediate clues concerning the relevance of certain
actions.25 From your observation today of someone affixing
a spear point to a shaft by means of a rope, you cannot infer
the action’s relevance for killing a boar tomorrow. In such
circumstances, it helps if the model assists you; for
example, by emphasizing salient actions through rep-
etition, by pointing to the functional features of a tool,
by contrasting proper versus improper usage, and so forth.
For teaching, language is helpful but not requisite.
Before mastering a language, human infants learn a lot
by relying on nonverbal cues (e.g., of their parents):
simple gestures such as pointing or showing objects;
sounds of excitement or disapproval in case of success or
failure; looking for eye contact, gaze shifting and captur-
ing, or redirecting attention (Csibra & Gergely 2006;
2009).
By and large, it is agreed that such active pedagogy
is uniquely human, notwithstanding two isolated
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observations of (supposed) teaching in chimpanzees by
Boesch (1991).26 To be sure, it is common that mother
chimpanzees stimulate their offspring to engage in tool
use (e.g., by leaving stones and nuts in the vicinity of the
anvil), and even facilitate it (e.g., by lending their own pre-
ferred tools to their infants); but active teaching is extre-
mely (!) rare, if existent at all.27
Summary: Human teaching is unique: Until now, no
nonhuman species has been reported to engage systemati-
cally in the kind of active teaching commonly observed in
Homo sapiens.
9. Social intelligence
Here I discuss four profound dependencies between soci-
ality and tool use: (1) heuristics for selecting models for
social learning; (2) theory of mind abilities; (3) contingent
reciprocity; and (4) goal sharing.
Let us start with the first. To avoid adoption of maladap-
tive behavior, social learners should be capable of selecting
as models those individuals that possess adaptive infor-
mation. Humans deploy several heuristics to that end.
These fall into two categories: model-based and fre-
quency-dependent heuristics.28
In the former, particular features of the model are used
to estimate the potential benefits of social learning. As a
copier, one might preferentially select particularly suc-
cessful individuals (inferred from their previous suc-
cesses); particularly prestigious individuals (inferred
from the amount of deference shown to them by other
individuals); or individuals that are simply similar to
oneself (inferred from self- and other-recognition; simi-
larity can work on different criteria, such as similar age,
similar ethnicity, similar dialect, etc.). In all three cases,
social cues are used to select individuals worth learning
from.
The cues of single individuals still might be ambiguous.
So a second set of strategies – namely, frequency-
dependent strategies – exploits information aggregated
over the behavior of many individuals. If most of one’s
group members do X, chances are high that doing X
pays off, given that selective forces are at work in each indi-
vidual of the population. The inverse of this conformity
bias may also occur; namely, when the rarity of a behavior
is used as a cue.
No such biases have been observed in great ape social
learning.29 But that both types of model selection are
potent mechanisms for technological innovation is uncon-
troversial: If individuals in a population are able to select
and learn from the most skilled individuals, ceteris
paribus, the average skill level of the population
increases – stated otherwise, the population as a whole
innovates.
Let us turn to the second sociocognitive trait facilitating
tool use: understanding the mental life of others. Thirty
years of research have not solved Premack and Woodruff’s
(1978) question of whether chimpanzees have a theory
of mind. According to Povinelli and colleagues (Penn &
Povinelli 2007b; Povinelli & Vonk 2003), on the one
hand, evidence is still lacking for something remotely
resembling chimp mental state attribution. According to
Call and Tomasello (2008), on the other, chimpanzees
have in several experiments displayed at least some grasp
of the mental life of others. Notwithstanding that fact,
Call and Tomasello, too, believe that chimpanzees lack
the full-fledged belief-desire psychology of humans.
Theory of mind abilities interact with human tool use in
at least two ways (both hinted at already). First, social
learning of complex tool-using and tool-making activities
is facilitated when the learner understands the model’s
intentions – that is, the model’s motives for executing
some actions yet omitting others (e.g., Cheney & Seyfarth
1990; Tomasello 2000). Theory of mind is one of the plaus-
ible mechanisms involved in the transition from overimita-
tion to selective imitation. Second, theory of mind makes
possible the divorce of tool production and usage.
Making a tool for someone else is contingent on the recog-
nition that the other may need the tool in question. Con-
temporary market research is a good exemplar of how
theory of mind abilities may drive technological change.
The third dependency between sociality and tool use
concerns contingent reciprocity and the way in which it
supports strong divisions of labor, at both kin and non-
kin levels. At kin level, a remarkable feature of humans
is their sexual division of labor. In hunter-gatherers, for
example, one sex is specialized in gathering, the other in
hunting, and the revenues of both are shared to the
benefit of the entire household (Marlowe 2007). Such div-
ision of labor yields a broader and more reliable diet and
an increase of skill level, which in turn leads to greater
foraging success rates.30 In chimpanzees, in contrast,
males and females target different foods but do not
share revenues within the sexual pair bond.
The point, in fact, generalizes: Chimpanzees are reluc-
tant to exchange foodstuffs. Plant food sharing has been
observed only sporadically outside the mother-infant
dyad.31 Male hunting chimpanzees do share meat with
non-kin; but this usually evidences mutualism (in this
case, male allies are given their share; see below) or one-
time pay-for-sex strategies (i.e., swollen females receive a
chop), not specialization or division of labor (e.g., Stanford
2001; Stanford et al. 1994).
Moreover, these redistributions are very local, and
involve only those group members present at the kill.
Bipedalism means that humans can transport gathered
foodstuffs and carcasses, allowing them to develop much
wider exchange networks.32 Also, transportation of food
to more permanent dwellings enables delay of consump-
tion. And when foods can be stored, it starts to pay off to
specialize in food production, because excesses can be
saved for future consumption or future exchange.
Quadrupedal chimpanzees face severe limitations in
this sense: Investments in specialization (say, the pro-
duction of sophisticated weaponry or other tools) can be
brought in balance only with immediate rewards – that
is, immediate consumption or immediate exchange (fol-
lowed by immediate consumption of the exchanged
goods). To make it even worse, chimpanzees also face a
cognitive handicap: Their limited sense of contingent reci-
procity precludes the development of reliable exchange
networks.
Contingent reciprocity occurs when A’s helping of B is
contingent on B’s previous help toA.33 Stevens and
Hauser (2004) discern seven cognitive requirements for
contingent reciprocity (see Table 1). I have already dis-
cussed two of them (i.e., time estimation and temporal dis-
counting) in section 6 (both under the heading of
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inhibitory control). For three of them (i.e., cheater detec-
tion, punishment, and reputation recognition), there is
little to no evidence in nonhuman primates. The last two
are borderline cases: numerical discrimination and
memory. Numerical discrimination – necessary to make
exchanges equitable, for if absent, defectors give back
less than a fair amount – has been observed in all of the
great apes (e.g., Hanus & Call 2007; Tomonaga 2008).34
Regarding memory: Although chimpanzees do have
reliable memories of past interactions with others when
it concerns services such as grooming or support
(especially de Waal 1989; also de Waal 2000; Matsuzawa
2001), such mental score keeping has not been observed
when it concerns exchanging foods for foods (Brosnan
et al. 2009; Melis et al. 2008). Finally, Table 1 contains
an eighth cognitive trait, not mentioned by Stevens and
Hauser (2004), but proposed by Brosnan and Beran
(2009) – namely, empathy. The idea is that reciprocal
exchange is facilitated by an ability to recognize someone
else’s needs, and a willingness to act thereupon. Although
such other-regarding behavior has been reported in chim-
panzees, again it does not come off in food contexts.35
To sum up, expensive investments in tool use will pay off
if one can share or exchange outputs exceeding one’s own
consumption. That, in turn, requires sophisticated mech-
anisms for contingent reciprocity. When limited in this
sense, as is the case with chimps, strong divisions of
labor and highly specialized toolkits are unlikely to evolve.
The fourth and final relation between social intellect
and tool use regards goal sharing – that is, many individ-
uals aligning their goals so as to produce group beneficial
outputs. Many authors invoke such a form of mutualism to
characterize some of the oldest tools found in the archae-
ological record. Toth and Schick (2009), for example, con-
jecture that Oldowan tool production was a social
enterprise, with production sites being used by large
social groups. Acheulean hand axes presumably required
even more social organization. These axes were – at least
according to some – thrown to knock down animals,
after which a group of hunters could club the animal
(Calvin 1990).
But even if Acheulean hand axes testify to a quite soph-
isticated social intellect, they do not yet indicate any super-
iority over nonhuman primates. After all, chimpanzees,
just like humans, strongly cooperate while foraging for
meat (but, unlike humans, typically go hunting unarmed)
(e.g., Boesch 1994; 2002; Boesch & Boesch 1989). The
most salient difference in social behavior between chimp
and human contemporary meat foraging is, according to
Stanford (2001), that humans (unlike chimps) coordinate
hunts with vocal and gestural communication. Therefore,
to the extent that prehistoric hunters can be modeled on
contemporary hunter-gatherers, it would be more
natural to argue that cooperative hunting depends on
improved communicative abilities, rather than on goal
sharing per se.
Better evidence for increased demands on social intelli-
gence would come from technologies that are produced by
many individuals, or from technologies the use of which is
unequivocally more socially involving. One contender is
the colonization of Sahul (or Pleistocene Australia–New
Guinea) some 45,000 years ago. That event arguably
required cooperation in production and usage, of marine
modes of transportation in particular. Another contender
is the decorative use of beads (110 kya), implying early
modes of communication and perhaps even trade. It also
might be that the first multi-component tools already
marked a difference in sociality. That is, it might be that
the first hafted tools (250–200 kya) were produced by
many – each individual responsible for (or even special-
ized in) the production of one component, complementing
one another to achieve a common goal. Indeed, the attain-
ment of that particular common goal would strongly
depend on a careful coordination between team members.
Summary: Four sociocognitive traits in particular are to
the advantage of Homo faber: (1) recognition and assess-
ment of social cues as a proxy for a model’s copy-worthi-
ness; (2) theory of mind abilities, facilitating selective
social learning and the divorce of production and usage;
(3) strong forms of contingent reciprocity, which enable
profound divisions of labor and specialization; and (4)
goal sharing, which helps to distribute the costs of
complex technologies among collectives of individuals.
Our nearest relatives score (much) lower in all four
domains.
10. Language
There are some obvious ways in which language facilitates
advanced tool use: Thanks to language, processes of social
learning and teaching and cooperation proceed far more
efficiently; technological knowledge is more easily pre-
served in linguiform format and therefore can accumulate
over longer periods of time, distributed over larger groups
of individuals; linguistic and other representational arti-
facts (from symbol systems, sketches and books to compu-
ters and models) speed up the cognitive process of
technological innovation; language paves the way for
more symbolic forms of cultural behavior.
Yet, it is far from certain that language was necessary to
make human technologies diverge from those used by our
closest relatives some 2–3 million years ago.36 On the con-
trary, numerous scholars have argued exactly the opposite:
Early advances in human tool use played a causal role in
Table 1. Cognitive requirements for contingent reciprocity
Time estimation See section 6
Cheater detection ?
Punishment ?
Reputation recognition ?
Temporal discounting See section 6
Numerical discrimination Hanus & Call 2007; Tomonaga
2008
Memory de Waal 1989; Matsuzawa 2001
But see Brosnan et al. 2009;
Melis et al. 2008
Empathy de Waal 2006; Warneken &
Tomasello 2006
But see Jensen et al. 2006; Silk
et al. 2005
Note: The second column gives references to reports describing
absence/presence of these requirements in chimpanzees. The
symbol “?” indicates that no systematic data are available.
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the evolution of language. It is this point, rather than the
more mundane contribution of language to modern tool
use, that is widely investigated and debated. This section
sketches the contours of the debate.
Roughly, there are two plausible ways of spelling out
the evolutionary transition from tool use to language.
Sequence A is as follows (e.g., Arbib 2005; Bradshaw &
Nettleton 1982; Corballis 2010; Gibson 1993; Stokoe
2001): (1) Advanced tool use gave good control of arm
and hand; (2) such manual dexterity automatically made
for increased gestural capacity; that is, it was exapted for
communicative purposes; (3) a similar form of fine
control was later applied to oral movements, leading to
speech.37
Arbib (2005) remarks that tool use actually offers an
excellent opportunity for the kind of gestural communi-
cation implied in step 2: When teaching an infant to use
a tool, pantomiming becomes salient (also Rizzolatti &
Arbib 1998). While the infant holds the tool, the model
acts out what the infant is supposed to do. In the panto-
mime, the model performs an action that is instrumental
in origin, but communicative in the context of teaching.
That is, the resources needed to perform the instrumental
act can be simply recruited to engage in communication –
it “just” requires a slightly different mind-set.
Sequence A is mainly inferred from observations of
patients with local left-hemispheric brain lesions, which
at the same time affect linguistic, gestural, and object-
manipulation capacities. Patients suffering from aphasia,
for example, often fail to perform easy actions with tools,
such as unlocking and opening a door (e.g., Kimura
1979); and defective pantomiming (e.g., of tool use) is
almost always associated with language deficits such as
aphasia.38
However, the finding that regions for language and tool
use overlap does not suffice to justify the particular chron-
ology suggested by sequence A. For that, one needs to
make an extra assumption; namely, that gestural communi-
cation indeed preceded vocal communication. It is a plaus-
ible assumption to the extent that one believes that our
closest relatives exhibit greater gestural than vocal
capacities; for under that condition, our common ancestor
must also have possessed better gestural than vocal skill.
The second way of spelling out the transition from tool
use to language draws on the exaptation not so much
of fine motor control as of resources for processing
complex hierarchical structures (e.g., Bradshaw & Nettle-
ton 1982; Gibson 1990; Greenfield 1991; Higuchi et al.
2009). Version B of the causal-temporal sequence, then,
is as follows: (1) Advanced tool use gave humans the
capacity to combine and integrate lower-order elements
(viz., actions) into higher-order units; (2) resources initially
devoted to structuring manual hierarchies were exapted
for linguistic purposes (viz., for combining phonemes
into words, words into meaningful sentences, and so
forth).
Section 6 already discussed (B1). I showed there that
Acheulean toolmaking requires the ability to organize
and execute a sequence of manual operations (viz., differ-
ent sorts of flake removal) in such an order that a higher-
level goal is achieved (viz., a standardized hand ax). Put
differently, the overall action (viz., Acheulean toolmaking)
consists of an ordered set of subactions. A similar hierarch-
ical organization is observed in human languages.
Sentences consist of lower-level units such as clauses,
which also consist of lower-level units such as phrases,
words, and eventually, phonemes.
What (B2) suggests, now, is not just an analogy between
the organizations of tool use and language but a common
origin (with the hierarchical organization of tool use evol-
ving first). Evidence for (B2) comes from three quarters:
developmental studies and lesion and neuro-imaging
studies.
With respect to the first, Greenfield (1978; 1991)
observes remarkable parallels in the development of
skills for organizing manual actions and words. For
example, children start to be able to pair objects (e.g.,
putting a smaller cup in a bigger cup) around the same
time that they learn how to pair words. In a similar vein,
but somewhat later, they develop strategies to combine
more than two objects (e.g., putting a cup in a cup, both
of which are then put in a third, even bigger cup)
around the same time at which they learn how to nest
words into sentence-like structures.
For a proof of common origin, concurrent development
is insufficient, though. It still might be that both types of
organizational skills develop in parallel coincidentally
and are regulated by two separate neurological structures.
Now lesion studies – the second type of evidence for B2 –
complement the developmental data in support of a
common origin. Grossman (1980; reviewed by Greenfield
in Walker 2009), for example, reports on agrammatic
patients with Broca’s aphasia. These patients lack hier-
archical organization in their syntactic production; they
just sequence individual words, without relating them so
as to produce meaningful overarching structures
(phrases, clauses, sentences). Grossman found that
Broca’s aphasics also face substantial difficulties when
reproducing hierarchically ordered drawings, such as
tree structures (like those used to represent genealogies
or phylogenies). He concludes the existence of a
domain-general hierarchical processor, which can be
used to organize both basic linguistic and nonlinguistic
elements into complex constructs.
Finally, neuro-imaging studies in support of (B2) point to
the recruitment of particular regions in Broca’s area during
both tool use and linguistic tasks. Higuchi and colleagues
(2009), for example, found increased activation in Brod-
mann’s area BA44 when subjects manipulated common
tools (scissors, pencils, and chopsticks) and when they
were listening to a narrator reading a Japanese fairy tale.
The perception of the hierarchical structure of a set of utter-
ances (as in the fairy tale comprehension task) therefore
appears to be regulated by the same neural resources gov-
erning the hierarchical organization of manual movements.
Moreover, Higuchi and colleagues (2009) make plausible
on neurological grounds that computational principles for
processing complex hierarchical structure originally
evolved to support tool use and were exapted for grammati-
cal purposes later. Because F5, the region in the monkey
brain thought to be homologous to BA44, is involved in
tool use just as well, and because monkeys lack syntactically
structured language, it is reasonable to think that only
humans have put to use their capacity for hierarchical organ-
ization (subserved by BA44) outside the domain of its origin.
As a final remark, it is noteworthy that sequences A and
B are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, it is likely
that tool use has given rise both to fine gestural/oral
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control and to a capacity for hierarchical organization. Of
course, even if this is right, an important question
remains; namely, whether these two abilities coevolved
(i.e., A and B happening concurrently) or one of them
evolved first, thereby, perhaps, triggering the emergence
of the other.
Summary: Although language has contributed enor-
mously to the sophistication of human technologies, the
prehistoric divergence between humans and other pri-
mates with respect to tool use is most likely not attributable
to linguistic ability. On the contrary, accumulating evi-
dence suggests that human tool use has played a causal
role in the evolution of human language, rather than the
other way around. Still, many of the details of the causal
pathway from tool use to language remain uncertain.
11. Overview
Let me briefly summarize my findings up until here. My
comparison has revealed striking differences between
humans and great apes – roughly, for eight of the nine
cognitive domains discussed (for a more detailed and
balanced assessment, see the overview in Table 2).
Humans benefit from, roughly, better hand-eye coordi-
nation (sect. 2); a unique system for causal thought (sect.
4); a unique system for representing functional knowledge
(sect. 5); remarkable inhibitory control and foresight (sect.
6); a suite of sophisticated social learning strategies (sect.
7); a unique disposition for teaching (sect. 8); increased
social intelligence (sect. 9); and all the fruits of language
(easing social learning and teaching, knowledge preser-
vation, cooperation, innovation, and the like; sect. 10).
Apparently, therefore, human tool use attests to a major
cognitive discontinuity between us and our closest rela-
tives. And relatedly, apparently no individual cognitive
trait can be singled out as the key trait differentiating
humans from other animals. In other words, my overview
should be an antidote to single-trait explanations of
“humaniqueness.”
Bearing this in mind, I now turn to the second part of
the paper. I consider how the cognitive traits discussed
add up, producing the technological complexity character-
istic of our lineage.
12. Cumulative culture and the complexity
of human technologies
The complexity of human technologies is tightly linked to
our remarkable ability for cumulative culture: Humans
have been able to build complex systems by accumulating
modifications over successive generations, gradually
improving on previous achievements.39
Key in recent explanations of this phenomenon is high-
fidelity cultural transmission: Accumulation will take place
when innovations are passed on to subsequent generations
without degenerating too much (e.g., Boyd & Richerson
1985; 1996; Henrich 2004; Henrich & McElreath 2003;
Richerson & Boyd 2005; Tennie et al. 2009; Tomasello
et al. 1993). The thought is intuitive, but not without
problems.
First, there is the classic problem of the Acheulean. The
continuity of Acheulean hand axes on vast scales of time
(1 million years) and space (from Africa to India to
Wales) must have been sustained by very accurate mech-
anisms of cultural transmission (e.g., Lycett & Gowlett
2008; Mithen 1996; 1999; Petraglia et al. 2005; Shipton
2010; Toth & Schick 1993). Yet, there is no clear sense
in which later generations of Acheulean assemblages
built further on previous ones; first signs of genuinely
cumulative culture are found in much more recent
times, with, for example, gradual refinements of pre-
pared-core and multi-component technologies. In light
of this, it is reasonable to suppose that cumulation requires
more than high-fidelity transmission alone.
Second, even if one grants that high-fidelity trans-
mission is just a necessary condition for cumulative
Table 2. Cognitive capacities subserving complex tool use.
Hand-eye coordination
Higher-order visual analysis +
Fine motor control ++
Population-level handedness +
Body schema plasticity ¼
Causal reasoning
Inferential causal reasoning ++
Analogical causal reasoning ++(?)
Diagnostic learning ++(?)
Function representation ++
Executive control
Inhibition ++
Autocuing ?
Foresight ++
Monitoring hierarchical action ¼(?)
Social learning
Imitation +/++
Emulation ++(?)
Social acquisition of goals ++(?)
Teaching ++
Social intelligence
Model selection ++(?)
Theory of mind +/++
Contingent reciprocity
Time estimation ++
Cheater detection ++(?)
Punishment ++(?)
Reputation
recognition
++(?)
Numerical
discrimination
+/++
Memory +/++
Empathy +/++
Goal sharing +/++
Language ++
Note: The symbol “++” indicates that the trait is highly more pro-
nounced in humans than in chimpanzees. The symbol “+ ” indicates
that the trait is more pronounced in humans. The symbol “ ¼ ” indi-
cates similar capacities in humans and in chimpanzees. The symbol
“?” implies that little comparative evidence is available. Symbols
are attributed in light of current scientific evidence; more detailed
explanations are given in the text.
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culture, the question remains of how it is implemented.
Most seem to agree that sophisticated mechanisms for
social learning and active teaching are essential.40
However, these labels also black-box much of the cognitive
machinery implied. The research described in section 7,
for example, suggests that human infants copy more faith-
fully than chimpanzees do when it concerns relatively
simple tasks, such as retrieving food from a box by
means of a stick. But it is doubtful that this basic, and
apparently fairly blind, disposition neatly scales up to
learning much more intricate behaviors of the kind
needed for sustaining incrementally complex technologies.
Rather, it is more likely that other cognitive capacities
need to be added; for example, that causal thought is
part and parcel of human social learning, and hence, of
high-fidelity cultural transmission.
These two issues are addressed below. I reconsider four
cognitive traits that do not directly link to high-fidelity
cultural transmission and show how: (1) by improving indi-
vidual learning, they may complement processes of high-
fidelity transmission (accommodating the insufficiency
objection); (2) by facilitating social learning and/or teach-
ing, they may subserve high-fidelity transmission (accom-
modating the black-box objection). Because at various
points my arguments remain speculative, I also identify a
set of issues in need of empirical validation.
The four traits in question are causal reasoning (as dis-
cussed in sect. 4), executive control (as discussed in sect.
6), and the capacities for contingent reciprocity and for
goal sharing (both discussed in sect. 9).41
12.1. Causal reasoning and cumulative culture
Boyd and Richerson (1995) point out that social learning is
adaptive when social learning makes individual learning
more effective; in particular, if it allows individuals to
learn selectively: individually, if cheap and accurate;
socially, if individual learning is difficult and error-prone.
By implication, for cumulation to take place, individual
learning costs must remain low. If not, all will switch to
social learning – everyone imitating everyone – with cul-
tural stasis or decline as a result.
Consider now the assumption that individual learning
costs increase proportionally to the complexity of technol-
ogies. Indeed, labor-intensive technologies quite plausibly
raise the costs of, for example, individual random trial-
and-error learning. Whereas a one-minute experiment
(say, in Oldowan flake production) may be excusable,
executing month-long random trials (say, in boat pro-
duction) is a cost that no single individual should be
willing to bear. Likewise, the causal structure of a technol-
ogy can be so intricate that the likelihood of success of a
random adjustment approaches nil. So even if an individ-
ual is prepared to spend her valuable resources on arbi-
trary interventions, her result will almost always be
inferior to that obtained through social learning. Even-
tually, that strategy is the one she adopts, and cumulation
comes to a halt.
So if I am right, the accumulation of complexity is con-
strained by the cost-effectiveness of individual learning
strategies.42 At some level of complexity, more sophisti-
cation in individual (rather than social) learning is required
to produce further complexity.
How can, in the face of accruing complexity, the cost of
individual learning be reduced? A capacity for causal
reasoning helps, for it makes individual learning targeted.
Causal thought allows individuals to consider and learn
directly about the salient features of a problem, not
wasting resources on the limitless array of irrelevant
factors. Suppose a particular deadfall is effective for catch-
ing small amphibians (e.g., frogs). One can easily learn how
to apply the deadfall to larger animals (e.g., rabbits) – if one
appreciates that it is the deadfall’s dimensions and bait,
rather than its operational principles, that are in need of
experimentation. Rather than random and difficult, individ-
ual learning gets targeted and affordable.
Even if early technologies owed little to scientific
theory, and they are consistent with being the product of
trial and error, the kind of trial and error involved was
plausibly reasoned rather than random: Given a folk
understanding of the reasons for success or failure of an
action, some interventions were tried, but not others.
Causes inferred from diagnostic learning and causal analo-
gies (e.g., that hafts are useful not just for spades, but also
for rakes and hoes) were brought to bear in order to struc-
ture and delineate ill-structured design problems and
spaces. This happened even more so towards the late
18th century, when science really began to have an influ-
ence on technology (although it is true that science is
not a good example of strict individual learning; but
more on this in sect. 12.3) (Mokyr 2002; Wolpert 2003).
We do not know whether by boosting individual learn-
ing, an improved grasp of causality forced the deadlock
of the Acheulean. For what it is worth, by the time cumu-
lative culture really got off the ground (say, in the Middle
Stone Age), human brain size had increased substantially
(e.g., Rightmire 2004). Yet, whether this improved our
causal reasoning capacities is uncertain, especially given
our uncertainties regarding the neural mechanisms under-
lying causal thought (see my discussion in sect. 4).
Fortunately, my argument is general enough not to
suffer from our ignorance about the precise whenabouts
of the evolution of causal thought. If increased complexity
indeed discourages individual learning, and a capacity for
causal thought can ease the burden of such learning, then
causal thought (whenever it emerged) is a plausible expla-
nans for why cumulative culture evolved so markedly in
humans and so modestly in apes.
Apart from reducing individual learning costs, causal
reasoning abilities may also positively affect social learn-
ing. In particular, causal reasoning may facilitate: emula-
tion learning (e.g., when putting to use a new device
without consulting the user’s manual, or when reverse-
engineering)43; selective imitation (i.e., copying only cau-
sally salient actions) (e.g., Want & Harris 2001); and
proper model selection (e.g., copy X’s doing of Y,
because X’s success is attributable to her doing of Y).
12.1.1. Outstanding questions.
1. Almost all studies concerning inferential causal
reasoning, analogical causal reasoning, and diagnostic
learning use only Westerners as human subjects.44 Are
these forms of causal thought universal and observable
cross-culturally?
2. Can the intuitive link between causal thought and
individual inventiveness be empirically validated?
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3. Although inferential causal reasoning in chimpan-
zees has received considerable attention, how do chimpan-
zees fare with respect to analogical causal reasoning and
(especially) diagnostic learning?
4. To what extent does causal thought smooth social
learning – in any of the three ways described above?
12.2. Executive control and cumulative culture
Improved executive control may positively affect cumulative
culture in four ways. First, it may facilitate social learning.
On this hypothesis, social learning of complex action
sequences requires extra resources for representing inter-
actions with the model; the social learner must inhibit her
current drives longer, pay attention to the model’s relevant
behaviors only, and put into accord various actions (past,
current, and future) of both model and herself.45 To the
best of my knowledge, no one has systematically addressed
the impact of executive functions on social learning.
Second, improved executive functions may contribute
to cumulative culture by lowering the costs of individual
learning. The study of Goldenberg and colleagues
(2007a; discussed in sect. 6) lends some support to this
thought, for the authors show that dysexecutive patients
perform poorly on innovative tasks, such as Tower of
London tasks. For this sort of problem solving, Golden-
berg and colleagues argue, it is apparently necessary to
mentally plan ahead the steps to take. On this account,
executive control would lower individual learning costs
in largely the same way as causal reasoning does: by
making individual learning reasoned rather than random.
Innovation is easy for farsighted individuals, cumbersome
for the arbitrary trial-and-error learner.
Third, better executive control may allow the represen-
tation of increasingly complex behaviors (however
learned). But, as explained in section 6, this idea is ques-
tioned by the finding of Goldenberg and colleagues
(2007a) that dysexecutive patients are able to execute
quite complex routine action sequences (such as making
coffee with a drip coffeemaker). Perhaps even more
complex routine tasks put higher demands on executive
functions; those not involving external reminders are
likely to. At any rate, the relationship between executive
control and complex action representation, however intui-
tive, has not been established yet.46
Fourth, inhibition of immediate drives makes room for
other motives, and those are remarkably diverse in
humans. Two nonbasic motivations in particular can be
expected to act on cumulative culture: the motivation to
be like others, and conversely, the motivation to be
unlike others (better than, different from). These act in
opposite directions: the former furthering conformity
and preservation of traits, the latter promoting compe-
tition and the introduction of new cultural variants. The
former has been claimed to be characteristic of small-
scale egalitarian societies (or of humanity, even) (e.g.,
Henrich & McElreath 2003); the latter is usually associ-
ated with modern cultures valuing personal achievement
and the strive for excellence (e.g., McClelland 1985).
The speed of technological progress in capitalist societies
since the Industrial Revolution seems to indeed be corre-
lated with motivations to excel and outperform others.
True, the rapid spread of many of our inventions may
well attest to strong norms of conformity; their enormous
diversity is more consistent with pronounced motivations
not to be like others.
Incidentally, as was the case for causal thought, it is
unknown whether improved executive functions, in any
of the four ways described above, were implied in the
Acheulean–Middle Stone Age transition.
12.2.1. Outstanding questions.
1. Does social learning of complex behaviors really
increase the demands on executive functions? (For
example, does dysexecutive syndrome affect social learning?)
2. Goal maintenance and planning ahead appear to be
critical for innovative tasks, such as solving Tower of
London problems. Does the same hold for other innova-
tive acts, especially those involving tools?
3. Models of cultural evolution have largely ignored the
effects of nonconformity.47 Questions related to nonconfor-
mity include: How do individual achievement motives
favor individual learning? Increase variation? Speed up inno-
vation rates? How does the resulting competition affect
cumulation?48
12.3. Social intelligence and cumulative culture
Section 9 discussed four sociocognitive skills: (1) heuristics
for assessing a model’s imitation-worthiness; (2) theory of
mind abilities; (3) strong forms of contingent reciprocity;
and (4) goal sharing. Cultural evolution theory has
amply discussed the effects on cumulative culture of the
former two. In this section, I consider the role of the
latter two.
12.3.1. Contingent reciprocity. Contingent reciprocity
supports cumulative culture, first, by allowing nonvertical
modes of social learning and, second (again), by lowering
individual learning costs.
First, when active teaching is involved, nonvertical
modes of social learning are more difficult to establish
than are vertical transmission modes. As teachers have
no genetic interest in helping non-kin apprentices, their
help is dependent on other forms of return on investment.
These may be indirect (e.g., increasing the teacher’s pres-
tige) or direct (e.g., receiving favors from the apprentice or
apprentice’s close kin). In the case of the latter, mechan-
isms for contingent reciprocity seem crucial.
There is much discussion about how important nonver-
tical modes of transmission have been in initiating human
cumulative culture.49 On the other hand, the role of
oblique and horizontal transmission in sustaining cumulat-
ive processes, especially in the modern era, is undeni-
able.50 Equally undeniable is the role of contingent
reciprocity in it – teaching has become an economic
good, just like butter and bread.
Second, the effect of contingent reciprocity on individ-
ual learning relates to the fact that contingent reciprocity
supports strong divisions of labor, also when learning is
concerned. Consider, for example, a subsistence farmer
who tries to learn individually which crop to plant.51 The
crop’s eventual yield is dependent on numerous factors
(e.g., climatic variations, soil conditions, pests), not just
crop choice; so the farmer would need to experiment
quite a bit before knowing which crop truly is best.
Because she is unlikely to be willing to bear the costs of
these experiments alone, she can be expected to just
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plant whatever crop other farmers plant(ed). Other
farmers, too, will prefer social learning over individual
efforts, and cumulation will come to a halt.
The stalemate can be broken if the farmer’s learning
costs are distributed: that is, if the farmer spends her
resources on optimizing crop choice while others carry
out the remaining tasks in return. The farmer specializes
in farming, others in weaving rugs, baking pottery, grind-
ing flour, and so forth. Goods are exchanged, and cumu-
lation occurs in all domains. Unlike causal thought and
executive control, contingent reciprocity thus lowers indi-
vidual learning costs relatively rather than absolutely:
Instead of making individual learning less laborious, con-
tingent reciprocity ensures the labor of learning does not
preclude the satisfaction of the other necessities of life.
There are some intuitive interconnections between con-
tingent reciprocity, on the one hand, and causal thought
and executive control, on the other. Contingent reciprocity
makes teaching profitable. The effect of teaching on cumu-
lative culture, in turn, can be expected to increase if the
teaching not only transmits certain domain-specific skills
(as in traditional transmissions of crafts), but also promotes
capacities for individual learning (e.g., by passing on
domain-general causal knowledge; see sect. 12.1) and
motivates learners to put these capacities to use (e.g., by
insisting on virtues of personal achievement and, popular
since the Enlightenment, of thinking for oneself; see
sect. 12.2). These reinforcement relations, however, still
lack empirical and/or model-theoretic bite.
12.3.2. Goal sharing. Individual learning costs can be dis-
tributed in yet another way: by, as it were, making individ-
ual learning social. Now several individuals bundle their
efforts to produce group-beneficial learning outputs.
Cognitively speaking, the individuals display goal sharing
in a learning context.
Several farmers, for example, may invest in a small, col-
lective experimental patch of land where they can try out
different crop varieties. The outcome of these experiments
is to the benefit of the collective; each group member
can now plant the crop the group jointly has identified as
best.
At a certain level of behavioral complexity, individual
specialization insufficiently reduces individual learning
costs, and joint learning strategies (of the sort just
described) need to arise for adding further complexity.
Take, for example, the fairly modest transition from CD
to DVD technologies. Even this small incremental
improvement was initially the product of a joint effort of
four major electronics corporations. Later, the technology
was developed further by an even much larger consortium,
the DVD Forum, consisting of 195 member companies in
2007. In other words, no single individual could have
invented the DVD, even if, as cultural evolution theorists
are fond of stressing, much of the work had been already
done by previous generations.
As said (see Note 50), we don’t know whether the evol-
ution of nonvertical modes of transmission terminated the
Lower Paleolithic, nor whether the evolution of joint
learning had anything to do with it.
12.3.3. Outstanding questions
1. What are the conditions under which costly, nonver-
tical modes of teaching evolve? Which of the cognitive
presuppositions of contingent reciprocity (see Table 1)
can be expected to be crucial?
2. Cultural evolution theory has studied the precondi-
tions, interactions, and effects of individual and social
learning. What are the preconditions and effects of joint
learning strategies, and their interactions with individual
and social learning strategies?52
13. Conclusion
Only human animals have been able to produce complex
technologies such as wireless communication networks,
satellite-driven navigation systems, and devices for
arthroscopic and nanobot surgery. I have shown that this
remarkable feature reflects a profound discontinuity
between us and nonhuman primates in matters of social
and non-social intelligence. And I have explained, albeit
tentatively, in what sense our social and non-social cogni-
tive sophistication has contributed to the technological
accumulation characteristic of our species.
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NOTES
1. For reasons of space, and because tool use has been studied
in primates more extensively than in other species, the contrast
class for humans will be chimpanzees (and on some occasions,
the broader class of primates). I agree that future research
should determine whether similar conclusions can be drawn
for, for example, crows, finches, dolphins, otters, and elephants.
Furthermore, my list of cognitive traits reflects my individual
judgment and discretion. My selection was mainly guided by
research in the cognitive sciences: Only traits that received
marked attention there made it to the list. Although my overview
may not be exhaustive, I believe it is fairly representative for what
we currently know about the cognitive bases of tool use.
2. Several authors have claimed to have found the humanique
trait. For an elegant overview, plus forceful counterargument,
see Penn et al. (2008).
3. Some believe that the inability of Kanzi (the world-star
bonobo; see Toth & Schick 1993) to produce proper Oldowan
flakes proves enhanced hand-eye coordination in humans. I
think that the experiments on Kanzi prove very little: first,
because of the peculiar incentive structure of the experiments;
and second, because simple biomechanical explanations may
suffice to explain its underperformance.
4. Some methodological concerns: (1) The study of Orban
et al. (2006) was conducted on rhesus monkeys, not chimpanzees;
(2) the study of Stout and Chaminade (2007) was conducted (evi-
dently) on modern humans, so inferences about the role of dorsal
IPS in early tool users should be made with care.
5. Population-level right-hand biases have been reported in
the wild for, for example, drinking water and nutcracking (Biro
et al. 2006), termite fishing (Lonsdorf & Hopkins 2005), and
ant dipping and extraction of palm heart (Humle & Matsuzawa
2009).
6. See the meta-analysis performed by Hopkins (2006).
7. Here is how Head and Holmes put it, as early as 1911:
“Anything which participates in the conscious movement of our
bodies is added to the model of ourselves and becomes part of
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those schemata: a woman’s power of localization may extend to
the feather of her hat.”
8. For (1): see, for example, Maravita et al. (2002). For (2):
see, for example, Berti and Frassinetti (2000). For (3): see, for
example, Farne` and La`davas (2000) and Maravita et al. (2001).
For an overview, see Maravita and Iriki (2004).
9. For a similar point, relying on a different kind of exper-
iment, see Holmes et al. (2004).
10. For a study showing profound similarities between human
and chimpanzee tool integration, see Povinelli et al. (2010).
11. The use of traps to test for animal causal knowledge was
introduced first by Visalberghi and Limongelli (1994).
12. This is observed both by Martin-Ordas and colleagues
(Martin-Ordas et al. 2008; Martin-Ordas and Call 2009) and by
Penn and Povinelli (2007a).
13. For a recent overview of the literature, see Keil (2011).
14. See, for example, Boesch and Boesch (1984) andMcGrew
(1992); for a rare report of tool reuse, see Carvalho et al. (2009).
Hunt (2006) observes a link between chimpanzee quadrupedal-
ism and the limited complexity and durability of chimp tools.
Because chimpanzees feed arboreally and, when on the
ground, use their hands to walk, they have difficulties carrying
both the tools they previously made and the excess in foodstuffs
resulting from their tool use. In light of this, investments in
complex and durable tools simply do not pay off.
15. The phenomenon was first described by Duncker (1945).
Evidence for the universality of the trait is presented by German
and Barrett (2005).
16. For the uniqueness of the trait, see also Casler and
Kelemen (2005).
17. For a useful overview, see Frey (2004).
18. For neurological evidence, again see Frey (2004); for a
recent follow-up study, see Goldenberg and Spatt (2009). The
sizable literature on function representation contrasts with how
little is known about the storage of learned behaviors, such as
tool use skills (Frey 2007). The existence of such a production-
level storage system in humans and other primates is indubitable;
what remains uncertain, however, is in which respects (if at all)
the human production-level system differs from that of nonhu-
man primates. To be clear, the question is not whether humans
acquire many more technical skills than nonhuman primates
do, because that fact is trivially true. Rather, the question
is whether our large skill repertoire really requires extra
cognitive/neural innovations; perhaps having a larger brain
simply suffices (Gibson 2007).
19. On many an occasion, inhibition, autocuing, foresight, and
monitoring ongoing action overlap. For example, when acting on a
plan for the long-term future (foresight), I often suppress actions
on current needs (inhibition) while keeping track of the things
that I am actually doing to bring the future state about (monitor-
ing). For present purposes, however, the four categories are con-
venient to be used to structure the wide variety of studies and
hypotheses concerning executive control and human tool use.
20. Other primate studies concerning forethought include
Mulcahy and Call (2006b) and Naqshbandi and Roberts
(2006). For planning in birds, see Raby et al. (2007).
21. For an earlier suggestion of imitation among chimpan-
zees, see Whiten et al. (1996).
22. The precise developmental trajectory of selective imita-
tion remains unclear. Some suggest selectivity already around
the age of 14 months (see, e.g., Gergely et al. 2002); others
suggest that infants do not imitate (let alone, selectively) until
their second year (e.g., Jones 2007; for a useful overview, see
Jones 2009).
23. For a similar suggestion, see, for example, Csibra and
Gergely (2007) and McGrew (1993).
24. Laland and Hoppitt (2003) briefly consider the possibility
that emulation rather than imitation is the default means of infor-
mation transmission in humans.
25. A similar suggestion is made by Aunger (2010).
26. Boesch reports two independent, unreplicated cases of a
mother chimpanzee demonstrating the use of a stone for cracking
a nut. For a set of alternative interpretations of Boesch’s obser-
vations, see Tomasello (1994).
27. For a description of stimulation and facilitation in chim-
panzees, again see Boesch (1991).
28. See the overview by Henrich andMcElreath (2003). For a
review of empirical research on model selection heuristics, see
Mesoudi (2009).
29. Two exceptions may seem Horner et al. (2010) and
Whiten et al. (2005). Yet, these studies define conformity and
prestige differently to how Boyd, Richerson, and Henrich
define them. Whiten et al. (2005) define conformity as simply
doing what other group members are doing; whereas Boyd,
Richerson, and Henrich define it as being disproportionately
more likely to copy the most common behavior (compared with
copying at random). Horner et al. (2010) equate “prestige” with
dominance; whereas Henrich and Gil-White (2001) make a
clear distinction between prestige and dominance, the latter
based on ability to coerce and fight (found in many species),
the former based on deference and knowledge (found only in
humans).
30. An alternative interpretation is that men engage in
hunting for other, less noble reasons – that is, they hunt to
signal their quality to potential mates. Marlowe’s cross-cultural
study, however, contradicts this interpretation.
31. Two reports of wild fruit sharing are Nakamura and Itoh
(2001) and Slocombe and Newton-Fisher (2005). Hockings
et al. (2007) conjecture that lack of wild fruit sharing does not
reflect a lack of willingness to share, but rather the fact that the
wild fruits that chimpanzees harvest are too small to be shared.
The authors base their hypothesis on the observation that chim-
panzees share more when large cultivated fruits are available.
For sharing plant foods in captivity, see, for example, de Waal
(1989).
32. In The Descent of Man, Darwin already remarked on the
importance of bipedalism in the explanation of human distinct-
ness. But, to be clear, bipedalism appeared some 312 million
years before the first stone tools. Hence, bipedalism is at best a
necessary condition for complex tool use.
33. In addition to contingent reciprocity, de Waal (2000) dis-
cerns two lower forms of reciprocity: symmetry-based reciprocity
(based on symmetries inherent to dyadic relationships; e.g.,
kinship) and attitudinal reciprocity (reciprocating positive atti-
tudes, without exact accounting of favors given and received).
These have been documented among chimpanzees (for an over-
view, see Brosnan & deWaal 2002); whereas evidence for contin-
gent reciprocity in chimpanzees remains scarce. For early,
theoretical treatments of contingent reciprocity (labeled “direct
reciprocity” there), see Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) and
Trivers (1971). Direct reciprocity contrasts most naturally with
indirect reciprocity; for example, A helping B because of B’s
reputation to be generally helpful to others (Nowak & Sigmund
2005).
34. For a review of symbolic numerical competences in chim-
panzees, see Matsuzawa (2009).
35. For evidence of other-regarding behavior in chimps, see,
for example, de Waal (2006) and Warneken and Tomasello
(2006). For absence of other-regarding behavior in food contexts
in chimps: see, for example, Jensen et al. (2006) and Silk et al.
(2005). See also the discussion on teaching, in section 8.
36. I here just assume, uncontroversially, a vast discrepancy
between human and chimp linguistic abilities. For an insightful
overview, see Premack (2004).
37. Calvin (1993) explains why it is not strange to think that
the neural machinery for moving the hand may affect capacities
to move the mouth. Although it is true that hand and mouth
are represented in different compartments of the motor cortex,
fine control is more a matter of preparing movements in the pre-
motor and prefrontal cortex. Fine motor control, in other words,
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is more domain-general (i.e., applicable to hand and mouth)
than the prima facie independence of hand and mouth might
suggest.
38. For an overview, see Kempler (1993). For more recent
treatments, see Goldenberg et al. (2007b) and Kro´liczak and
Frey (2009).
39. Even though cumulation has been observed in nonhuman
species, it remains fairly modest (see Whiten et al. 2003 for a
detailed overview).
40. Social learning and teaching, in turn, are likely facilitated
by bipedalism and good hand-eye coordination (see sect. 2).
41. I leave out theory of mind and language in my discussion
not because I think they are unimportant, but because their
importance has been claimed by so numerous authors before.
Instead, I focus on traits the impact of which is less debated
but, as I hope to show, far-reaching nonetheless.
42. For a similar observation, including empirical and
model-theoretic support, see Mesoudi (2011). His and my
observations are similar to, yet different from, those of McEl-
reath (2010). McElreath suggests that individual learning
must be sufficiently developed to get cumulation started.
Mesoudi and I suggest a further step: Once started, the cumu-
lative process will come to a halt without further investments in
individual learning.
43. Experiments by Caldwell and Millen (2008) indicate, ten-
tatively, that cumulative effects may also occur in humans when
they are given opportunities for emulation only. Caldwell and
Millen simulated generational succession by repeatedly removing
and replacing participants while giving them simple tasks, such as
building paper planes. Planes of later generations flew signifi-
cantly farther than those constructed by earlier generations,
even if participants could learn through emulation only; that is,
by being given the opportunity to inspect just the planes, not
the actions of their makers.
44. This is, in fact, a general shortcoming of studies in the be-
havioral sciences, as Henrich et al. (2010) point out. Exploratory
papers concerning causal thought across cultures are Lewis
(1995), Morris et al. (1995), and Norenzayan and Nisbett (2000).
45. Of course, similar requirements could hold for those indi-
viduals involved in active teaching.
46. Incidentally, conceptual systems such as those discussed
in section 5 may also be involved in more complex action rep-
resentations. The functional information stored there provides
a shortcut to proper usage; coffeepot, filter, water container,
and so forth, can be put to use forthwith, without prior trial-
and-error investigation.
47. The existence (rather than the effects) of conformity and
nonconformity biases has been studied fairly extensively; for a
useful overview, see Mesoudi (2009). For the idea that confor-
mity is not default in social learning, see, for example, Efferson
et al. (2008) and Mesoudi (2011).
48. Attempts to model competition between cultural variants
are found in evolutionary economics; see, for example, Saviotti
(1996) and Saviotti and Metcalfe (1984).
49. There seems to be considerable agreement that vertical
transmission dominated the Acheulean (see, e.g., Mithen 1994;
Shennan & Steele 1999; but see Lycett & Gowlett 2008).
Much more disagreement exists about what happened next.
Richerson and Boyd (2005; 2008) believe that nonvertical trans-
mission evolved towards the end of the Pliocene; Shennan and
Steele (1999) argue that for complex skills, such as tool-related
crafts, vertical transmission has remained dominant, likely until
the modern era.
50. This is consistent with models of Henrich’s showing that
complex skills may get lost if populations display low social inter-
connectedness – for example, when individuals learn only from
their parents (Henrich 2009). If populations are highly intercon-
nected, inventions spread more widely, and as such, are better
secured against loss through inaccurate transmission or acciden-
tal loss of the best models in the population. Notably, the more
complex the skill in question, the more interconnectedness is
needed to sustain and improve it. Henrich (2004; 2009) also
shows that population size matters; a similar result is obtained
by Powell et al. (2009). These arguments, however, should not
be interpreted as showing that population size alone is sufficient
for cumulative culture, for they presuppose mechanisms of non-
vertical transmission. So population size can have its effect on the
condition that certain cognitive capacities (such as contingent
reciprocity) are in place.
51. The example is drawn from Henrich (2002) and Sterelny
(2006).
52. Work in evolutionary economics and organization theory
may serve as a source of inspiration here. For a useful review cov-
ering relevant findings in both fields of study, see Dodgson
(1993).
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Abstract: We examine tool use in relation to the capacity of animals for
construction, contrasting tools and nests; place human tool use in a more
general problem-solving context, revisiting the body schema in the
process; and relate the evolution of language and of tool use.
Tools versus nests.Many creatures can use tools of a specific
kind, and in some cases, even make them, as do New Caledonian
crows (Hunt 1996; Weir et al. 2002). Lefebvre et al. (2002) con-
clude that the complex cognitive processes involved in tool use
may have independently co-evolved with large brains in
several orders of corvine and passerine birds. Nonetheless, it
seems to me that nest building by birds is even more impressive
than their tool making is; and indeed, Hansell & Ruxton (2008)
urge that we view tool behaviors as a limited subclass of con-
struction behavior. Nest building in birds has been a key
driver of habitat diversification and speciation in these groups
(Collias 1997; Hansell 2000). It is therefore intriguing that
Stewart et al. (2011) show that re-use of specific nest sites by
savanna chimpanzees may be a result of “niche construction”
(Iriki & Taoka (2012) Laland et al. 2000) through formation of
good building sites within trees. They speculate that environ-
mental modification through construction behavior may have
influenced both chimpanzee and early hominin ranging by
leaving behind recognizable patterns of artifact deposition
across the landscape.
Human tool use in construction. Let us shift attention from
“using a tool” to the ability to deploy multiple tools to solve a
problem. To join a piece of wood to the wall, I may employ a
screw of sufficient length plus a screwdriver or a nail and
hammer. I may also employ a stud finder, but if I need to affix
an object where there is no stud, I deploy a rawlplug, a drill,
and a hammer to prepare for the screw. For household repair,
I may deploy these tools and more to solve a truly novel
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problem by breaking it down into subproblems for which I have
routine solutions. Or I may call in a handyman, thanks to the
great specialization within human society and the social construc-
tion of monetary incentives.
An etymological detour to the Oxford English Dictionary: The
word handiwork (“a thing made by the hands”) comes from the
Old English hand+ geweorc. As geweorc ≈ iwork did not
survive in Middle English, hand-iwerc was reanalyzed as a com-
pound of werc with handi. Handi was eventually treated as an
adjective, handy, meaning “of, or done by, the hand” when
used in new compounds – including handy-man. The point
here is that the refined shape and controllability of the human
hand must be complemented by many changes in the brain to
yield “handyness.” Of the nine cognitive capacities listed by
Vaesen, only three – enhanced hand-eye coordination, body
schema plasticity, and function representation – relate directly
to using a tool for its intended purpose. Two – causal reasoning
and executive control – relate not so much to tool use as to the
more general skill of problem solving (of which construction,
with or without tool use, is a crucial subcase). The remainder –
social learning, teaching, social intelligence, and language – all
relate to social interaction in general or the transfer of skills
in particular, whether or not they involve tool use.
Vaesen argues that only one of these nine capacities, body
schema plasticity, cannot be invoked to explain what makes
human technological abilities unique as “we share the trait with
our closest relatives.” However, the issue is not whether the
body schema can be extended, possibly by extensive shaping as
in monkeys (Iriki et al. 1996; Umilta` et al. 2008). Rather it is
(in part) the uniquely human rapidity and flexibility with which
different extensions of the body schema can be deployed in
some overall task, switching back and forth between using
some part of the body or some part of a tool as the end-effector
for the current action (Arbib et al. 2009).
Language. Vaesen distinguishes two routes from tool use to
language:
Advanced tool use promoted manual dexterity that was exapted
for communicative purposes; a similar form of fine control
was later applied to oral movements, leading to speech.
Advanced tool use gave humans the capacity to combine
and integrate lower-order actions into higher-order
units; resources initially devoted to structuring manual
hierarchies were exapted for linguistic purposes.
and cites the mirror system hypothesis (Arbib 2005) as an example
of the former. However, the actual theory overlaps both andmakes
no appeal to advanced tool use. Rather, it stresses complex imita-
tion, the ability to recognize and imitate combinations of actions
used to reach a perceived goal, together with variations on
known actions. Recently, inspired by Stout’s (2011) essay on
stone toolmaking and the evolution of human culture and cogni-
tion, I developed a scenario (still in rather rudimentary form) in
which complex imitation underwrites the co-evolution of language
and toolmaking, with neither required to reach a critical complex-
ity to initiate the evolution of the other (Arbib 2011; a somewhat
modified account appears in Arbib 2012). In this regard, it is
useful to think of the grammar of a language not as a very
general set of syntactic rules but rather as involving a large
number of constructions that provide tools for assembling words
hierarchically to meet the communicative goals of both familiar
and novel social situations (Arbib & Lee 2008; Croft 2001;
Goldberg 2003; Kemmerer 2006; Verhagen 2005).
Conclusion. Vaesen closes his article by saying that he has
“explained, albeit tentatively, in what sense our social and non-
social cognitive sophistication has contributed to the technologi-
cal accumulation characteristic of our species” (sect. 13).
Notably, the direction here – from social and non-social cogni-
tive sophistication to technological accumulation – does not
privilege tool use as the driver for human exceptionalism, and
therefore challenges us in our evolutionary thinking to consider
the diverse interactions that must have driven the evolution of
these capacities singly and in tandem.
Evidence of recursion in tool use
doi:10.1017/S0140525X11001865
Lluı´s Barcelo´-Coblijn and Antoni Gomila
Human Evolution and Cognition Group, University of the Balearic Islands,
07122 Palma.
toni.gomila@uib.cat lluis.barcelo@uib.cat http://evocog.org/
Abstract: We discuss the discovery of technologies involving knotted
netting, such as textiles, basketry, and cordage, in the Upper Paleolithic.
This evidence, in our view, suggests a new way of connecting toolmaking
and syntactic structure in human evolution, because these technologies
already exhibit an “infinite use of finite means,” which we take to
constitute the key transition to human cognition.
In section 10 of the target article, Vaesen reviews some of the
approaches that link increased complexity in tool use to language
evolution. For example, several proposals have seen in the mode
of production of Oldowan choppers (2.6 mya) and/or Acheulean
hand axes (1.7 mya) the kind of structural complexity that charac-
terizes human language: that the kind of finer motor control
involved in tool use facilitated speech control (Calvin 1993); or
that hand motor control for tool use was rather instrumental in
the appearance of a gestural mode of communication that is sup-
posed to predate oral language (Arbib 2005; Rizzolatti & Arbib
1998); and that such tools illustrate the kind of hierarchical struc-
ture that is characteristic of language (Greenfield 1991).
These approaches take for granted an early scenario for
language evolution; that is, that the structural capacity required
for grammar is already present in the abilities manifested in
early hominin tools. Late scenarios for language evolution, on
the contrary, contend that language is connected to the transition
to Homo sapiens and its diaspora from Africa, which started about
120,000 years ago. In other words, it is in the behavioral complexity
and cultural explosion of the past 100,000 years of human evol-
ution where the critical changes that account for human unique-
ness are to be looked for. In so doing, a stronger evolutionary
discontinuity is established between human and non-human pri-
mates. Given Vaesen’s concern in the target paper to argue for a
cognitive discontinuity between human and non-human primate
tool use, he should be sympathetic to such late scenarios and
pay attention to the structural complexity involved in the tools of
this age, rather than just the early ones he discusses.
It is from this standpoint that Upper Paleolithic knotting technol-
ogies (Adovasio et al. 1996; Sofer et al. 2000) are relevant in this
context. Knotting technologies are involved in basketry, nets, and
textile weaving. Archeological remains of such crafts consist of
clay imprints, dated circa 30,000 years ago. Binding by knotting
can also be inferred in the case of spears, harpoons, and arrow
heads and their corresponding bows (c. 70,000 years ago), which
had to be strongly attached to their shafts (older spears were
glued to their bases; see Wadley 2005). Perforated ornaments,
such as necklaces, bracelets, and wristbands, also were tied. Two
features of these tools need to be underlined: They appear just in
the last 70,000 years, and they are associated with Homo sapiens
sites (ornaments also appear in late Neanderthal sites in Europe,
but after they got in contact with the newly arrived H. sapiens).
It has been suggested (Camps & Uriagereka 2006) that the
formal structure of knotting is similar in complexity to a
context-sensitive grammar, such as that required to capture
recursivity in human language. Relying on Chomsky’s (1959)
formal hierarchy, Camps and Uriagereka claim that knots also
could involve a context-sensitive generative procedure. They
observe that the procedure for tying a knot cannot be specified
as an iterative sequence of steps (a finite automata), because
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each step in the procedure has to have access to previous stages
and the material context of physical forces the knot is made to
resist. The kernel of their reasoning is the claim that the knotting
procedure involves higher-level units (“phrases”), which are
deployed according to the material context. This is obvious
when one thinks of the sophisticated ways of sailor knots. In
general, though, the two hands have to mutually coordinate
along the procedure, rather than doing one thing after another.
Context sensitivity is linked to operational memory requirements,
to keep track of each operation, taking the previous and next ones
into account at the same time. From this, Camps and Uriagereka
claim that the archeological evidence of knots – even if indirect
and inferential – provides the best indication available of a cog-
nitive complexity equivalent to that required by human language.
We think that their case can be strengthened in two directions:
First, whereas in projectiles and perforated ornaments a single
knot may be required to fix two elements together or to string
them around the body, in textiles, nets, and basketry a series of
knots is involved, within a general constructive plan (therefore,
a more complex, context-sensitive, generative procedure).
Second, such a series of knots is in the service of recursive pat-
terns, which can be transformed, following distinct axes of sym-
metry, for example. Simple iterative processes are clearly not
enough to generate such complex structures, where each single
operation is conditional on the state of the rest of the fabric
and the physical forces the knot is supposed to resist.
Besides, knotting cannot be accounted for in terms of Green-
field’s “action grammar,” which is equivalent to a finite-state auto-
mata. She contented that the structural complexity of language can
be also found in hierarchical organization of action. The kinds of
actions she paid attention to, though, such as “Russian dolls”
inclusion, are developmentally easier than knot tying is, and they
are also within the reach of non-human primates (whereas knots
are beyond the capacities of chimpanzees, according to Josep
Call, personal communication). Therefore, the attempt to view
recursion in terms of Greenfield’s “action grammar,” as it has
been recently suggested (Fujita 2009), does not pay proper atten-
tion to the context sensitivity of recursion.
On the other hand, the proposed connection between knotting
and language entails that the program proposed by Hauser et al.
(2002) got it right that recursion is uniquely human, but wrong
that it is a uniquely linguistic capacity, even if the evidence is
still not enough to decide how it came about: It could be a
general capacity, deployed in different domains, or a domain-
specific one that was exapted in others (Barcelo´-Coblijn, in
press). It also offers a plausible hypothesis to set apart the linguis-
tic capacities of sapiens and neanderthal, given that both species
cannot be distinguished at the speech level (Barcelo´-Coblijn
2011). In summary, context-sensitive rules offer a principled
mark of modern humanity, beyond the typical lists of modern
behaviors that can be found in archeology (Henshilwood &
Marean 2003).
Tool innovation may be a critical limiting step
for the establishment of a rich tool-using
culture: A perspective from child development
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Abstract: Recent data show that human children (up to 8 years old)
perform poorly when required to innovate tools. Our tool-rich culture
may be more reliant on social learning and more limited by domain-
general constraints such as ill-structured problem solving than
otherwise thought.
Vaesen is right to identify the tension between the need for
reliable conservation of tool forms and the need for deviation
from reliable reproduction if new tools are to be created. Yet,
he does not draw a clear enough distinction between the cogni-
tive demands of tool innovation and other aspects of tool use.
Tool innovation is seen when individuals make a tool to solve a
problem without learning socially or having seen a model sol-
ution. Where Vaesen refers to human children’s tool use, it is
to emphasise human beings’ strengths from a very early age
(e.g., sect. 4). However, taking a developmental perspective on
human tool use has shown that tool innovation may be particu-
larly difficult for human children, compared with using pre-
made tools. Successful innovation in older children and adults
is needed to explain the unique richness of human tool culture,
whereas the difficulty of innovation observed in human children
casts new light on the importance of other abilities, such as social
learning, for retaining hard-won innovations.
We (Beck et al. 2011) tested human children on a tool making
task based on Weir et al.’s (2002) wire bending problem. This
task was originally made famous by the successes of a New Caledo-
nian crow (Corvus moneduloides) andmore recently rooks (Corvus
frugilegus) (Bird & Emery 2009). Having previously used a hook to
retrieve a bucket from a tall vertical tube, these corvids were then
able to fashion a straight piece of wire into a hook to solve the task:
that is, they used novel means to make a familiar tool. We ques-
tioned whether children would innovate a novel tool, critically
without having seen the solution to the task (a hook).
Children up to 5 years old found it near impossible to innovate
a novel tool to solve this task, and it was not until 8 years of age
that the majority of children succeeded (Beck et al. 2011). Chil-
dren’s difficulty was replicated on a task requiring them to
unbend a bent wire to make a long, straight tool (Cutting et al.
2011) and on tool-innovation tasks involving other materials
and other transformations (i.e., adding and subtracting from
the tool object as well as bending; Cutting et al., under review).
The results could not be attributed to a lack of causal understand-
ing: Young children readily used a pre-made hook tool to solve
the vertical tube task (Beck et al. 2011, Experiment 1). Nor
could results be explained by a pragmatic resistance to adapting
the materials: Children’s difficulties remained in the face of
ample encouragement to reshape the wire (a pipe cleaner). We
gave children pre-trial experience manipulating the materials,
encouraged them to “make something,” and demonstrated tool
manufacture on a different task (see Cutting et al. 2011).
Children’s ability to select an appropriate pre-made tool indi-
cates that they did not lack the causal knowledge to solve the task
(in Vaesen’s terms, analogical causal reasoning; see sect. 4). Fur-
thermore, when an adult demonstrated how to make an appropri-
ate tool, almost all children (97%) found it apparently trivially easy
to manufacture their own tool and fish the bucket from the tube
(Beck et al. 2011). Why, then, is tool innovation so late developing?
One possibility is that an over-reliance on social learning and/
or teaching (see sects. 7 and 8) prevents children from innovating
for themselves. We agree with Vaesen that human children are
experts at learning from others. But a species that evolves to
pass on information so efficiently to new learners does so at a
cost. It is inefficient and possibly counterproductive for children
to try to generate their own solutions to problems as well as adopt
them from others. At least in childhood, if not also in adult life,
the ability to innovate may be sidelined in preference to learning
from the more experienced individuals who share our goals and
are motivated to collaborate with us (see sect. 9).
However, we doubt that this will be the full explanation.
Vaesen argues that developing an advanced technological
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culture requires trial-and-error learning and causal understanding.
In addition, we suggest that tool innovation is challenging because
it makes distinctive demands on executive function. In cognitive
and neuropsychological investigation of executive function, “ill-
structured” problems are tasks that do not exhaustively define
the means of getting from the start point to the goal, but instead
require participants to generate such structure for themselves
(Goel 1995). From this perspective, tool innovation is clearly an
intrinsically “ill-structured” problem: Participants know the goal
(e.g., of retrieving the bucket from the tube), and their start
point includes the necessary materials (e.g., the wire), but they
must generate for themselves the strategy of using the materials
to make the necessary tool. As ill-structured problem solving has
been associated with late-maturing areas of medial prefrontal
cortex (Dumontheil et al. 2008), it is likely to be limited in
young children. Hence, unlike trial-and-error learning and
causal understanding, which may be observed in young children,
difficulty with ill-structured problem solving may explain why
children find tool innovation so surprisingly difficult.
Recognising that tool innovation might be an intrinsically
difficult problem helps us understand why the capacity for
social learning is so important for the development and mainten-
ance of a tool-using culture in both humans and non-human
animals: Social learning avoids individuals having to “reinvent
the wheel” for themselves. Furthermore, if tool innovation
requires ill-structured problem solving, this might help explain
why tool cultures of non-human animals are less rich than
those of humans. Importantly, though, this leaves open the ques-
tion of how non-human animals develop the tools that they have.
One possibility is that they rely only on trial and error, the useful
products of which are maintained through social learning.
Another possibility is that tool cognition provides a window
onto non-human animals’ ill-structured problem solving,
through which we might gain important understanding about
the origins of executive control.
Tool use as situated cognition
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Abstract: Vaesen disregards a plausible alternative to his position, and
so fails to offer a compelling argument for unique cognitive
mechanisms. We suggest an ecological alternative, according to which
divergent relationships between organism and environment, not exotic
neuroanatomy, are responsible for unique cognitive capacities. This
approach is pertinent to claims about primate cognition; and on this
basis, we argue that Vaesen’s inference from unique skills to unique
mechanisms is unwarranted.
Humans are often observed using multipurpose smartphones to
listen to podcasts, surf the Web, and plan international travel.
By contrast, even the most sophisticated non-human primates
only use single-purpose tools for situation-specific purposes.
Whereas wild chimpanzees, for example, use reeds to fish for ter-
mites, they never build tools with multiple components and they
never use tools in ways that diverge from the situation-specific
purpose for which they were created. Put simply, there are unde-
niable, significant, and manifest differences in the tool-using be-
havior of human and non-human primates. Vaesen maintains
that such differences are best explained by reference to evolutio-
narily discontinuous cognitive mechanisms. He argues that our
comparative advantage in eight cognitive capacities suffices to
establish “a major cognitive discontinuity between us and our
closest relatives” (sect. 1). We disagree.
The term capacity has a variety of distinct meanings in the cog-
nitive and biological sciences: It can denote a trait, ability, or
mechanism; and although evolutionary pressures sometimes call
for the evolution of novel mechanisms, it is generally less expensive
to integrate, redeploy, or recalibrate existing mechanisms than it is
to build new ones from scratch (Gould & Vrba 1982; Shubin &
Marshall 2000; Simon 1996). On the related assumption, that per-
mutations “of the old within complex systems can do wonders”
(Gould 1977), even an evolutionary gradualist can acknowledge
unique skills while rejecting appeals to newmechanisms. To estab-
lish more than the banality that there are uniquely human traits
and abilities, Vaesen must demonstrate that these traits and abil-
ities depend on phylogenetically novel wetware. But we hold
that his argument is inconclusive, because it ignores a salient expla-
natory alternative: namely, the hypothesis that cognitively sophis-
ticated tool use depends not on phylogenetically novel wetware,
but on the appropriation of social and environmental scaffolding.
We invite Vaesen to consider this explanation, for it is simpler
than the appeal to unique mechanisms, and therefore preferable
even by his own standards.
To make the case for this, we must note that non-human pri-
mates use tools in ways suggestive of several (at least) proto-
human cognitive capacities. Wild chimpanzees and capuchins
use tools to obtain food that is out of reach, crack nuts with
“hammers,” and sponge liquid with leaves (Boesch & Boesch-
Achermann 2000; Fragaszy et al. 2004; Whiten et al. 1999); and
although neither vervets nor cotton-top tamarins use tools in
the wild, both can be trained to do so in the laboratory (Santos
et al. 2003). Of course, many non-human primates fail to rep-
resent the functional properties of their tools (cf. Povinelli
2000). But wild chimpanzees use different tools at different
kinds of termite nests, show selective preferences for different
materials, and repeatedly visit nests with reusable tools (Sanz &
Morgan 2010) and recent data suggest that they use multi-func-
tional tools (Boesch et al. 2009). Furthermore, captive capuchins
can discriminate between functionally appropriate and inap-
propriate throwing tools (Evans & Westergaard 2006); and
looking-time methods reveal that cotton-top tamarins and
rhesus macaques perceive changes in functional properties as rel-
evant to tool use, but color change as irrelevant (Santos et al.
2003; for vervets and lemurs, see Hauser & Santos 2007).
Finally, repeated experience with tools appears to lead to a
more sophisticated understanding of their functionally relevant
features (Santos et al. 2003, p. 280).
Next, we contend that an ecologically valid approach to cogni-
tion requires attending to both the environment in which traits
are expressed and the complex relationships between organisms
and their embedding environment. Although it is sometimes legit-
imate and productive to focus on internal mechanisms, cognitive
processes (including categorization, inference, and reasoning)
are often better understood by reference to coupled organism-
environment systems (Hutchins 2008). Consider two uncontrover-
sial examples: When chimpanzees are trained to exploit abstract,
symbolic resources, they show a pronounced increase in executive
control and inhibition (Boysen & Berntson 1995). Similarly, when
human beings supplement their internal capacities for working
memory and mathematics with external resources such as pens
and paper, we are capable of executing a significantly wider
range of computations than we otherwise could (Carruthers
2002; Rumelhart et al.1986). As an organism’s capacities are deli-
neated by the tasks it is able to perform, we contend that many
capacities are likely to depend on environmental scaffolding
(Barrett 2011; Clark 2008).
We suggest that Vaesen should consider the merits of a more
ecological approach to uniquely human traits. Relatively minor
modifications of primate neuroanatomy (underwritten by the
increase in volume of the prefrontal cortex and intimately
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coupled changes in evolutionary niches) might have enabled
humans to cash in on the informational potential of their environ-
ments. Both humans and non-human primates engage in acts of
epistemic engineering, construct cognitive niches, and exploit the
cognitive potential of their environments (Clark 2006; Sterelny
2003. This dynamic relationship with the environment can
increase the sophistication and power of existing cognitive
capacities (cf. Beer 2000; Kelso 1995). In many cases, unique
capacities are parsimoniously explained by reference to
coupled organism-environment systems; and where the environ-
ment plays the role of cognitive catalyst, we have little reason to
appeal to exotic evolutionary mechanisms (Pinker 2010). Finally,
such ecological explanations make sense in light of the highly
competitive context in which human cognition evolved. Just as
corporations often increase their productive capacities by out-
sourcing production, human brains increase their computational
capacity by outsourcing cognitive operations onto the environ-
ment. In both cases, we find a marked increase in capacity
without expensive changes in internal structure.
We assume that none of these claims will surprise Vaesen, and
moreover, that they are not particularly controversial. So perhaps
our disagreements are merely terminological. Not only does
capacity have numerous meanings; so, too, does unique. Every
species is genetically, behaviorally, and developmentally unique
in some respect or other, but Vaesen presumably regards these
facts as beside the point. At any rate, we hold that terminological
clarity and consistency are crucial for discussions of evolutionary
uniqueness. Because we are unsure that Vaesen’s treatment lives
up to this standard, we would like to see a clearer statement of his
key terms. For only in light of such a statement could we accu-
rately evaluate the ultimate force of his arguments.
Human tool behavior is species-specific
and remains unique
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Abstract: Human tool behavior is species-specific. It remains a
diagnostic feature of humans, even when comparisons are made with
closely related non-human primates. The archaeological record
demonstrates both the deep antiquity of human tool behavior and its
fundamental role in distinguishing human behavior from that of non-
human primates.
In an effort to understand the origins of human tool behavior,
investigators have focused on tool behavior in primates,
especially in chimpanzees. Nevertheless, tool behavior is wide-
spread and complex in the animal world, as indicated by the
survey of Shumaker et al. (2011). This demonstrates that tool be-
havior evolves through convergent evolution, a point that is most
cogently made by examining its presence in capuchin monkeys
and birds (Emery & Clayton 2004; Fragaszy et al. 2004), as
well as in the great apes. The intense focus on chimpanzees is
driven by two factors. First, and most important, is the argument
by ancestry: Chimpanzees are the closest living relatives of
human beings. The second factor is comparatively trivial, but
determines much research: If one studies chimpanzees – and
they have received enormous attention for 50 years – any behav-
ior that they demonstrate will be considered intrinsically
important.
Vaesen does a remarkable job of assembling the array of evi-
dence separating human tool behavior from the tool behavior of
other animals. However, I believe that one line of evidence
should have received more emphasis in the paper. In discussing
causal reasoning, Vaesen briefly notes the experiments conducted
by Povinelli et al. (2000), and presents one example of these exper-
iments (Fig. 1 of the target article). The total corpus of these exper-
iments demonstrates a profound difference in cognition between
humans and chimpanzees. The Povinelli monograph underscores
the great gulf that exists between human causal reasoning and
the reasoning abilities of chimpanzees. In fact, chimpanzees do
not seem to have a “theory of how the world works.” If this is
so, then it epitomizes the unique character of human tool
behavior – that it is based on the unconscious, sophisticated
knowledge of energy, movement, objects, and the interaction of
objects that Povinelli et al. (2000) label “folk physics.”
Vaesen elegantly dissects the factors underlying contingent
reciprocity in Table 1 of the target article, and is right to point
out potential problems with the existence of empathy in non-
human primates. Sharing and exchange underlie the division of
labor seen in humans, as well as human trade, which is seen indis-
putably in the archaeological record at about 40,000 years ago.
The active teaching discussed by Vaesen is involved in human
cultural transmission and the wide dispersal of human culture.
Yet, active teaching certainly also underlies human cooperation,
and one of the major differences between humans and other
animals is that humans habitually cooperate in using and
making tools.
In addition to the unique cognitive behaviors underlying human
tool use that Vaesen notes, differences in behavior between
humans and non-human primates can be documented with
stone tools occurring at the earliest archaeological sites, dating to
2.6–2.5 mya. Studies of chimpanzee “archaeology” (e.g., Mercader
et al. 2002) only highlight the differences between humans and
chimpanzees. Chimpanzees create microscopic stone shatter
when they use hammer stones to pound open nuts, but they do
not create stone artifacts. In spite of claims that chimpanzees
create stone tools that are indistinguishable from the earliest
tools in the archaeological record (McGrew 1992), chimpanzee
“archaeology” emphatically demonstrates otherwise. Behaviors
that frequently are typically associated with the origins of anatomi-
cally modern humans actually have a deep antiquity in the archae-
ological record, going back to at least 1.6–1.4 mya (Cachel 2009).
These include greater dispersal ability, spatial organization of be-
havior at archaeological sites, behavioral variability between
sites, transport and curation of stone raw materials and animal
carcasses, primary access to animal carcasses whether through
hunting or confrontational scavenging, change in stone artifacts
through time, and forethought or planning.
Technological selection: A missing link
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Abstract: Vaesen’s description of uniquely human tool-related cognitive
abilities rings true but would be enhanced by an account of how those
abilities would have evolved. I suggest that a process of technological
selection operated on the cognitive architecture of ancestral hominids
because they, unlike other tool-using species, depended on tools for
their survival.
Vaesen has produced a convincing descriptive account of the
unique cognitive abilities that support human-style tool use.
The icing on the cake would be to explain how those abilities
may have evolved. What were the selection pressures that
made tool-using hominid minds different from the minds of
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other tool-using species? Washburn suggested the answer to this
question more than 50 years ago:
Tools changed the whole pattern of life[,] bringing in hunting,
cooperation, and the necessity for communication and language.
Memory, foresight and originality were favored as never before, and
the complex social system made possible by tools could only be realized
by domesticated individuals. In a real sense, tools created Homo
sapiens. (Washburn 1959, p. 31)
A process of technological selectionwould operate when the use
of a tool enhances the tool user’s fitness. A dependency on tools
that conferred fitness advantages may have arisen as hominid
ancestors became stranded in increasingly drier open landscapes
that offered few places to hide from predators. Even before
scrounging for food or having sex, the most important thing
those hominids could have done was to protect themselves from
being killed and eaten. The solutions they developed to this sur-
vival problem would have been under strong selection pressure
(Hart & Sussman 2005), and data on modern cases of wild
animal attacks on humans indicate that using tools as weapons
would have been a very good solution. In a study of 542 animal
attacks occurring on all continents, Crabb and Elizaga (2008)
found that when victims or passersby used any of 65 different
tools to defend against attacking animals, injuries and deaths
were significantly lower than when no tools were used. Smart
tool use saves human lives in the present, and very likely would
have saved the lives of hominid ancestors. One cognitive legacy
of this ancestral dependence on tools for protection (albeit not
mentioned by Vaesen) may be a preparedness in modern
humans to associate aggressive impulses with tools that could be
used as weapons (Crabb 2000; 2005; Kenrick & Sheets 1993).
Hominid ancestors who clutched sticks and stones to guard
against predators wherever they roamed would have gotten to
know their tools quite well. Those individuals with sufficient var-
iants in cognitive abilities would have experimented with and ela-
borated upon their tools, eventually hitting on the invention of
true tools (i.e., tools made by using other tools; Gruber 1969)
that would have provided even more survival benefits and
additional cognitive and technical challenges.
The differential survival of adept tool users would have con-
tributed to the growth of tool-using culture. A tool-dense
culture would in turn influence which genes were subject to
selection, and genes that supported the cognitive architecture
for sophisticated tool use would be favored (see Laland et al.
2000; Richerson & Boyd 2005). Darwin seemed to have had
just this kind of gene-culture coevolutionary process in mind:
We can see that, in the rudest state of society, the individuals who were
the most sagacious, who invented and used the best weapons or traps,
and who were best able to defend themselves, would rear the greatest
number of offspring. The tribes which included the largest number of
men thus endowed would increase in number and supplant other
tribes. (Darwin 1871/1981, p. 159)
In this way, the life-saving technological way of life constructed
only by human ancestors would have selected the cognitive
tunings described by Vaesen.
Unique features of human movement control
predicted by the leading joint hypothesis
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Abstract: Vaesen suggests that motor control is not among the primary
origins of the uniqueness of human tool use. However, recent findings
show that cognitive processes involved in control of human limb
movements may be much more sophisticated than it was believed
previously. The sophistication of movement control may substantially
contribute to the uniqueness of humans in tool use.
Vaesen limits the consideration of the motor component of the
tool use to two aspects: eye-hand coordination and adaptation
of the body schema. However, recent findings show that cogni-
tive processes involved in control of limb movements may be
much more complex and diverse. In particular, the leading
joint hypothesis developed in my lab predicts extensive and soph-
isticated cognitive processes involved in control of human limb
movements. Here I discuss the predicted processes and their rel-
evance to the uniqueness of human tool use.
The leading joint hypothesis suggests that movements are
organized by exploiting the multi-joint structure of the limbs
(for reviews, see Dounskaia 2005; 2010). The multi-joint limbs
consist of chains of approximately rigid segments brought in
motion by muscles spanning the joints. During motion, the seg-
ments mechanically interact with each other. The leading joint
hypothesis suggests that the nervous system benefits from these
interactions and exploits them for movement production by
introducing a hierarchy among the joints. One (leading) joint is
used to generate energy for the entire limb motion, similar to
the whip handle that brings in motion the entire whip. Another
analogy for the role of the leading joint is towing one vehicle
with another. The role of the musculature at the other (subordi-
nate) joints is to modify their passive motion and adjust it to task
requirements. An analogy for subordinate joint control is steering
the towed vehicle to correct deviations of it from the direction
followed by the towing vehicle. Thus, the leading joint generates
limb motion and the subordinate joints regulate this motion
according to the demands of the task.
The leading joint hypothesis implies that humans use mechan-
ical properties of the limbs to achieve everyday goals in the same
way as they use properties of tools. This interpretation suggests
that the uniqueness of humans known for tool use may, in part,
be observed in limb movements. One can argue that since pri-
mates have a similar multi-joint structure of the limbs, the
leading joint hypothesis predicts similarity of cognitive processes
underlying movement control in humans and primates. This
inference may be only partially correct. Indeed, the leading
joint hypothesis implies two components of movement planning,
each of which may be a source of differences in motor control
between humans and primates. The first component is the selec-
tion of a leading joint and planning its motion that, after modifi-
cation at the subordinate joints, can perform the task. The
second component is the determination of the subordinate
joint control that will adjust the limb movement to the task
requirements. Although these two components of movement
planning must be present in both humans and primates, the pro-
cesses involved in human movement control may be more
sophisticated.
The superior ability of humans to use leading joint motion for
movement production is evident from the vast repertoire of
human motor actions. The variety of movements performed
during sports activities, dancing, and expressive gestures demon-
strates exclusive creativity of humans in exploiting mechanical
effects that can be generated within the body through different
leading joint motions. This creativity may be a crucial component
in mastering diverse tools because each tool changes mechanical
properties of the limb in a specific way, and the leading joint
motion needs to correspond to these changes.
The subordinate joint control is another possible source of
differences in motor performance between humans and pri-
mates. Human motor control may be characterized by greater
diversity of the ways in which the subordinate joint musculature
can modify passive motion caused by the leading joint. This pre-
diction finds support in our recent findings that the modification
of passive motion of the subordinate joints requires substantial
neural resources. In our experiments, participants performed a
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free-stroke drawing task that provided freedom in the selection
of movement direction (Dounskaia et al. 2011; Goble et al.
2007). Arm movements were performed through flexion and
extension of the shoulder and elbow. Participants demonstrated
consistent directional preferences by frequently selecting certain
movement directions and strongly avoiding some other direc-
tions. The most preferred directions were those in which the sub-
ordinate joint moved largely passively. The most avoided
directions were those in which the subordinate joint had to
rotate in the direction opposite to the passive rotation. Cognitive
load created by a secondary task (counting back by 3’s from a
given number, e.g., “57, 54, 51, . . .,” during the performance of
the primary, free-stroke drawing task) markedly strengthened
the directional preferences (Dounskaia & Goble 2011). These
results show that the modification of passive motion at the sub-
ordinate joints requires substantial cognitive effort and that
humans tend to avoid this effort. It is plausible that this tendency
is stronger in primates, who may have limited ability to provide
substantial modifications of passive motion at the subordinate
joints. However, the capability to accurately modulate passive
mechanical effects with muscle activity may be crucial for soph-
isticated tool use.
To summarize, the interpretation of multi-joint movement
control offered by the leading joint hypothesis provides new
insights with respect to complexity of cognitive processes
involved in motor performance. The idea that the limbs are
used as tools for achieving goals of daily life suggests that the
uniqueness of humans in tool use may be not limited to the
higher levels but presented already at the level of motor
control . Obtaining solid support for this hypothesis is a subject
for future research.
Brain structures playing a crucial role in
the representation of tools in humans and
non-human primates
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Abstract: The cortical representation of concepts varies according to the
information critical for their development. Living categories, being
mainly based upon visual information, are bilaterally represented in the
rostral parts of the ventral stream of visual processing; whereas tools,
being mainly based upon action data, are unilaterally represented in a
left-sided fronto-parietal network. The unilateral representation of tools
results from involvement in actions of the right side of the body.
In his stimulating target article, Vaesen rightly suggests that the
obvious superiority of humans, in comparison with non-human
primates, in tool use may result from several (social and non-
social) cognitive capacities that differentiate them from other
animals. Now, as each of these cognitive capacities is subsumed
by specific cortical networks, the problem that I would take
into account in my commentary concerns the brain structures
that could play a critical role in the conceptual representation
of tools in humans versus non-human primates. My commentary
will be based on empirical data (obtained in anatomo-clinical
studies or neuroimaging experiments, mainly conducted in
humans) interpreted according to the principles of the “embo-
died cognition theories” (Barsalou 2008) and of the “sensory-
motor model of semantic knowledge” (Gainotti 2006).
According to these principles, concepts are not represented
in the brain in a formal, abstract manner, totally unrelated to
the brain processing of sensory-motor functions (e.g., Fodor
1987); instead, they are represented in the same format in
which they have been constructed by the sensory-motor
system. Furthermore, the brain organization of categorical
knowledge reflects the importance of the sensory-motor mech-
anisms that have mainly contributed to the development of each
category.
From the anatomical point of view, these principles predict a
close relationship between cortical areas crucially involved in a
given category and localization of the sensorimotor mechanisms
that have mainly contributed to the development of that category.
These predictions have been confirmed by results obtained
studying the neuro-anatomical correlates of category-specific
semantic disorders and the brain areas activated by different
conceptual categories during functional brain imaging exper-
iments (see for reviews Barsalou 2008; Gainotti 2006). Both
anatomo-clinical and functional neuroimaging experiments
have, indeed, shown that living categories, such as “animals”
and “plant life,” are bilaterally represented in the rostral and
ventral parts of the temporal lobes, because their knowledge is
mainly based on the integration of highly processed visual data
with other perceptual information. On the contrary, artefacts
(and in particular, tools) are unilaterally represented in a left-
sided fronto-parietal network, because these categories are
mainly based upon action and somatosensory data. Obviously,
it is almost impossible to match the brain correlates of the
“tools” category in humans and in non-human primates,
because, as rightly remarked by Vaesen in his target article, pri-
mates in the wild use for food retrieval whatever they come
across. Their lack of permanent functional attributions ( func-
tional fixedness) implies the impossibility of constructing a cat-
egory characterized by functional features, such as tools. The
study of the brain representation of objects in non-human pri-
mates has, therefore almost uniquely concerned the ventral
stream of visual processing, where important similarities have
been found between humans and non-human primates (e.g.,
Kriegeskorte et al. 2008).
The impossibility of matching the brain correlates of tools in
humans and non-human primates does not imply that the analysis
of the brain structures playing a crucial role in the representation
of tools in humans may not be relevant to understand the brain
mechanisms that have allowed the development of the “tools”
category and its astonishing complexity in humans. In particular,
the left lateralization of fronto-parietal lesions observed in
patients with a category-specific disorder for artefacts and the
activation of the same left fronto-parietal areas during studies
dealing with tools can be explained by two lateralized factors
(handedness and language functions) that have been extensively
discussed by Vaesen in his target article.
Handedness has been considered as a factor contributing to
the development of tools in humans because lateralization
enhances manual precision and facilitates motor coordination
in social learning tasks. On the other hand, language is deemed
to have more contributed to the sophistication of human technol-
ogies than to the divergence between humans and other primates
in the development of tools. This Vaesen position, which empha-
sizes more the contribution of handedness than that of language
to the tool development is supported by two recent studies, con-
ducted by Lewis et al. (2006) and by Willems et al. (2010) in
strong right- and left-handers, to evaluate the role played by
asymmetries in motor experience (right-handedness) and by
the left dominance for language on the left lateralization of
tool representation. In the first study Lewis et al. (2006) have
compared the pattern of cortical activation evoked by hand-
manipulated tool sounds and by animal vocalizations, showing
that tool sounds preferentially evoke activity in high-level
motor-related cortical regions of the hemisphere opposite to
the dominant hand. In the second study, Willems et al. (2010)
used functional magnetic resonance imaging to compare pre-
motor activity associated with understanding action verbs
(strictly related to tool use) and showed that right-handers
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preferentially activated the left premotor cortex, whereas left-
handers preferentially activated right premotor areas. In both
studies, therefore, and in agreement with the positions defended
by Vaesen in his target article, the laterality of cortical regions
activated by the high-level action and tool use was related to
right-handedness and not to the left-hemisphere dominance
for language.
Human tool-making capacities reflect
increased information-processing capacities:
Continuity resides in the eyes of the beholder
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Abstract: Chimpanzee/human technological differences are vast, reflect
multiple interacting behavioral processes, and may result from
the increased information-processing and hierarchical mental
constructional capacities of the human brain. Therefore, advanced
social, technical, and communicative capacities probably evolved
together in concert with increasing brain size. Interpretations of these
evolutionary and species differences as continuities or discontinuities
reflect differing scientific perspectives.
Although once considered a prime hallmark of humanity, tool
making has, in recent decades, often been relegated to the ranks
of unintelligent behaviors well within the capacity of other
animals. Instead, some now postulate that the distinguishing
feature of humanity is another specific cognitive capacity, such
as theory of mind, cooperation, or syntactical language. Vaesen
provides an important service to evolutionary scholars by empha-
sizing two points. (1) Human technological accomplishments far
exceed those of chimpanzees. (2) Human excellence reflects a
host of advanced, interacting cognitive and motor skills, as
opposed to the possession of a single unique cognitive, motor, or
social capacity.
Whether human versus ape technological and associated
capacities should be labeled “discontinuities” will, however,
remain a matter of debate. Behavioral continuities and disconti-
nuities, like beauty, reside in the minds of beholders. Many inves-
tigators, for example, routinely interpret animal behaviors within
the context of Morgan’s Canon. This essentially assures that most
animal behaviors will be interpreted as unintelligent – hence,
discontinuous with those of humans. Other investigators begin
with assumptions that all human cognitive skills derive from
animal precursors – and hence, are continuous. Differences
also derive from the nature of the observed data. Investigators
who primarily study cage-reared animals seem to routinely
judge chimpanzees and other apes to be less capable of
human-like behaviors than do investigators who study human-
reared or wild animals. Similarly, those who study the cognitive
and linguistic skills of human infants often seem more open to
continuity views than are those who focus on the competencies
only of adults or older children. Investigators’ views on brain
function, however, may be of paramount importance. Assump-
tions that most unique human behaviors reflect genetically deter-
mined, behaviorally specific neural modules predispose to
interpretations of discontinuities. In contrast, a focus on develop-
mental neural plasticity and probable brain size–related influ-
ences on behavioral functions may predispose to continuity
perspectives.
I have previously postulated behavioral continuities between
great apes and humans based on three primary considerations
(Gibson 1991; 1993; 1996; 2002; Gibson & Jessee 1999):
(1) Most traits postulated as uniquely human are eventually
found to occur in more rudimentary forms in other animals
including great apes: for example, tool making, symbolism,
theory of mind, deception, cooperation, culture. In most
instances, ape/human differences appear to relate primarily to
differences in the amount of information that can be brought
to bear on each task and then hierarchically synthesized into
new cognitive constructions. (2) Neo-Piagetian perspectives,
such as those of the late Robbie Case (1985), postulate quite
similar developmental changes across a variety of behavioral
domains in maturing human infants and children. Case inter-
preted these cognitive changes as reflections of developmental
increases in information-processing capacities. (3) Irrespective
of whatever reorganizational changes may have occurred in the
human brain, the most obvious ape/human neuroanatomical
differences relate to the overall size of the brain and of many
of its component parts (Gibson 1990; 2002; Gibson & Jessee
1999; Gibson et al. 2001) and hence, to probable increases in
information-processing capacities throughout much of the
brain. The archaeological and paleontological records indicate
gradual increases in both brain size and hierarchical capacities,
and hence, a probable continuing process of increased infor-
mation-processing capacities resulting in increasingly advanced
cognitive and motor skills. Nonetheless, I view the differences
between ape and human behaviors as quite large, much as
Vaesen does. Therefore, investigators can have similar views
about the distinctions between ape and human capacities, and
nonetheless draw different conclusions about continuity or lack
thereof. Perhaps, then, they should simply focus on clearly articu-
lating observed animal/human differences and the cognitive and
neurological mechanisms perceived to underlie them, rather
than on potentially fruitless continuity arguments.
Even if one adopts the information-processing and hierarch-
ical constructional approach, other issues remain. Did hier-
archical information-processing capacities evolve first in the
tool-using domain and then transfer to other domains (a view
Vaesen erroneously attributes to me); did advanced infor-
mation-processing capacities evolve separately in each behav-
ioral domain; or is hierarchical construction a domain-general
process that increased simultaneously in all behavioral
domains? Current behavioral and neurological evidence is
insufficient to provide a definitive answer to such questions.
As Vaesen points out, given that it is the interaction of many
advanced human behavioral capacities that distinguishes
humans, and in all probability, later fossil hominins from
apes, it seems to me most likely that information-processing
capacity increased synchronously in many domains.
Vaesen also questions evolutionary relationships between
gesture and tool use. Again, he erroneously attributes a hypoth-
esis to me – that manual dexterity first evolved for tool use and
then was transferred to the gestural domain. Current evidence
seems, if anything, more compatible with the opposite view. In
apes, laterality (one component of manual dexterity) is more pro-
nounced in the gestural than in the tool-using domain (Hopkins
& Vauclair 2011). At one time, I did adhere to Gordon Hewes’s
hypothesis that hominin-like gestural communication systems
evolved earlier than did hominin-like vocal communication
systems (Hewes 1973; Parker& Gibson 1979). This hypothesis,
which was based on earlier views that ape gestural capacities
exceed their vocal capacities, no longer seems necessary.
Recent research indicates that great ape vocal learning capacities
are much greater than were previously believed (Slocombe
2011). Moreover, gestural and vocal communications are inex-
tricably linked in modern humans (Goldin-Meadow 2011) and
probably were similarly linked throughout human evolution. To
the extent that human tool making, communicative, and
advanced social behaviors involve similar hierarchical mental
constructional capacities and may all have evolved in relationship
to the invasion of new foraging niches such as omnivorous extrac-
tive foraging (Parker & Gibson 1979), hunting (Vaesen), and/or
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scavenging (Bickerton 2009), it seems most likely that advanced
communicative (gestural and vocal), social, and tool-making
capacities evolved together as one complex whole.
Language and tool making are similar
cognitive processes
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Abstract: Design features for language and stone toolmaking (not tool
use) involve similar if not homologous cognitive processes. Both are
arbitrary transformations of internal “intrinsic” symbolization, whereas
non-human tool using is mostly an iconic transformation. The major
discontinuity between humans and non-humans (chimpanzees) is
language. The presence of stone tools made to standardized patterns
suggests communicative and social control skills that involved language.
When I wrote “Culture: A Human Domain” (1969), I was
attempting to show that the cognitive processes involved in tool-
making (not tool using, as then known in several different animal
species) and language were extremely similar, if not identical. If
I understand Vaesen’s thesis, he has a similar viewpoint (but I
would keep toolmaking and tool use as separate processes), and
I believe he has extended the analysis well beyond what I
attempted and in a most admirable way. I particularly agree
with his emphasis on social intelligence and learning, as I
earlier suggested that toolmaking was an inherently social
process (1967; 1975; 1981; 1996; Holloway et al. 2004),
suggesting social consensus and standardization, and thus some
element of social control. My emphasis and his differ in that I
have always been struck by the arbitrariness of human symbol
systems (i.e., language) and by how internal (“intrinsic”)
symbols become transformed into the external (“extrinsic”)
symbol systems that can literally define reality – whether it actu-
ally exists or not, such as various forms of religious doctrine, not
to mention countless historical (and prehistorical) examples of
“man’s inhumanity to man,” such as the Holocaust. These are
perhaps “spandrels” of the human dark side and language, and
tangential here.
More to the point of language and toolmaking, and to provide a
concrete example, I still believe that the transformation of a
branch used by chimpanzees for termite fishing is an iconic trans-
formation where the final product is immediately visible in the
original product (i.e., stick without leaves visible in a stick
with leaves). This contrasts with much of hominid toolmaking –
possibly starting with developed Oldowan, and surely present
with the Acheulean, Levalloisian, Mousterian, and all blade
tools (for in these instances, the final product is an arbitrary trans-
formation where the final product is not necessarily apparent in
the prior form but, rather, is a template formed in a social
environment). In 1969 I tried to show that the three “design fea-
tures” (Hockett 1960) considered unique to human language –
namely, duality of patterning, productivity, and traditional trans-
mission (the last also present in chimpanzees) – could be assessed
in careful analyses of the units making up to the tool making
process. For example, the “test-operate-test-exit” (TOTE) para-
digm used by Miller et al. (1960) can provide a quantitative as
well as qualitative description of making any stone tool, as well
as many other activities. Therefore, as crude examples, an
Oldowan chopper would be a one TOTE unit tool, if a pebble
was hit twice to detach two flakes without rotation. Rotation
would add another TOTE unit. An Acheulean hand axe would
involve selection of the blank, detachment of flake(s), rotation
to other side, detachment of flakes until criteria are met (exit),
thus yielding four TOTE units, but with multiple steps in each.
Levalloissian flakes would add addition TOTE units. The exact
number depends on selection processes for raw materials, as
well as the actual flaking and rotating processes. Needless to
say, there are also many stone tools where a predetermined
shape has been selected because it was very close to the final
sought product, as well as properties inherent in stone materials.
After 42 years, I still believe that culture as I defined it
then (“that complex whole . . . shared by man as a member of
society . . . is also the imposition of arbitrary formupon the environ-
ment”;Holloway 1969, p. 395) is still an exclusively human domain.
The word imposition reflects my belief that arbitrary symbol use is
not a natural phenomenon and is learned and practiced against
psychological and societal resistance. Newer brain imaging, and
fMRI studies conducted by Schick and Toth (1993), Toth and
Schick (2010), and Stout et al. (2009; 2010), provide some tantaliz-
ing co-occurrences between complex motor patterns for stone tool
knapping and the motor areas for language in Broca’s region as
well as the occipital and parietal lobes.
Nevertheless, as our understanding of non-human animal be-
havior is enhanced with both field and laboratory studies, it is
likely that only language will remain the essential divide
between us and other animals.
Not by thoughts alone: How language
supersizes the cognitive toolkit
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Abstract:We propose that Vaesen’s target article (a) underestimates the
role of language in humans’ cognitive toolkit and thereby (b)
overestimates the proposed cognitive discontinuity between chimps and
humans. We provide examples of labeling, numerical computation,
executive control, and the relation between language and body,
concluding that language plays a crucial role in “supersizing humans’
cognitive toolkit.”
In the target article, Vaesen notes a remarkable discontinuity
between humans and chimps in tool use and cognitive features.
Language is suggested to play a merely facilitative role for
other cognitive functions. We propose that Vaesen (a) underesti-
mates the role of language in humans’ cognitive toolkit and
thereby (b) overestimates the proposed cognitive discontinuity
between chimps and humans.
Language can be considered, in Clark’s words (2008), as a
mind-transforming cognitive scaffold. It can productively trans-
form people’s cognitive capacities by simplifying their outer
world. For instance, the simple act of labeling creates a new con-
stellation of “perceptible objects” and reconfigures the problem
space (Clark 1998a), thereby increasing people’s computational
ability enormously. Consider numerical computation as another
example. Dehaene and colleagues (1999) proposed that when
people use number words to complement more basic biological
capacities, people acquire an evolutionary novel ability to deal
and think about unlimited exact quantities, hinging crucially on
language. Systematic skill improvement attempts, fault detection,
and corrections of flaws in people’s own planning – to mention
only few – are the result of the interaction of biological brains
with linguaform resources that together allow “thinking about
thinking” (Bermudez 2003; Clark 1998b; 2008). As such,
language opens up new computational opportunities, enabling
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humans to solve complex problems. This may be the case for
some (if not most) of the cognitive tools that Vaesen points out
in his target article.
Furthermore, we agree that one cannot easily determine the
evolution of language (cf. Richerson & Boyd 2005). Yet, it is
undisputed, also by Vaesen, that language has been particularly
useful for participating in culture, in particular in keeping track
of complex relational systems (i.e., gossip). However, relatively
simple forms of communication are not unique to humans; the
most primary vocalizations even seem to be present in primates,
which often participate in relatively simple relational systems
(Dunbar 1997). As such, language seems to have developed pri-
marily for purposes directly related to social interactions, becom-
ing more important once people began living in larger groups.
Language has since become immensely important for other cog-
nitive tools. Clark even suggested that the “recent intellectual
explosion in evolutionary time is due as much to linguistic-
enabled extensions of cognition as to any independent develop-
ment in our inner cognitive recourses” (Clark 2008, p. 232).
This point is further exemplified by recent work in (social)
psychology. As an example of two of the cognitive tools Vaesen
put forth – executive functioning and body plasticity – we
know that both chimps and humans show relatively simple and
automatic affiliative behaviors in response to an angered inter-
action partner (Ha¨fner & IJzerman 2011; Preuschoft & Van
Hooff 1997). Humans, however, seem to have the unique
capacity to control the self to accommodate for the other in com-
mitted relationships (Rusbult et al. 1991). One could wonder to
what extent similar behaviors may occur in other species that
display monogamous pair bonding.
Yet, the simple fact that humans possess advanced abilities to
postpone immediate self-interest (i.e., self control) in relation to
negative emotions like anger (and their facial expressions) is not
surprising, as language has been shown to closely rely on
modality specific representations that guide and help people’s
cognition (e.g., Pulvermu¨ller 2005; Zwaan & Taylor 2006).
Verbs (indicative of action; compared with adjectives) related
to smiling or frowning induce greater activation of zygomaticus
or corrugator muscles (Foroni & Semin 2009). In addition, phys-
ically warm (as compared with cold) conditions induce people to
use more relational language (verbs; IJzerman & Semin 2009).
One might logically propose that linguistic features play a vital
part in actions and thoughts above and beyond “merely” “extend-
ing the body.” Research suggests it can. Linguistic features
permit to represent close and near “future” at different abstrac-
tion levels, allowing people to coordinate and plan future joint
and individual actions (Clark & Semin 2007).
In short, whether it is for computational purposes or for social
interaction, language allows complex uses for otherwise simple
elements and thoughts. Language not only allows new uses of
people’s outer worlds, but it also allows an “intellectual
explosion” because of an exponential increase of the utility and
potential of existing tools. Taken together, we think that the “dis-
continuity” between humans’ and chimps’ tool use may be mis-
leading. Indeed, our suggestion seems to find support in work
on conceptual knowledge; research shows that both for human
and nonhuman animals, the presence of a specific object (e.g.,
a conspecific or food) activates knowledge distributed across
modality-specific systems, rather than through modular and
amodal systems (see Barsalou 2005).
We have proposed that differences between humans and
chimps in tool use are not due to a discontinuity between
humans and chimps, but, instead, due to a vast discrepancy
enabled by the language that provides immensely complex
usages of otherwise relatively simple cognitive tools. Language
thus complements otherwise basic biological abilities, thereby
providing a key factor in the differentiation between humans
and chimps.
For these reasons, language plays a fundamental role not only
in the development of tool use, but also, and most importantly, in
creating culture accumulation. Vaesen’s discussion on cumulative
culture surprisingly omits the important and, we argue, necessary
role of language in building complex systems and in the develop-
ment of human technology.
Can object affordances impact on human
social learning of tool use?
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Abstract: The author describes “higher” and “uniquely human”
sociocognitive skills that he argues as being necessary for tool use. We
propose that those skills could be based on simpler detection systems
humans could share with other animal tool users. More specifically, we
discuss the impact of object affordances on the understanding and the
social learning of tool use.
Vaesen speculates that the human capacity to learn novel tool use
from observing goal-directed movements performed by others
(Csibra & Gergely 2007) is a hallmark of our uniqueness, and
that it is based on “higher” sociocognitive skills. It has been pro-
posed that such skills were supported by the ability to (1) decode
kinematic information into causal relationships between a behav-
ioural sequence and its result (Gergely 2007); (2) interpret
others’ behaviors as rational (assuming that the most efficient
observed action means are adopted to achieve a particular goal;
Gergely & Csibra 2003); and (3) accumulate a priori knowledge
from past observations about agents’ intentions and behaviours in
order to predict future events (Chambon et al. 2011).
We agree with the author that the sophistication of such socio-
cognitive skills goes far beyond those of any other animals’. Yet,
we believe that this sophistication could also be the result of
simpler systems allocated to the detection of low-level, local
sources of information, such as the manipulative properties of
objects called “affordances.”
Affordances define relational properties that emerge from
matching the perceived physical features of objects and the
agent’s biomechanical architecture, goals, plans, values, beliefs,
and past experiences. We propose that affordances allow agents
to delineate the number of candidate motor acts that could be
performed on tools. We postulate that affordances constrain
the number of possible solutions by generating biomechanical
prior expectations in line with the bodily architecture of agents.
These priors would bias individuals to act towards objects
aiming at biomechanical optimization (Rosenbaum et al. 1996;
Weiss et al. 2007).
As the author rightly points out, compared with other animals’,
the many degrees of freedom characterizing human effectors and
their striking motor control considerably enhance our ability to
detect new affordances and new potential objects uses. All this
contributes to increase the variety of the behavioural repertoire.
Nonetheless, we are sceptical about the idea that the primary
advantage such architectural properties bring for tool use acqui-
sition is fine-grained social learning. Indeed, in many situations,
detecting tools affordances allows learners to avoid such a
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high-level but costly strategy. Instead, this biomechanical unique-
ness could increase the probability of individual innovation, par-
ticularly in situations where novel tools are physically
unstructured and multi-purpose. For example, Acheulean stone
tools are poorly structured and roughly symmetrical objects with
a cutting edge. They do not offer affordances salient enough to
constrain the number of candidate motor acts that could be per-
formed on them. Sterelny (2003b) points out that the exact func-
tions and uses of Acheulean stone tools, although they were the
dominant element of human technology for more than a million
years, remain a matter of debate. It is more plausible that our
ancestors – who were predisposed to behavioural innovation
thanks to their high biomechanical flexibility – progressively dis-
covered not one or two, but a multitude of tasks that Acheulean
stone tools could roughly carry out.
We argue that the evolution of the human technological
environment favoured the utility of simpler systems such as affor-
dances detection. This eases the negotiation of the highly
demanding cognitive problems of tool use learning (Clark 1997;
Dennett 1995; Sterelny 2003a; 2003b). Indeed, tools we interact
with daily are designed for specific purposes. Affordances that are
available through their complex physical attributes offer the
chance for naive users to extract their functions at low cost
(Dennett 1982; 1995; Gregory 1981; Norman 1988). In our
engineered environments, affordances play a crucial role in the
acquisition of tool skills through individual trial and error as
well as social learning. More specifically, we argue that perceiv-
ing affordances directly biases the understanding of tool beha-
viours performed by others, and consequently the extraction of
related functional knowledge. The biomechanical priors that
emerge from the perception of tools affordances constrain the
number of candidate motor acts an individual could initiate.
Similarly, they also tune the observer’s prior expectations about
which motor behaviors are most likely to be performed by
others, enhancing the predictability and learnability of novel
tool use. Learning about a novel tool from observing a demon-
strator using it in a biomechanically “rational” way would be
less costly than learning from a demonstrator that violates our
expectations. That is, the convergence of the demonstrator’s
and observer’s biomechanical expectations facilitates an efficient
learning strategy, based on kinematics, rationality principle, or
prior knowledge.
Taken together, these observations question the exact role of
high-level, fine-grained social learning in the acquisition of new
tool skills. Relevant to this is work addressing animal behavioural
“traditions” – behavioural patterns that are relatively stable in
groups and are at least partly maintained by some forms of
social learning. These could result from constraints that limit
the number of possible alternative behaviours, more than from
the robustness of high-level social transmissionmechanisms (Clai-
die`re & Sperber 2010; Tennie et al. 2008). Here, we posit that the
crucial role affordances play in the acquisition of tool use strongly
suggests that fine-grained social learning strategies, such as true
imitation of observed action goals and means, are sometimes
less important than previously assumed. In fact, affordances,
together with ecological constraints and other products of episte-
mic engineering, could enhance the effectiveness of more frugal
forms of socially directed learning (Acerbi et al. 2011; Franz &
Matthews 2010) such as emulation learning (i.e., the observer
copies action goals performed by a demonstrator without consid-
ering action means) or even stimulus enhancement (i.e., when an
individual directs its behaviour towards an object or a part of an
object with which it saw another individual interact).
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Abstract: The investigative strategy that Vaesen uses presumes that
cognitive skills are to some extent hardwired; developmentally plastic
traits would not provide the relevant comparative information. But
recent views of cognition that stress external resources, and
evolutionary accounts such as cultural niche construction, urge us to
think carefully about the role of technology in shaping cognition.
Vaesen should be congratulated for proposing a multifaceted
account of a human uniqueness. Too often, hypotheses of
human uniqueness posit a single breakthrough, with a sub-
sequent cascade of other traits. Vaesen, to his credit, offers a
package of cognitive skills that he believes underlies a single
unique trait: cumulative cultural evolution. However, the com-
parative method that Vaesen uses to get to this package of cogni-
tive skills is problematic. By engaging in straight comparison of
chimp and human cognitive skills, Vaesen omits the possibility
for the co-evolution of cognition, technology, and culture that
potentially underpins human uniqueness. The comparison also
presumes that these traits are not developmentally plastic.
The co-evolutionary picture is important given recent models
of cognition that emphasise the importance of the external
world in cognitive processes and the acquisition of cognitive
skills (Clark 2008; Clark & Chalmers 1998; Menary 2010;
Sterelny 2010a) and neural plasticity (Quartz & Sejnowski
1997). In particular, the hypothesis of cultural niche construction
of Kim Sterelny argues that these human interactions with the
world are important for human cognitive evolution. The develop-
mental and cultural environment of hominins helps shape cogni-
tive processes (Sterelny 2003; 2010b; 2012). Tools, and the
behaviours of other tool users and makers, can act as scaffolds
to cognition.
Moreover, Vaesen never mentions how his list of cognitive
skills gets “in the head” of humans; but the assumption that
drives the comparative method is that the skills are evolved and
hardwired traits. Co-evolutionary models such as niche construc-
tion offer an alternative developmental route for these skills.
We can see the potential impact of these alternative models of
cognition in relation to the Acheulean tool culture that Vaesen
briefly discusses in the second part of his article. Vaesen suggests
that there is not much variability in Acheulean tool form, and that
it lacks evidence of cumulative development. Consequently,
Vaesen infers that the associated cognitive skills he thinks are
necessary to possess a cumulative culture are therefore absent.
However, many archaeologists point out that there is in fact a
great deal of variation in tool manufacturing methods, materials,
and rawmaterial resource strategies (Lycett & Cramon-Taubadel
2008; Lycett & Gowlett 2008; McNabb et al. 2004; Sharon 2009).
So whilst tool form, and possibly even tool use, is fairly constant,
tool manufacturing methods do in fact show some signs of cumu-
lative culture. So, the evidence for Vaesen’s package of cognitive
skills is potentially present in manufacturing methods, even if it is
absent from the final tool form. Lycett and Gowlett (2008)
suggest that this is the result of transmission between generations
that allows for the accumulation of variation in manufacturing
skills but fails to transmit and accumulate variations in tool
form. Using ideas about the co-evolution of culture and cogni-
tion, and acknowledging the role that external resources play in
cognitive processes, we can make sense of this contradiction.
As a social animal, hominins may take the presence of tools and
other toolmakers as physical and behavioural templates for their
further tool production. Hominins or modern sapiens making a
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tool can use as a template other tools possessed by individuals in
their community. Consequently, the “idea” of a tool need not be
“in the head” of an individual, as tools possessed by other
members of the group can play this role. There are any
number of external resources that can assist individuals to stay
“on track” in their manufacturing task.
This social world is crucial in learning to make tools. Other tool-
makers are accessible behavioural templates of toolmaking activi-
ties. Tools, and other tool users, create an environment that can
support the development of cognitive skills associated with tool
manufacture. Tools are made in a world where there are other
people making tools, and where there is close contact between
toolmakers and their behavioural outputs. For a young hominin
learning to make a tool, this environment provides a situation
where the cost of learning a tool is relatively low. There are lots
of behavioural templates around, some of whom may even have
a genetic interest in ensuring the young hominin acquires the
appropriate skills (Sterelny 2010b; 2012).
In his section on executive control (sect. 12.2), Vaesen notes
that individuals with certain brain lesions can achieve complex
sequences of tasks where there is clear “next steps” available in
the form of environmental cues (the lunch box packing case;
sect. 6) but cannot achieve tasks where purely mental planning
is necessary (Tower of London tasks; sect. 6). For a social organ-
ism, tool manufacturing quite likely resembles the first task, with
abundant physical props and a community of users and makers.
Tools may scaffold executive control (Jeffares 2010b).
Therefore, we can resolve the apparent paradox of the Acheu-
lean by understanding the environment that the tools are made
in. Acheulean tools are made in a social context; and being
members of a toolmaking community buffers the transmission
of skills, reduces learning costs, and allows variation to develop.
Nevertheless, the hominins that made these tools appear to not
have the capacity to accumulate technological improvements in
tool form. This suggests that suitable buffering effects were not
present during deployment activities, or that different processes
encouraged standardisation of tool form (Jeffares 2010a).
Regardless of the details of this case, what should be clear is
that we have to acknowledge that cognitive skills do not straight-
forwardly facilitate technological accumulation. There is a cogni-
tive ecology of co-evolutionary processes, external resources,
scaffolds, and developmental influences that shape human cogni-
tion, both now and in the past. This matters to understanding
human uniqueness and how it evolved.
Humans make tools because they live in a unique cultural
environment that helps them learn, and fine-tune, the cognitive
skills necessary for toolmaking. To understand cumulative
culture, we must understand how culture scaffolds the learning
of cognitive skills, and not presume the skills that underlie it.
By not considering the historical environment and the external
environment as part of that matrix of forces that shapes cognition,
Vaesen potentially ignores the possibility that some of his package
of cognitive skills are learnt.
Tool use induces complex and flexible
plasticity of human body representations
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Abstract: Plasticity of body representation fundamentally underpins
human tool use. Recent studies have demonstrated remarkably complex
plasticity of body representation in humans, showing that such plasticity
(1) occurs flexibly across multiple time scales and (2) involves multiple
body representations responding differently to tool use. Such findings
reveal remarkable sophistication of body plasticity in humans,
suggesting that Vaesen may overestimate the similarity of such
mechanisms in humans and non-human primates.
Vaesen presents a compelling and comprehensive overview of
the cognitive abilities underpinning human tool use. Across
diverse domains, Vaesen argues for important differences
between humans and other primates in all but one. Here we
focus on this last domain, body schema plasticity, which Vaesen
suggests may not differ substantially between humans and apes.
Although we agree that the fact of body schema plasticity charac-
terises both human and non-human primate cognition, recent
results have revealed a highly complex relation between plasticity
of body representations and tool use in humans. We suggest that
there are likely to be fundamental differences in such mechan-
isms between humans and other primates, with important impli-
cations for tool use and its relation to other cognitive abilities. In
particular, we focus on two main issues: (1) the time course of
plasticity in humans occurs flexibly across multiple time scales,
and (2) multiple body representations coexist in the human
brain, responding with differential plasticity in the context of
tool use, and accounting for the different kinds of experience
associated with different types of tools.
Apes and monkeys in the wild rarely use tools spontaneously,
and they learn to do so only after long and laborious training
(Iriki & Sakura 2008). In humans, however, tool use induces plas-
ticity at multiple time scales, showing long-term learning in the
case of specific expertise, but also flexibly changing over just a
few seconds in experimental situations. For example, some
studies have varied tool use on a trial-to-trial basis, finding
clear modulation of peripersonal space representations depend-
ing on whether or not a tool is used (Holmes et al. 2007) or
what length tool is used (Longo & Lourenco 2006), demonstrat-
ing that tool use induces nearly instantaneous plasticity. Other
recent studies have demonstrated long-term plastic changes
associated with expertise for specific tools. In blind cane users,
for example, merely passively holding the cane extended audi-
tory-tactile interactions along the length of the tool; in control
participants, by contrast, active training with the cane was
required to induce such extension (Serino et al. 2007). Analogous
findings have been reported for everyday use of the computer
mouse (Bassolino et al. 2010): Merely holding a mouse in the
hand habitually used to control the mouse (the right) extended
auditory-interactions to the space near the screen; whereas
such effects were found only when the mouse was actively
used, and not just passively held, in the hand not habitually
used to control the mouse (the left). These results demonstrate
that tool-induced plasticity is highly complex, occurring across
multiple time scales and levels of abstraction.
Although the human brain certainly treats wielded tools at
some level as if they were extensions of the body, distinctions
between the body and tools must also be made, and at several
levels. For example, Povinelli et al. (2010) rightly point out that
one important function of tools is to allow actions that would
otherwise be prohibitively dangerous, such as reaching into a
fire or stirring a pot of boiling soup. In such cases, effective gui-
dance of the tool may require it being treated as part of the body,
even as safety considerations may necessitate it being strongly
distinguished from the body. Such conflicting requirements high-
light the need for multiple body representations, maintaining
parallel, and potentially inconsistent, representations of the
body with or without the tool.
This flexibility appears much less pronounced in non-humans
primates: In monkeys, long-term tool use trainings induce struc-
tural changes in neural body representations, which are rigid and
persist whether the animal is tested with the tool or without
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(Quallo et al. 2009). In humans, conversely, long-term tool use
expertise develops multiple body representations, which can be
selectively activated depending on the presence/absence of the
tool. In blind cane users, for example, peripersonal space rep-
resentations were extended towards the far space, or limited
around the hand (as in sighted subjects), depending on
whether blind subjects held their cane during testing (Serino
et al. 2007).
It is also interesting to note that in humans, the subjective
experience of wielding a tool is strikingly different from that of
illusions, such as the rubber hand illusion (Botvinick & Cohen
1998), in which external physical objects are treated as being
part of the body. This dissociation suggests that the tool is “embo-
died” at a lower, more implicit level, what De Preester and Tsa-
kiris (2009) refer to as “body-extension,” distinguishing it from
the higher-level, more conscious “body-incorporation” seen in
the rubber hand and related illusions. An interesting, intermedi-
ate case is that of prosthesis implantation: A prosthesis is a tool,
extending action potentialities of an accidentally limited body;
but prostheses also replace the shape of the missing limb,
hence restructuring the physical body. There seems to be wide
variability in amputees’ experiences of their prostheses, from
those who experience the prosthesis as a corporeal structure to
those who consider it an artificial device (Murray 2004). It is
probable that both functional (level of motor control) and cos-
metic (level of anthropomorphism) features of the prosthesis
underlie such differences. Recent findings suggest that the
sense of ownership over a prosthesis can be enhanced by illusory
(Ehrsson et al. 2008) or physical (Marasco et al. 2011) sensory
feedback to the stump. This level of abstraction in the experience
of body incorporation of artificial objects cannot be investigated
in non-human primates (Graziano 1999).
We suggest that different levels of body schema plasticity
characterize human cognition and might account for the different
experiences associated with the multiplicity of complex tools used
by humans in everyday life. These and other recent findings have
provided fundamental insight into the role of plasticity of body
representations in human tool use. Together, they suggest that
body schema plasticity is a highly complex, flexible, and task-
dependent process, which should not be thought of as simple
“present or absent” in an organism or species. Therefore, we
believe Vaesen has too quickly excluded an important role for
this factor as an important source of differences between
human tool use and that of other primates.
Prosthetic gestures: How the tool
shapes the mind
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Abstract: I agree with Vaesen that it is a mistake to discard tool use as a
hallmark of human cognition. I contend, nonetheless, that tools are not
simply external markers of a distinctive human mental architecture.
Rather, they actively and meaningfully participate in the process by
which hominin brains and bodies make up their sapient minds.
If we could rid ourselves of all pride, if, to define our species, we kept
strictly to what the historic and the prehistoric periods show us to be
the constant characteristic of man and of intelligence, we should say
not Homo sapiens, but Homo faber.
— Henri-Louis Bergson, Creative Evolution (1911/1998, p. 139)
Despite the famous feats of termite-fishing chimpanzees and
hook-crafting crows, Bergson’s words from his Creative
Evolution remain largely unchallenged (for a good review of
the evidence, see Seed & Byrne 2010; Tomasello & Herrmann
2010). Even the most highly trained nut crackers could
not manage to equal the abilities seen in the earliest hominin
stone tool makers (Davidson & McGrew 2005; Iriki & Sakura
2008). There is more to the notion of Homo faber, however.
For it is not the sheer variety and sophistication of human tech-
nologies, but rather the profound complexity of our engage-
ment with tools and technologies that matters the most: We
humans alone define and shape ourselves by the tools we
make and use. Inspired from the work of Bernard Stiegler
(1998) and Andre´ Leroi-Gourhan (1963/1993), I would like
to describe human tool use as the prosthetic gesture par excel-
lence (Malafouris 2010a). This is a species-unique and self-
transforming human predisposition that leaves very little
space for valid relational comparisons with other animals (or
so I wish to suggest).
I understand that those committed to the long-held evolution-
ary ideal of a cognitive “continuum” between human and nonhu-
man animals would probably take my previous points as
ill-conceived and anti-Darwinian: “The difference in mind
between man and the higher animals, great as it is, is certainly
one of degree and not of kind” (Darwin 1871, p. 105). But I
think that so far as the human entanglement with tools is con-
cerned, Darwin’s claim is rather misleading. What must have
certainly started as a difference in degree soon became one of
kind – that is, a difference that makes a difference. No doubt,
the lack of conceptual clarity about the use and meaning of
terms such as degree, kind, mind, and tool is a major contributing
factor for our troubles with the question of “human cognitive
autapomorphies” (Suddendorf 2008, p. 147), and I am afraid
Vaesen’s paper does very little to help us clear the ground.
In any case, the interesting question is not whether human and
animal tool-using abilities are different, but rather, why they are,
and how did they become so different. Where do we start, then?
Mainstream approaches to the comparative study of cognition
follow two main paths when it comes to answering those ques-
tions: The first seeks to explain apparent discontinuities in
human mental function as the natural outcome of the human
genome, that is, resulting directly from biological adaptations
(e.g., the “supermodule” hypothesized by the relational reinter-
pretation [RR] hypothesis proposed in this journal by Penn
et al. 2008). The second path seeks to account for the differences
between human and nonhuman cognitive abilities by way of
language, culture, learning, and the external symbolic represen-
tational means that these capacities afford (e.g., Tomasello
et al. 2005; Tomasello & Herrmann 2010). The former path
takes us into the realm of biology; the latter into the realm of
culture.
Vaesen’s approach combines both paths. His thesis is essen-
tially that humans are born with better-equipped neural
systems and cognitive machinery, which is sufficient to account
for the discontinuity between human and nonhuman animal
tool use capacity even in the absence of culture. He then shows
how our superiority with respect to the nine cognitive capacities
deemed crucial to tool use can also explain why technological
accumulation evolved so markedly in humans. In other words,
the aim of his study is not to question the barrier between “indi-
vidual brain power” and “culture,” (sect. 1) but instead to argue
that human superiority is reflected at the former biological
level as much as it is in the latter sociocultural level: “[h]uman
tool use reflects higher social intelligence (indeed), but just as
much greater non-social wit” (sect.1, para.2).
Here is, then, the nub of the problem – at least as I see it:
Whilst Vaesen’s comparative gaze seems squeezed within
the artificial boundaries that separate the cultural from the
biological realm, the sort of things we call tools stubbornly
inhabit the hybrid realm between – that is, the realm where
brain, body, and culture conflate, mutually catalyzing and consti-
tuting one another (Malafouris 2008; 2010b). As a result,
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Vaesen’s account leaves out some of the issues that I believe
matter the most. For example, the human total reliance on
tools (Schiffer & Miller 1999) and their role in what Andy
Clark calls “supersizing the mind” (2008), or the possibility that
the cognitive discontinuity between us and our closest relatives
may be largely the product of the cognitive continuity of
human brains, bodies, and tools.
Is there any way out of this? I believe that searching for the
neural and cognitive bases of tool use provides useful pointers
but cannot in itself explain the unique ways humans and tools
bring each other into being – especially when grounded in a
strictly “internalist” and “computationalist” view of mind, as is
the case of Vaesen’s paper. The question of human tool use is
not one that can be answered by looking deeper into the
human brain; it demands a holistic anthropological stance (in
both the philosophical and the cognitive sense). We need to
start thinking about human tool use as a transformative constitu-
tive intertwining of neural, bodily, and material recourses, rather
than in terms of a pre-specified set of adapted neural structures
and cognitive functions (seeMalafouris 2010a; 2010b; Wheeler &
Clark 2008, p. 3563). This approach to the study of human tool
use could also help us to avoid the long-exposed but still
engrained anthropocentric prejudices that any discussion of non-
human animal tool use inevitably embodies (Hansell & Ruxton
2008). Moreover, it will lead us to ask questions not simply
about how the mind shapes the tool, but also about how the
tool shapes the mind.
Cathedrals, symphony orchestras, and
iPhones: The cultural basis of modern
technology
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Abstract: The distinctions drawn by Vaesen are plausible when we are
comparing chimpanzees and human beings somewhere between the
middle Paleolithic and the Neolithic. But since then new kinds of
organization have vastly outstripped these neurological differences to
account for the enormous advancement of human technology – from
cuneiform to the iPhone – leaving our remarkable evolutionary cousins
far behind.
Never let overwhelming similarities obscure fundamental
differences.
— Leslie A. White, personal communication (ca. 1960)
I think that Vaesen’s article is exemplary in characterizing the
differences between human and ape technology until about the
beginnings of the Neolithic. Since then ape technology seems
unchanged (except for a few items some captive apes may have
learned from humans). Note that my argument is not meant to
diminish apes; they are, on their own terms, utterly amazing crea-
tures. Chimpanzees can, for example, do dentistry (McGrew &
Tutin 1972) (Fig. 1).
And I will always be in awe of Gombe’s Figans, who, at just the
right moment, quietly announced impending danger, scattering
the whole troop and leaving the newly opened box of bananas
all to himself (Rappaport 1979). Such creativity and imagination
with such modest tools are remarkable.
It seems plausible that some neurological capacities account
for the differences between apes and pre-Neolithic humans;
but since then, the explosion of technology, science, knowledge,
and religion is due not to anything particularly neurological but to
things explicitly cultural. Things like:
Village life – with technological specialization, emerging
immediately after the first plant and animal domestication,
requiring defensive fortifications to protect stored food and
seed against raiders, implausible for individuals, but relatively
simple for a group with some leadership (utterly novel 10,000
years ago).
Transportation – allowing the easy movement of people and
things over vast distances starting with, say, the Silk Road;
then the development of shipping (sails, compasses, accurate
clocks); then trains, cars, and trucks; then 2,000 contemporary
airlines moving 2 billion passengers per year (increasing at
about 5% a year, hence, doubling in 15 years).
The sharing of knowledge – ranging from things such as the
Rosetta stone, both the actual one and the language-learning
computer program; the Google project to scan and make avail-
able all the books ever written; the huge explosion of edu-
cation, and particularly higher education, making the most
sophisticated thought and practice available retail (currently,
more than 80,000 Chinese students are enrolled in colleges
and universities in the United States; 37% of students at the
University of Michigan are from abroad).
Cell phones – a while ago I read that half the people in the world
had never made a phone call; but today, about 60 people per
hundred own cell phones, and many of those who don’t will
live in homes with people who do; the first mobile phone (a
car phone) appeared in the mid 1950s; countries with relatively
few cell phones are political dictatorships, where leadership
prohibits them (Burma, Laos, Cambodia).
Symphony orchestras.
The instantaneous emergence of whole new global technologies –
for example, the iPhone was first sold mid-year 2007; by the
beginning of 2011, more than 300,000 “apps” were available
for the iPhone; as I write this 7 months later, there are an
additional 125,000, that’s 18,000 new ones per month; the
iPhone 4S5 with Siri, the personal assistant, is just out.
Computer fluency – There are about 11 million people in the
world fluent in one or another computer programming
language; more than 3 million1 (others estimate 4 million) of
them use C++, arguably more than any other computer
language.
None of these things, or things like them, are due to changes in
the brain. They are due to innovations in the way people can work
collectively at vast projects such as building a medieval cathedral
(probably the first truly international industry)2 or the World
Trade Center in Bahrain.3 They are due to the fact that thou-
sands of otherwise ordinary individuals are acting in coordinated
ways to achieve otherwise impossible outcomes; lately not so
much in gangs but in networks. Imagine how many people
have a hand in manufacturing a Toyota.
Figure 1 (Moerman). Belle is removing Bandit’s loose tooth
with a small stick while Shadow observes. Copyright # W.C.
McGrew.
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None of this hinges on brain changes. These things hinge on
how our brains are used (or maybe how they use us).
The medieval cathedrals are an excellent case in point. They
were constructed with only the very simplest machines:
wedges, pulleys, levers. Many of the techniques used, particularly
in the forming of vaults, are unknown to us; some restorers of
600-year-old cathedrals (e.g., E. E. Viollet le Duc, who rebuilt
Notre Dame between 1845 and 1864) have made many ingenious
inferences and have helped us to understand what seems almost
impossible (Reiff 1971). Some of these magnificent buildings
were under construction for 200 years. And most of them were,
in effect, built of wood by carpenters; masons then laid stone
over the wood, the wood then removed, leaving what we see
today. Wrote Viollet le Duc in about 1860:
A well-made scaffolding is a feature of the builder’s art which engages
his best intelligence and his thorough supervision, for the real skill of
the builder can be judged from the manner in which he places his
scaffolding.. . . If the scaffoldings are massive, if they employ wood in
profusion, the [subsequent] workmen are well aware of it: they judge
the chief’s degree of practical knowledge from this provisional work,
and they recognize any inclinations of his from his abuse of
means.. . . [T]he very lives of his workmen depend on it. (Fitchen 1961)
Here we see the art of scaffolding: intelligence, supervision,
teamwork, skill, awareness, life itself – that is, leadership. And
when done, it is torn down.
This is all organization, cooperation, planning, teaching, enga-
ging the skills of hundreds or thousands of different people with
different background and training to make a cathedral or an
iPhone. Without offense, we see nothing like this in chimpanzees.
NOTES
1. This estimate is a personal communication from Dr. Bjarne
Stoustrup, the designer and implementer of the C++ programming
language.
2. Google “Reims cathedral images” for a spectacular example, one of
hundreds.
3. Google “Bahrain Trade Center images.”
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Abstract: Human life history incorporates childhood, a lengthy post-
weaning period of dependency. This species-specific period provides an
opportunity for extensive learning and for sophisticated cultural
behaviors to develop, including crucial tool use skills. Although I agree
that no individual cognitive trait singularly differentiates humans from
other animals, I suggest here that without childhood, the traits that are
key to human tool use would not emerge.
When Jane Goodall (1998) first reported that chimpanzees strip
leaves from twigs to fish for termites, Louis Leakey famously
responded: “Now we must redefine tool, redefine Man, or accept
chimpanzees as humans.” The decades of research followingGood-
all’s discovery have convincingly rendered invalid any description
of Homo sapiens that places us as the planet’s only tool-making
animal. Yet we remain without peer when one considers the
depth, breadth, and inventiveness of our tool use. Vaesen’s claim
that the way we use tools constitutes a major cognitive discontinuity
between our closest relatives and ourselves is staked on solid
ground. Standing out in his coverage of tool-related cognitive
traits is a reliance on experimental comparisons of human children
and adult chimpanzees. In this a critical point is missed: Ours is the
only species to have a childhood as a life stage, something that likely
lies at the heart of the discontinuities Vaesen outlines.
The majority of mammals follow birth with a period of infancy
(characterised by the appearance of deciduous teeth and all or
some nourishment being provided by maternal lactation) that
transitions seamlessly into adulthood. Chimpanzees postpone
puberty and insert an extended phase of juvenile growth
between infancy and adulthood whereby offspring are dependent
on their mothers for about 5 years (Kaplan et al. 2000).
Humans have a shorter infancy and, at least in preindustrial
societies, breast-feeding is usually discontinued around the
beginning of the third year (Kaplan et al. 2000; Sellen & Smay
2001). Weaning at this young age places a great nutritional
burden on offspring. Three-year-olds are not typically mature
enough to prepare their own food and are too limited by decid-
uous dentition and a small gastrointestinal tract to consume an
adult diet. In various hunter-gatherer societies, the solution to
this problem is for older members of the social group to
provide specially prepared foods that are high in energy and
nutrients until self-care becomes possible at around 7 years
(Locke & Bogin 2006). This post-weaning pre-juvenile stage con-
stitutes “childhood” and corresponds with a distinct, species-
specific growth curve and changes in sex-hormone patterns
(Bogin 1990; Hochberg & Albertsson-Wikland 2008).
The insertion of childhood as a life stage not only lengthens the
period of dependency on others, but also places responsibility of
care for the child with the community. By contrast, chimpanzees
transition directly from infant dependence on the mother to
independent juvenility. Human childhood therefore affords an
extended period of development during which offspring are pro-
vided multiple opportunities for learning from the broader com-
munity while buffered from survival pressures incumbent on
juveniles and adults. These opportunities will be enhanced by
the uniquely human practice of teaching. The slow somatic
growth and delayed sexual maturation of childhood serve to maxi-
mize maturational differences between adult teachers and child
students, differences that allow a great deal of learning, practice,
and modification of survival skills (Bogin 1990).
Associated with adult-child instruction is the tendency of chil-
dren to replicate all of the actions an adult uses when achieving
an object-directed outcome, even actions whose relevance is
shown to be causally redundant (see Nielsen & Blank 2011).
This “over-imitation” facilitates the rapid acquisition of skills,
actions, and behaviors while avoiding the potential pitfalls and
false end points that can come from trial-and-error learning.
Indeed, children are not particularly good at innovating even
simple tools (Beck et al. 2011). Though traces can be found in
the infancy period, data collected among contemporary descen-
dants of hunter-gatherers indicate that teaching and over-
imitation become firmly established during childhood (Hewlett
et al. 2011; Nielsen & Tomaselli 2010). Other social-cognitive
traits Vaesen links to tool use, such as theory of mind
(Wellman et al. 2001) and mental time travel (Suddendorf
et al. 2011), are similarly established in this period – as is the
uniquely human propensity for pretending, an endeavor in
which the mind can find a rich bed to sow the seeds of invention
(Nielsen 2012). The emergence of childhood as a life stage
therefore presents itself as a critical step in the evolution of
human tool use. It might also have underpinned marked
increases in tool innovation among our hominin ancestors.
Vaesen alludes to the apparent lack of cumulative culture
evident in the Acheulean Industrial Complex, which appeared
on the paleolandscape 1.6 mya, exemplified by the teardrop-
shaped bifacial hand axes made by Homo ergaster and Homo
erectus. The production of these lithic artifacts is characterized
by a regularity of design that lasted for hundreds of millennia
and is thought indicative of a general lack of technological inno-
vation (Foley & Lahr 2003; Hill et al. 2009). There is evidence to
suggest that such lack of innovation is due to the absence of a
childhood period. During the last three decades, the most
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common method used to address questions of hominin growth
has been the study of fossil teeth, with a modern human-like
sequence of dental development now regarded as one of the diag-
nostic hallmarks of our species (Dean et al. 2001). Microscopic
analysis of growth patterns in fossil teeth indicates that dental
development in lower Paleolithic hominins followed a chimpan-
zee-like timing. That is, childhood as a life stage was not present
before 1.5 mya. Crucially, evidence points to a lack of childhood
in hand axe–making erectus (Dean 2000; Dean et al. 2001). Con-
versely, and though a matter of ongoing debate (see Smith et al.
2010), rates of dental development found in fossilized Nean-
derthal teeth are suggestive of a childhood in this species
(Macchiarelli et al. 2006). This ties in with the emergence of
the Mousterian tool kit around 300,000 years ago that signified
an order-of-magnitude increase in technological complexity
that we have not looked back from.
Human offspring are confronted with a vast array of tools they
must learn to use. Childhood emerged at some point in our evol-
ution and provided time for the acquisition of the requisite skills
to do so, along with the emergence of the multifarious social and
cognitive advances that make us who we are. With childhood
there is no need to redefine tool, redefine Man, or accept chim-
panzees as humans. With childhood we became Homo faber
(Bergson 1911/1998).
What exists in the environment that motivates
the emergence, transmission, and
sophistication of tool use?
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Abstract: In his attempt to find cognitive traits that set humans apart
from nonhuman primates with respect to tool use, Vaesen overlooks
the primacy of the environment toward the use of which behavior
evolves. The occurrence of a particular behavior is a result of how that
behavior has evolved in a complex and changing environment selected
by a unique population.
In his target article, Vaesen attempts to find a set of intrinsic cog-
nitive traits, often described in terms of neurological structures,
that help explain the divergent paths with respect to tool use
taken by humans and non-human primates. The emphasis here
seems to be skewed in the direction of intrinsic traits at the
expense of ecological contexts. Yet, as Rosen (2000) pointed
out succinctly, a function of an organism can never be understood
in terms of its internal structure, because “a function requires an
external context; a structure does not” (p. 25). I do agree with
Vaesen that “no individual cognitive trait can be singled out as
the key trait differentiating humans from other animals” (sect.
1). However, it is not that multiple cognitive traits differentiate
humans from nonhuman primates, but that species are never
adequately differentiated by means of such essentialistic criteria
(Ghiselin 1974; Reed 1996).
The examples that illustrate the inadequacy of the assumption
of simple mapping between intrinsic traits and functional behav-
ior range from the convergence of nut-cracking behavior in
extant primate species, where both 45-kg chimpanzees (Pan tro-
glodytes) and 3-kg capuchin monkeys (Cebus libidinosus) use
stone hammers around 1 kg in mass (Haslam et al. 2009), to
upland geese with webbed feet that never go near the water.
The latter were observed by Darwin (1859), who remarked,
“habits have changed without a corresponding change of struc-
ture” (p. 186).
In human evolution, the time gap between the start of stone
flaking and the earliest Homo fossils suggests that earlier
hominin taxa (i.e., Australopithecus) could be the makers of
the earliest stone tools (McPherron et al. 2010; Plummer
2004), whose relative brain sizes appear to be roughly equival-
ent to those of the extant great apes (Asfaw et al. 1999;
Kappelman 1996). Recent discovery of 1.76-million-year-old
early Acheulean tools, which pre-date the oldest known out-
of-Africa hominin sites with no such artifacts, provides evidence
that at least two contemporaneous hominin groups coexisted in
Africa at that time: one with early Acheulean technology who
remained in Africa and the other without such technology
who developed strategies for dispersion into Eurasia (Lepre
et al. 2011). Whether this indicates the cultural disparity
within species or the existence of separate species is
unknown, but I seriously doubt that such division can be
caused by the preceding changes in their “cognitive” capacities
alone.
Today, there is increasing evidence to suggest that changes in
behavior that establish a new environmental relationship often
antedate genetic, physiological, or morphological changes; and
behavior is viewed as one of the leading edges of evolution,
rather than simply the end product of it (Gottlieb 2002; Plotkin
1988). The recurrence of new environmental relationships may
influence the selection pressures on species, favoring individuals
with phenotypes that match the usage of novel behavioral
resources of the environment (Lewontin 2001; Odling-Smee
et al. 2003). A consensus among researchers holds that novel be-
havioral shifts associated with the discovery of conchoı¨dal frac-
ture, which allowed for meat and marrow procurement by
means of sharp-edged tools, played instrumental selective roles
during human evolution (Asfaw et al. 1999; Bril et al. 2010;
Isaac 1976; McPherron et al. 2010; Roche 2005; Semaw et al.
1997; Stout et al. 2010).
Our own experimental study on this particular way of exploit-
ing behavioral resources in the environment – the control of con-
choı¨dal fracture in flaking through direct hard-hammer
percussion – revealed the necessity of considerable amount of
experience in predicting and controlling the consequence of a
strike given to a core (Nonaka et al. 2010). This requires
seeking out the relevant features in the surface structure of the
core that reflect the constraints of conchoı¨dal fracture. Specifi-
cally, modern experienced stone knappers have discovered a
regularity that exists in the relationship between the observable
layout of surfaces of the core, size of a detachable flake, and
threshold of kinetic energy required to initiate the fracture,
which was demonstrated by the selection of striking location
and the control of movement. Essential to the acquisition of
this kind of skill is the firsthand experience to explore the prop-
erties of a core and a hammer stone. We suggested that the evi-
dence of precise control of conchoı¨dal fracture in the Early Stone
Age records (e.g., Delanges & Roche 2005) may be indicative of
the recurrence of a situation in which juveniles are provided with
the experience of rediscovering important affordances of the
environment directly, by looking at the surface of the core and
wielding the hammer stone.
Vaesen does rightly emphasize the role of social learning in
human technological accumulation. However, what exists in the
environment (outside of the head) that “motivates” the accumu-
lation of knowledge across generations is largely left out of his
account. Among the nut-cracking populations of wild chimpan-
zees, for example, the same stone tools have been re-used over
successive generations (S. Hirata and S. Carvalho personal com-
munication). Capuchins are known to accumulate stones that are
appropriate for the nut-cracking task at sites with appropriate
anvils, the remains of which may last for millennia (Visalberghi
et al. 2007). In such cases, not only the ecological “givens” but
also the ecological “takings” and “makings” make up the facts
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of the physical world that surrounds evolving populations of
animals (Reed 1996). These facts of the environment are no
less biological and no more cultural than neurological structures
and genes are, which are equally incorporated into, and thereby
contribute to, the furtherance of various biological processes of
animals.
What makes a particular behavior such as tool use occur as it
does is a result of how that behavior has evolved in the environ-
ment, selected and modified by a unique population (Gibson
1986; Reed 1985). Given the primacy of the environment into
which animals are born toward the use of which behavior
evolves, I would welcome Vaesen’s making a connection
between his ideas and the following question: What exists in
the environment that motivates the emergence, transmission,
and sophistication of tool use?
An area specifically devoted to tool use
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Abstract: A comparative fMRI study by Peeters et al. (2009) provided
evidence that a specific sector of left inferior parietal lobule is devoted
to tool use in humans, but not in monkeys. We propose that this area
represents the neural substrate of the human capacity to understand
tool use by using causal reasoning.
Vaesen lists nine cognitive capacities crucial to tool use in
humans and discusses to what extent they are also present in
the great apes. One of these capacities is causal reasoning,
which, as stressed by Vaesen, does not simply involve noticing
the covariance between a cause and an effect, but also allows sub-
jects to infer a mechanism relating the two. The author concludes
that current evidence suggests that this capacity is present in apes
only to a modest degree. He does not indicate, however, any
possible anatomical basis for this cognitive difference between
apes and humans.
Recently, Peeters et al. (2009) examined the neural basis of
tool use in human and non-human primates (rhesus monkeys).
In a comparative fMRI study, they scanned human volunteers
and untrained monkeys, as well as monkeys trained to use
tools, while they observed hand actions and actions performed
using tools. In both species, presentation of an action activated
occipito-temporal, intraparietal, and ventral premotor cortex
bilaterally. In humans, however, the observation of an action per-
formed with tools yielded an additional, specific activation of a
rostral sector of the left inferior parietal lobule, referred to as
the anterior supramarginal gyrus (aSMG) tool use region. They
proposed that this region, unique to humans, underlies a specific
way of understanding tool actions based on the appreciation of
the causal relationship between the intended use of the tool
and the result obtained by using it.
That monkey parietal cortex contains only the biological hand-
action observation areas need not imply that these areas cannot
be modified by the training to use tools, as has been documented
by Iriki et al. (1996). However, the fact that monkeys learned to
use simple tools does not necessarily imply an understanding of
the abstract relationship between tools and the goal that can be
achieved by using them. The tool used, for example, the rake,
might simply become, with training, a prolongation of the arm,
as shown by the response properties of neurons recorded in
the medial wall of the intraparietal sulcus.
The human aSMG region was discovered by an interaction
analysis subtracting out static shape differences between the
tool-use and hand-action videos. This suggests that the human
area uses differences in kinematics to distinguish tool actions
from biological actions. This links nicely with another species
difference that has been discovered by Orban et al. (2006): The
human parietal cortex is much more sensitive to visual motion
than is its monkey counterpart. Some of these motion-sensitive
areas, such as dorsal intraparietal sulcus anterior (DIPSA), are
very close to the tool area, providing, possibly, an anatomical
link with aSMG. Thus, human parietal cortex is not simply
more sensitive to three-dimensional form from motion (Vanduffel
et al. 2002), providing more sophisticated higher-order visual
analysis capacities for guiding tool action; this cortex is also
more sensitive to lower-order motion, providing the kinematics
signals for the aSMG region.
Two further implications of the aSMG discovery are relevant to
the present discussion. First, as commented upon by Peeters et al.
(2009), the grouping of tool-related neurons in the aSMG might
dramatically increase the computational power of this neuronal
population. Interestingly, Vaesen discusses how causal reasoning,
which we propose to be implemented in the aSMG,may be instru-
mental in the development of technology by increasing the cost-
effectiveness of individual learning strategies. As mentioned
above, the grouping of tool-related neurons is lacking in
monkeys. However, these neurons might be scattered throughout
the biological hand-action observation circuit and, therefore,
remained unnoticed in theMR scanner. To what extent the group-
ingmay already be present in great apes remains a topic for further
experimentation. The existence, however, of such an embryonic
grouping, if present, could explain some of the rudimentary cogni-
tive abilities related to tool use in apes.
Second, the human aSMG area corresponds to regions where
MR responses have been measured during pantomiming and
imagining tool use (see Lewis 2006 for review). Hence, the
human aSMG region is involved in both the observation of tool
actions and their planning. It is, therefore, conceivable that it
houses neurons with mirror-neuron–like properties (Rizzolatti
& Craighero 2004) that allow for both tool use and tool-use
understanding. This may support tool imitation and learning by
imitation. A word of caution is of course needed, as the presence
of mirror neurons has yet to be demonstrated in aSMG, and their
presence is a necessary but not sufficient condition for imitation
to develop.
In conclusion, with the proviso that Peeters et al. (2009)
studied rhesus monkeys and not great apes, their findings are
in striking agreement with the review of Vaesen and provide a
neuronal basis for species differences in eye-hand coordination
and in causal reasoning related to tool use.
Foresight, function representation, and social
intelligence in the great apes
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Abstract: We find problems with Vaesen’s treatment of the
primatological research, in particular his analysis of foresight, function
representation, and social intelligence. We argue that his criticism of
research on foresight in great apes is misguided. His claim that
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primates do not attach functions to particular objects is also problematic.
Finally, his analysis of theory of mind neglects many distinctions.
Although we believe that a list of cognitive capacities involved in
human tool use might be fruitful in other respects, we fail to see
the gain from using it in the perspective of comparative cognition.
Vaesen’s list has been reverse engineered from modern human
cognition. How does it help us to describe the evolution of
human tool use to know whether or not a modern chimpanzee
has a similar list? Vaesen claims that the list can at least explain
the discrepancy between chimpanzee and human tool use. This
may be, but no cognitive capacities need invoking to argue that
humans and, for example, chimpanzees use tools differently.
The paper could have been an analysis of the cognitive capacities
themselves, or a paper on the evolution of human technology –
but using a comparative approach does not tie the paper
together.
We also find problems with Vaesen’s treatment of the primato-
logical research on cognitive capacities per se. Specifically, we
want to comment on the analysis of foresight, function represen-
tation, and social intelligence.
Vaesen regards a study by Osvath and Osvath (2008) on chim-
panzees and orangutans as coming closest to showing inhibition
in relation to foresight in nonhuman primates. One of the
study’s four experimental conditions included an inhibition task
where the subject could select either an immediate, favoured
reward (a grape) or a tool that might be used 70 minutes in the
future for retrieving a large, also highly favoured liquid reward
(rosehip berry soup). All subjects performed significantly above
what would be expected of an animal with no foresight.
However, Vaesen dismisses the results as a consequence of
mere associative learning, based on the misapprehensions of
Suddendorf and Corballis (2009) in their commentary on the
study. Not only does the original study contain an experiment
specifically designed to control for associative learning; there
also exists an extensive response to Suddendorf and Corballis
(Osvath 2010) that Vaesen does not account for. There is little
doubt that the inhibitory behaviour was not caused by purely
associative learning.
Vaesen does, for sake of argument, suppose that associative
learning can be excluded; but he then finds that the different
rewards are not qualitatively different, which would imply that
the apes are not taking a future state into account when selecting
their tool. Vaesen argues that wanting to eat a grape and wanting
to drink rosehip berry soup are the result of the same desire:
namely, hunger.
First, hunger is not a desire; it is a response to a physiological
state. In any case, the subjects in this study were not particularly
hungry or thirsty: Their daily feeding routines had not been inter-
rupted. Second, eating and drinking are dissimilar activities, with
different physiological outcomes. For the time being, allow the
most parsimonious interpretation to be that the apes select
between two different desires.
Vaesen concludes from very few studies – two, it appears –
that great ape foresight is highly limited compared with that of
humans. However, the few great ape studies that exist simply
have not tested for a range of foresight skills allegedly present
in humans. Much work needs to be done before great ape fore-
sight abilities can be delineated. We are plainly ignorant of sig-
nificant facts about great ape foresight and also know little
about the mechanisms of foresight in themselves. If a certain,
uniquely human type of foresight is indeed essential for superior
tool use, the evidence for such uniqueness, in the experimental
literature that Vaesen cites, is insufficient.
Third, we have concerns with how Vaesen handles the abilities
of great apes to represent tool function. We will here limit our-
selves to the previously mentioned foresight study by Osvath
and Osvath (2008). The fourth experimental condition in that
study included novel items from which the apes were to select.
Of the four items, only one was functional for retrieving the
future reward. The subject had to decide, by visual inspection
of each novel item, whether that item would be functional in
the future. Stimulus generalisation – of length, colour, size,
and shape – was precluded. The apes performed significantly
above chance.
It is difficult to explain these results without ascribing to the
apes some representation of function. This novel use would
imply a type of causal understanding, according to Vaesen’s
line of argumentation. When it came to ascribing to a tool a par-
ticular function, it is obvious that, in the other three conditions in
the study, the apes consistently chose the functional tool. The
experimental condition for associative learning controlled more
specifically for whether the tool was selected because of its func-
tion – rather than representing an arbitrary, reinforced stimulus.
These results are not compatible with Vaesen’s statement that
primates do not attach particular functions to particular objects.
Fourth, Vaesen adopts Premack and Woodruff’s (1978)
characterization of theory of mind in the section on social intelli-
gence. Since this definition was first proposed, the capacity for
theory of mind has been shown to consist of several components
(e.g., Call & Tomasello 2008; Ga¨rdenfors 2001; 2003). One
should at least distinguish understanding the emotions of
others from understanding their attention, understanding their
intentions, and understanding their beliefs. Only the last capacity
is normally called a theory of mind.With the other capacities, it is
fully possible for the agent to react to visible behaviours directly.
Evidence for both the capacity to understand emotions and the
capacity to understand attention can be found in non-human pri-
mates (Preston & deWaal 2002; see Call & Tomasello 2008). The
situation is less clear for understanding intentions, although
Tomasello et al. (2005) claim the capacity to form joint intentions
as the hallmark of humans. Only with respect to understanding
the beliefs of others is there, so far, no evidence from non-
human primates. A less anthropocentric research methodology
might change the situation, as it did for research on understand-
ing the attention of others.
Look, no hands!
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Abstract: Contrary to Vaesen’s argument that humans are unique with
respect to nine cognitive capacities essential for tool use, we suggest
that although such cognitive processes contribute to variation in tool
use, it does not follow that these capacities are necessary for tool use,
nor that tool use shaped cognition per se, given the available data in
cognitive neuroscience and behavioral biology.
Enhanced hand-eye coordination, social learning, teaching,
language, and social intelligence undoubtedly contribute to the
accumulation of advanced, human-like technologies, but are
they required for tool use? For example, given the strong selec-
tion pressure for successful foraging, fine motor control over
one’s feeding apparatus, be it beak, trunk, or claw, may
promote tool use (e.g., Kenward et al. 2006). Primates use their
hands extensively while foraging, but many species lack hands
(or analogs) yet regularly use tools. In fact, primate tool use
accounts for only about 10% of documented cases of animal
tool use (Bentley-Condit & Smith 2009). Furthermore, most
tool-using animals do not, as far as we know, socially learn the be-
havior or possess other components of social intelligence deemed
essential by Vaesen (e.g., Brockmann 1985).
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Although Vaesen’s nine capacities provide mechanisms for tool
use transmission, maintenance, and improvement, thereby
advancing technology, they are not preconditions for tool use
as such. Therefore, although human technological achievements
are unique, Vaesen’s capacities and tool use itself may not be.
Studies of behavioral trait evolution demand an appropriate
comparison group (i.e., all hominoidea, all anthropoidea, or all
primates), but surveying analogous behaviors in distant taxa can
elucidate the ecological and evolutionary contexts of these
traits. Vaesen focuses on great ape studies that support his
claims and ignores conflicting data. He extensively refers to the
(phylogenetically distant) monkey literature that suits his argu-
ment (e.g., Cummins-Sebree & Fragaszy 2005; Hauser 1997)
and ignores relevant monkey and even ape studies that do not
(e.g., Hauser et al. 2002; Santos et al. 2003; Whiten et al. 2005;
although Whiten et al. 2005 is mentioned later in a different
context). In fact, Whiten et al.’s (2005) study and a new study
(Hanus et al. 2011) may very well indicate functional fixedness
in chimpanzees. The ape studies Vaesen does mention here are
placed in Note 14, and one (Carvalho et al. 2009) provides a
strong case of tool reuse.
Among more distant taxa, bottlenose dolphins in Shark Bay,
Australia, reuse basket sponge tools for a little more than an
hour, as presumably during that period the tool remains func-
tional; but much beyond that, functionality is lost and the tool
is discarded (Patterson & Mann 2011). Furthermore, functional
fixedness is not necessarily a valuable cognitive trait and may
even be inhibitory (e.g., Hanus et al. 2011). Flexibility, on the
other hand, is a cognitive bonus, as with little to no modification
a single tool becomes many (e.g., chimpanzees use sticks to fish
for termites, honey [Fay & Carroll 1994], and ants [McGrew
1974] and even as hunting spears [Pruetz & Bertolani 2007]).
When discussing executive control and forethought, Vaesen
focuses on ape studies by Osvath and Osvath (2008) but fails to
mention other ape research (e.g., Biro & Matsuzawa 1999;
Boesch 1994; Boesch & Boesch 1989; Dufour & Sterck 2008;
Noser & Byrne 2010; Osvath 2008). Vaesen does mention two
additional studies, but again they are buried, in Note 20 rather
than in the main body of his text. In fact, conflicting literature
is repeatedly placed in notes (e.g., hand-eye coordination [5],
functional representation [14], executive control and forethought
[20], heuristics for selecting models for social learning [29], and
food sharing [31]).
While not implicitly stating it, Vaesen strongly implies that
human tool use and his nine capacities coevolved. If so, then
Vaesen must address whether the phenotype was selected for
and whether its current utility is the same as its historic use
(Gould & Lewontin 1979). Human technology is obviously
indicative of higher cognitive ability, but may be a product of
our cognition rather than the selective force behind it. Two
other well-established brain evolution theories deserve consider-
ation: the social brain hypothesis (Byrne &Whiten 1988; Dunbar
1998) and the ecological complexity hypothesis (Reader &
Laland 2002). Although tool use likely played a role in our cogni-
tive evolution, either as a product or as a driving factor, it
demands a systematic and comprehensive approach.
Finally, most of Vaesen’s arguments rely on a lack of evidence,
rather than evidence of absence (de Waal & Ferrari 2010). This
amounts to trying to prove the null hypothesis, a nearly futile task
when comparing across taxa because of (1) a lack of data for some
species, (2) low ecological validity, (3) poor internal validity due
to poorly designed tasks, (4) biases in research effort, and (5)
the sheer difficulty of researching cognition in animals. Vaesen
even admits, but is not deterred by the fact, that for 8 of the 16
traits he claims are decidedly more pronounced in humans
than in chimpanzees, few data are available (Table 2).
Tool use should be studied with a comparative approach,
including the examination of other taxa and analogous behaviors,
and by maintaining an appreciation for the ecological and social
contexts in which tool use arises (de Waal & Ferrari 2010). For
example, Povinelli’s studies on captive chimpanzees using
human behavioral models fail to show causal reasoning (but see
Call 2010), whereas Cheney and Seyfarth’s (1995) study with
wild baboons, which uses more relevant tests, seems to demon-
strate causal reasoning in natural social contexts. With more
appropriate tests, apes may very well excel (albeit, not to the
level of humans) in all of the nine capacities. Non-primates,
such as rats, crows, and likely elephants, show causal reasoning
(Blaisdell et al. 2006; Plotnik et al. 2011; Taylor et al. 2009a).
Other areas that could benefit from this comparative approach
include, but are not limited too, imitation (e.g., dolphins;
Herman 2002), social learning (e.g., woodpecker finches;
Tebbich et al. 2001), social intelligence (e.g., dolphins; Connor
2007), insight learning (e.g., crows; Taylor et al. 2010), fore-
thought (e.g., dolphins; McCowan et al. 2000), teaching (e.g.,
meerkats; Thornton & McAuliffe 2006), inhibition (e.g.,
rodents, birds, and marine invertebrates; Dally et al. 2010; Kim
2010; Vander Wall et al. 2009), food sharing (e.g., killer whales;
Ford & Ellis 2006), and theory of mind (e.g., dolphins and ele-
phants; Douglas-Hamilton et al. 2006; Plotnik et al. 2010; Xitco
et al. 2004).
Surely those without hands deserve another look.
So, are we the massively lucky species?
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Abstract: We are in vehement agreement with most of Vaesen’s key
claims. But Vaesen fails to consider or rebut the possibility that there
are deep causal dependencies among the various cognitive traits he
identifies as uniquely human. We argue that “higher-order relational
reasoning” is one such linchpin trait in the evolution of human tool use,
social intelligence, language, and culture.
We are in vehement agreement with most of Vaesen’s key claims.
We have long argued that sophisticated tool use and abstract
causal reasoning reflect a fundamental cognitive discontinuity
between humans and all other extant animals (Penn & Povinelli
2007a; Penn et al. 2008; Povinelli 2000). And we have previously
proposed, in this very journal, an explanation for the discontinu-
ity between human and non-human minds that overlaps with
Vaesen’s in many respects (Penn et al. 2008).
The remainder of this commentary, then, should be read as an
intramural critique. We have a couple of small issues with
Vaesen’s argument and one big one.
Causal reasoning. Vaesen correctly points out that “causal
understanding involves more than just noticing (e.g., through
trial and error) the covariance between a cause . . . and an
effect” (sect. 4, para. 1). But then Vaesen goes on to claim,
incorrectly in our view, that a cognizer must “infer a
mechanism” in order to possess true causal understanding. To
be sure, there are those who have advanced such a view (e.g.,
Ahn et al. 1995). However, the notion that prior knowledge of
a mechanism is required for causal understanding offers no
insight into how causal learning can get started: that is, how
can a reasoner infer a causal mechanism from noncausal
observations (Cheng 1993; 1997)? More recent theoretical
work based on variants of causal Bayes nets has established
that a cognizer can recognize a relation as specifically causal
without necessarily understanding anything about unobservable
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causal mechanisms (for reviews see Gopnik & Schulz 2007;
Holyoak & Cheng 2011).
Because Vaesen overlooks the distinction between causal
reasoning and the representation of unobservable causal mech-
anisms, he misconstrues the results of Povinelli’s rake exper-
iments as evidence that chimpanzees learn through “associative
learning” (sect. 4, para. 3). We have argued that the chimpanzees
in these experiments were perfectly capable of first-order causal
understanding (Penn & Povinelli 2007a). It is the ability to reason
about higher-order causal relationships that eludes them (Penn
et al. 2008; Povinelli 2000).
Function representations. Vaesen is probably correct that
chimpanzees do not form “functional representations” (sect. 5)
of tools in the same manner as humans. But it seems
implausible to us that chimpanzees do not form functional
representations at all. They certainly perceive stick-like objects
as able to “function” in a certain manner for achieving certain
goals, and these representations generalize over a fairly wide
variety of shapes, colors, and textures. In our view,
chimpanzees are perfectly able to form functional
representations of stick-like objects in terms of surface features
of the objects – they just fail to represent “functions” in terms
of the underlying causal mechanisms involved (Povinelli 2000).
Explaining the discontinuity. In summarizing his findings
from the first half of the paper, Vaesen (sect. 11) argues that
“no individual cognitive trait” can be singled out as the key trait
differentiating humans from other animals, and then claims
that his argument is an antidote to “single-trait explanations of
‘humaniqueness’” (sect. 11, para. 3). This is our major point of
contention with Vaesen.
To be sure, we know of no researcher who claims that there is
one and only one trait that distinguishes human and nonhuman cog-
nition. There are, indeed, a large number of cognitive traits that
appear to be distinctively human – ranging from mental state attri-
bution and language to causal reasoning and contingent
cooperation. But Vaesen does not consider or rebut the possibility
that there might be a deep dependency between many or even
all of these disparate traits both at a cognitive/computational level
of explanation and at an evolutionary/biological level of explanation.
It is possible, of course, that each of our uniquely human cogni-
tive traits evolved independently of each other, and that each is
embodied in a separate and independent “module” in the
human brain. There are certainly researchers who defend such a
“massively modular” explanation for human cognition (Carruthers
2005; Tetzlaff & Carruthers 2008). But to our eyes, it seems wildly
implausible that one and only one species was lucky enough to
have evolved separate and independent mechanisms for each of
these uniquely human traits (in a few million years to boot),
whereas no other species evolved any of them. It seems much
more likely (not to mention parsimonious) that there are deeper
dependencies among these disparate traits such that a species
that evolved a few linchpin traits would be in a more propitious
state, from an evolutionary point of view, to acquire the others.
We have argued that the ability to represent and reason about
the relation among relations – that is, “high-order relational
reasoning” – is a plausible candidate for one of these linchpin
traits (Penn et al. 2008). It certainly seems noteworthy that
many of the cognitive traits Vaesen identifies as instrumental in
the evolution of human tool use – causal reasoning, functional
representations, foresight, teaching, mental state attribution,
contingent reciprocity, goal sharing – appear to depend upon a
common set of higher-order relational competences.
Numerous researchers, for example, have demonstrated a
strong empirical relationship between higher-order relational
reasoning and theory-of-mind competence (e.g., Andrews et al.
2003; Zelazo et al. 2002). And almost all theoretical models of
mental state attribution presume higher-order relational reason-
ing as an underlying mechanism (e.g., see the theories proposed
in Carruthers & Smith 1996). With respect to causal reasoning,
most contemporary researchers agree that the ability to reason
about a network of causal relations in a systematic and allocentric
fashion is the bedrock of human causal cognition (e.g., Lagnado
et al. 2005; Tenenbaum et al. 2006). Higher-order relations are
also central to language (e.g., Gomez & Gerken 2000; Hauser
et al. 2002; Pinker & Jackendoff 2005).
The cognitive traits Vaesen subsumes under the heading of
“executive control” are a motley set. There is good evidence that
some of these – e.g., inhibition, autocuing, and self-monitoring –
are necessary components of the ability to reason about higher-
order relations (Andrews et al. 2003; Cho et al. 2010; Halford
et al. 1998; Robin & Holyoak 1995). Others – for example,
foresight, hierarchical planning, and inferential coherence –
are plausibly the result of being able to reason about higher-
order relations.
Much work remains to be done to disentangle the necessary and
sufficient components of higher-order relational reasoning in
humans, and to understand how such a unique computational
mechanism evolved in the brain of one particular species.
However, there is already strong evidence, from a wide variety of
domains and researchers, that this ability lies at the heart of
“what makes us so smart” (Gentner 2003). Our principle difference
with Vaesen is that he neither considers nor rebuts this possibility.
The key to cultural innovation lies in the group
dynamic rather than in the individual mind
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Abstract: Vaesen infers unique properties of mind from the appearance
of specific cultural innovation – a correlation without causal direction.
Shifts in habitat, population density, and group dynamics are the only
independently verifiable incentives for changes in cultural practices.
The transition from Acheulean to Late Stone Age technologies requires
that we consider how population and social dynamics affect cultural
innovation and mental function.
By focusing on human cognitive capabilities, Vaesen dismisses the
function of the group dynamic in the emergence of complex social
repertories (Garrod & Doherty 1994; Steels 2006; Steels et al.
2002). Underlying biological capacities tend to be difficult to
delineate; the same biology often displays considerable behavioral
flexibility in response to shifts in social dynamics and environ-
mental challenges. Vaesen’s nine cognitive prerequisites are
important for human cultural evolution, but one can make only
educated guesses about how, why, or when these capabilities
emerged. Evidence for cognitive capacities is inferred from the
presence of the tool assemblages they purport to explain,
without independent evidence for the direction of causation. Cer-
tainly, one can argue that many if not all of these capacities,
including language, were present in Homo erectus toolmakers.
Three parameters are consistently associated with complex
cultural adaptations to an environment: (1) relatively large
brains and prolonged postnatal, activity-dependent maturation
of the central nervous system, (2) environmental stress, and (3)
increased population densities. Over hominin evolution, as a con-
sequence of maturational delays and encephalization, human
brains came to have remarkable developmental plasticity
throughout the lifespan. Changes in life history created the
potential for behavioral flexibility and altered social dynamics
among mothers, infants, and others (Hrdy 2009; Kaplan et al.
2000; O’Connell et al. 2002; Ragir 1985). Evidence for
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maturational changes is abundant in the fossil record beginning
3–4 mya and indicates a relatively modern profile of prolonged
juvenile growth and encephalization beginning with H. erectus
(Ragir 2000). The altered human life history is best explained
through changes in habitat, diet, and locomotion (Aiello &
Wells 2002; Cachel & Harris 1995; Laden & Wrangham 2005;
Ragir et al. 2000). The transition from Acheulean to Middle
Palaeolithic in Europe (Middle Stone Age in Africa) took place
long after the appearance of a human-size brain and develop-
mental profile. This leaves the interdependence between
environmental stress and regional population growth as the
incentive for the proliferation of human technologies in the
Middle Pliestocene.
Improvements in diet supported increases in population den-
sities by decreasing birth spacing (Aiello & Key 2002). Intensifi-
cation of exploitation of local resources has been closely
associated with a division of labor and the specialization of knowl-
edge required for rapid technological advancement (Jochim
1981). Technological advancement progresses slowly where
populations are small and widely dispersed, and where there is
little external pressure for change, as in modern hunter-gatherer
societies (Jochim 1976); indeed, technological advances may be
lost between generations when there is a drop in population
density (Boserup 1981).
Let us consider how changes in population density result in the
specialization of labor and knowledge using cooking as an
example. Within a community, cooking skills are typically wide-
spread, but the quality of production is uneven. In small commu-
nities, foods are often limited to local produce and ethnic
tradition, and equipment is general purpose. Among home
cooks, some are especially talented and capable of producing
high-quality meals, but their innovative recipes and techniques
often disappear after a generation or two. As communities
increase in size, functional institutions appear (e.g., courts,
estates, the army) that use full-time cooks to prepare meals for
dozens of people. Professionals design specific tools to take the
guesswork out of combining ingredients and systematize the
techniques and timing of food preparation. With specialization
comes a formal transfer of skills in the form of recipes, apprentice-
ships, and schools that disseminate a standardized knowledge of
cooking methods. Archaeologically, the simple artifacts of home
cooking appear as early as sedentary villages; and these continue
to be found even after the appearance of the specialized toolkits of
professional chefs. One does not supersede the other – they con-
tinue, one changing slowly and the other proliferating innovations,
spatially but not temporally distinct.
Studies of language formation offer further insights into the
emergence of complex cultural repertories. Among deaf individ-
uals, the effect of community size on the emergence of communi-
cation systems from home sign to fully developed sign languages
demonstrates the centrality of social dynamics. Isolated deaf chil-
dren invariably use gestures to communicate with family
members and achieve a perceptible degree of systematization
in their gestural repertories (Goldin-Meadow 2003). However,
within a broader community, systemization creates stable,
broadly shared system of signs (Kendon 1984). Given a commu-
nity open to new learners, the informal syntax of a pidgin coa-
lesces into a formal syntactic system within a few generations
(Kegl et al. 1999). Whereas isolated deaf children create idiosyn-
cratic conventions in interaction with their families, global
conventions emerge only within communities of some critical
size (Ragir 2002; Senghas et al. 2005).
Simulations and experimental studies further demonstrate the
role of collaborative learning in the proliferation and mainten-
ance of novel systems of information exchange. Fay, Garrod,
and colleagues (e.g., Fay et al. 2010; Garrod et al. 2010) com-
pared the emergent graphic communicative systems of those par-
ticipants engaged in pair-wise interactions with different group
members and those of isolated pairs over an equivalent
number of communicative turns. Only in the case of
community-wide interactions did individuals converge on a
global system. Furthermore, global signs were found to be
more transparent with respect to meaning than were those pro-
duced by isolated pairs (Fay et al. 2008). These results suggest
that system standardization and streamlining may require colla-
borative negotiations among members of groups larger than a
family (Fay et al. 2000).
Group dynamics lead to the emergence of conventional pro-
cedures and global symbols, in such domains as ceramics,
fashion, music, and the Internet, from cottage crafts to the assem-
bly line. The resultant technologies alter the ontogeny of individ-
ual minds, in the form of activity-dependent changes in
information processing (Bavelier et al. 2010; Donald 1991;
Greenfield 1984; Tobach et al. 1997). Simple negotiations of
information are capable of producing unexpectedly complex be-
havioral repertories, such as seen among social insects, migratory
birds, and animals engaged in cooperative parenting (Hrdy
2009). Social interactions that systematize activities and negotiate
global conventions effect significant changes in neural connec-
tivity and cognitive functions. Unique human faculties are
likely to emerge as the result of, rather than as necessary con-
ditions for, innovative cultural repertories.
The limits of chimpanzee-human comparisons
for understanding human cognition
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Abstract: Evolutionary questions require specialized approaches, part of
which are comparisons between close relatives. However, to understand
the origins of human tool behavior, comparisons with solely chimpanzees
are insufficient, lacking the power to identify derived traits. Moreover,
tool use is unlikely a unitary phenomenon. Large-scale comparative
analyses provide an alternative and suggest that tool use co-evolves
with a suite of cognitive traits.
We are sympathetic to Vaesen’s view that no single cognitive trait
differentiates human tool behavior from that of other animals,
and we agree that comparative analysis has an important role in
understanding the cognitive bases of human tool use. However,
in our view, several vital issues are unaddressed. Have tool-
using capacities driven human cognitive evolution, or is tool
use the by-product of another ability? To what degree are the
perceptual and cognitive traits underlying tool use and techno-
logical cultural evolution independent from each other and
from morphological, societal, or ecological traits? What is the
role of culture and development in shaping patterns of tool inno-
vation and social learning? How much of cumulative cultural
evolution rests on increases in causal understanding of tools, as
Vaesen suggests, and how much on retention of “blind” variants
(Simonton 2003)?
Here we focus on problems raised by the analysis of human
tool behavior based on comparisons with one taxon, chimpan-
zees. Vaesen’s aim is not to compare humans and chimpanzees,
but to understand the cognitive bases of human tool use. As
useful as comparisons with chimpanzees are, Vaesen’s appli-
cation of this tactic is critically flawed for at least four reasons.
Although Vaesen admits his narrow focus on chimpanzees, the
flaws are germane both to his conclusions and to other work in
the field.
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First, Vaesen’s chimpanzee-human comparison assumes that
shared ancestry explains similarities, whereas differences are
explained by independent evolution of the trait in humans and
not, for example, the loss of the trait in chimpanzees. However,
the ancestral state must be established, which requires investi-
gation of additional species (de Kort & Clayton 2006).
Second, tool use is unlikely a unitary phenomenon. A variety of
neurocognitive and genetic mechanisms can underlie a behavior-
al outcome such as tool use (Shumaker et al. 2011). Hence, it is
not a given that similarities and differences between species in
tool-related behavior or test performance equate to similarities
and differences in underlying cognition, potentially compromis-
ing the explanatory power of species comparisons. Independent
evolution may have produced similar behavioral specializations
with different underlying mechanisms (de Kort & Clayton
2006), or behavioral similarities may appear as a consequence
of some third variable, such as enhanced social tolerance (van
Schaik et al. 1999). Furthermore, tool-using capacities may be
present but unexpressed. For example, expression of true and
proto-tool use (Shumaker et al. 2011) appears sensitive to vari-
ation in social and ecological conditions. Finches turn to tools
in arid conditions, rarely using tools to extract prey where food
is abundantly accessible (Tebbich et al. 2002); dolphins use
sponges to locate prey that cannot be detected by other means
(Patterson & Mann 2011); adult male capuchin monkeys are
strong enough to bite open certain nuts, whereas females and
juveniles require tools to open them (Fragaszy & Visalberghi
1989); and grackles use water to soften hard food when the
risks of kleptoparasitism are low (Morand-Ferron et al. 2004).
These observations suggest tool use may frequently be a costly
option employed flexibly, taken when other options fail or are
unavailable. Similarly, innovation in tool use can be employed
flexibly; for example, driven by the social milieu (Reader &
Laland 2003; Toelch et al. 2011). Hence, numerous variables
could underlie species differences in tool-related behavior, and
even apparent similarities may reflect different underlying
mechanisms.
Third, chimpanzees may be well studied, and our close rela-
tives, and provide much informative data (e.g., Hrubesch et al.
2009; Marshall-Pescini & Whiten 2008), but other animals
provide relevant data and counterpoints to Vaesen’s proposals.
For example, work on finches and crows demonstrates that
social learning is not essential for the acquisition of tool use
(Kenward et al. 2005; Tebbich et al. 2001); meanwhile
macaque observational data suggest that social transmission of
nonfunctional object manipulation occurs outside humans
(Leca et al. 2007, who do not class nonfunctional behavior as
tool use). Similarly, selective social learning may be rarely docu-
mented in apes but has been described in numerous other
species, including monkeys, other mammals, fish, and birds
(Laland 2004; Lindeyer & Reader 2010; Seppa¨nen et al. 2011;
van de Waal et al. 2010). Selective social learning may be necess-
ary for cumulative cultural evolution, but is clearly not sufficient,
unless cumulative cultural evolution occurs unobserved in these
animals. Researchers have demonstrated several other behaviors
in non-primates that Vaesen identifies as distinctively human:
ants, pied babblers, and meerkats teach; fish punish and image-
score; birds use baits to trap prey, forgoing immediate rewards
in a manner not unlike the human traps that Vaesen argues
require foresight and inhibition (Bshary & Grutter 2005; 2006;
Shumaker et al. 2011; Thornton & Raihani 2011). We urge
caution in interpreting even flexible and sophisticated tool use
as necessarily the product of complex cognition.
Finally, any comparison based on an effective sample size of
two is problematic. Humans and chimpanzees differ on numer-
ous characteristics. In the absence of additional behavioral data
on the role of underlying candidate mechanisms in tool use,
any of these characteristics alone or in combination could
account for differences in tool behavior. To robustly identify
correlates of tool use with comparative data, repeated and
independent co-evolution must be observed, using modern tech-
niques to focus on independent evolutionary events and to
account for multiple confounding variables (Nunn & Barton
2001). Confidence in such results is strengthened further if the
same patterns are observed in multiple taxa. Such correlational
comparative analyses, incorporating large numbers of species,
reveal that avian and primate tool use has co-evolved with
several cognitive traits and with brain volume measures, and
(in primates) with manual dexterity (Byrne 1997; Deaner et al.
2006; Lefebvre et al. 2002; 2004; Overington et al. 2009;
Reader & Laland 2002; Reader et al. 2011; van Schaik et al.
1999). These data, supported by discoveries of tool use capabili-
ties in species previously not noted tool users (Reader et al. 2011;
Shumaker et al. 2011), are consistent with the idea that tool use
can result from a generalized cognitive ability and that it forms
part of a correlated suite of traits. However, such analyses
would benefit from experimental data teasing apart the processes
underlying tool behavior.
If human tool use really is unique, identification of its cognitive
bases by comparison with any species will be problematic. We
must unpack tool use, understand the underlying motivational
and neurocognitive mechanisms in humans and other species,
and study a range of species that both possess and lack these abil-
ities in order to understand the consequences for tool behavior.
Evolutionary approaches hence have an important role to play
in investigations of cognition. Work with chimpanzees is but
one part of solving this important issue.
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Abstract: Vaesen argues that functional knowledge differentiates
humans from non-human primates. However, the rationale he provides
for this position is open to question – with respect to both the
underlying theoretical assumptions and inferences drawn from certain
empirical studies. Indeed, there is some recent empirical work that
suggests that functional fixedness is not necessarily uniquely human. I
also question the central role of stable function representations in
Vaesen’s account of tool production and use.
In his target article, Vaesen acknowledges the fundamental role
of tools in characterizing uniquely human psychological skills,
but he perseveres with a vision that distinguishes material tools
from psychological (ideal) ones. The argument he develops in
the article omits a long-standing and important conceptual tra-
dition in psychology, namely the cultural-historical tradition
(e.g., Cole 1996). In this approach, tools have a dual nature;
they are at the same time both material and ideal. The dual
nature of tools has implications for many of the nine cognitive
capacities noted by Vaesen. I will focus on functional represen-
tation, as it has important implications for how we understand
and develop novel forms of artifacts. Vaesen argues that func-
tional knowledge differentiates humans from non-human pri-
mates, but his argumentation is problematic – with respect
both to the empirical evidence and to certain of his theoretical
assumptions, which I outline briefly below.
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Problems concerning empirical evidence. There is some
recent empirical evidence that seems to show that functional
fixedness is not uniquely human. Hanus et al. (2011) have
provided suggestive evidence for the hypothesis, put forward
by Tennie et al. (2010), that the difference they observed
between chimpanzees and orangutans in their ability to solve
the Floating Peanuts task (Mendes et al. 2007) was due to the
functional fixedness of the chimpanzees with respect to the
water dispenser. In Experiment 3, Hanus and colleagues
showed that simply adding a new water dispenser in the
experimental settings led the chimpanzees to use water as a
tool for recovering the peanuts – but by taking water from the
new dispenser only, and not from the one from which they
used to drink. This would seem to indicate that the chimps also
show functional fixedness.
Theoretical assumptions. Stable function representations
cannot account for the peculiar human ability to generate
functions that go beyond what is physically feasible to perform
with any material thing. The generation of such functions is the
result of the dual nature of artifacts (material and ideal), as
expressed in cultural-historical psychology (Ilyenkov 1977).
Vaesen (2011) recognizes the dual nature of tools, but
addresses the ideal side as representing the intentions of the
designers embodied in the tool (i.e., functional aspects) as well
as by other roles involved in the production of the material
object (marketing, manufacturing). But the ideal component is
not a matter of capturing the functional or pragmatic factors
that in different moments inform the production of a material
tool. It has to do rather with how people harness material
things (natural and artificial, abiotic and biotic) for thought.
It has to do with two complementary sides of the same coin: on
the one side, with the ability to perceive, understand, and use for
their own goals the intentional relations that other persons have
with an object or tool in their everyday practice – the intentional
relations that other people have to the world through that object
(i.e., intentional affordances; Tomasello 1999). This intentional
relation may or may not be related to the intentions of the
people involved in the original production of the artifacts
(Rizzo 2000; 2006). Indeed, as observed by the Victorian writer
Samuel Butler (1912/1951): “Strictly speaking, nothing is a tool
except during use. The essence of a tool, therefore, lies in some-
thing outside the tool itself” (p. 121).
On the other side, the ideal component has to do with our
capacity to go beyond what is physically feasible to perform
with any material thing. This is an ability humans show very
early in their development; for example, in pretend play. In
pretend play, meaning is cast on objects in virtue of the actions
the objects allow the children to perform, yet these actions are
performed away from conventional use of the object. Pretend
objects still need to support the pretend act, but a pretend
horse does not need to afford riding or feeding; it only needs to
afford pretend riding or feeding. Actually, the child can select
very different objects as a pretend horse, insofar as the objects
are good enough to support the specific enactment. It’s the
pattern of action that specifies the meaning, not the object (Szo-
lonsky 2006). Lev Vygotsky (1933/1967) gave a clear description
of this phenomenon:
In play the child creates the structure meaning/object, in which the
semantic aspect – the meaning of the thing – dominates and deter-
mines his behavior. To a certain extent meaning is freed from the
object with which it was directly fused before. I would say that in
play a child concentrates on meaning severed from objects. (p. 11)
And Vygotsky was quite explicit in stating that “a child does not
symbolize in play”:
A symbol is a sign, but the stick is not the sign of a horse. Properties of
things are retained, but their meaning is inverted, i.e., the idea
becomes the central point. It can be said that in this structure things
are moved from a dominating to a subordinate position. (p. 11)
Pretend play is most likely a uniquely human social activity
(Rakoczy 2008); and, like speech, it has to do with the emancipa-
tion of situational constraints and with the creation of a new
reality, which exists only in virtue of the human ability to share
intentions. This allows the arbitrary creation of what Searle
(1995) has named the status function of objects. For example,
there is nothing in the physical constitution of a 10-euro note
that makes it money, as even if I could clone a 10-euro note
atom by atom, the result would not be money. It is the collective,
yet subjective, intentionality that creates an objective and factual
reality, which exists only for humans.
Therefore, specifically human functional knowledge would
be better characterized not by stable function representation
but by pretend play and drama inquiry. Indeed, these are just
the key components of human innovative strategies such as gen-
erative scenarios (Rizzo & Bacigalupo 2004) and tinkering with
things:
Tinkering is what happens when you try something you don’t quite
know how to do, guided by whim, imagination, and curiosity. When
you tinker, there are no instructions – but there are also no failures,
no right or wrong ways of doing things. It’s about figuring out how
things work and reworking them. Contraptions, machines, wildly mis-
matched objects working in harmony – this is the stuff of tinkering.
Tinkering is, at its most basic, a process that marries play and
inquiry. (Banzi 2008, vi–vii)
The role of executive control in tool use
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Abstract: Comparing cognitive functions between humans and
nonhuman primates is helpful for understanding human tool use. We
comment on the latest insights from comparative research on executive
control functions. Based on our own work, we discuss how even a
mental function in which non-human primates outperform humans
might have played a key role in the development of tool use.
Research on executive control has rapidly grown over the last
15 years. There has been an increasing conjunction of psy-
chology and neuroscience, not only in brain imaging, but also
in single-neuron studies in monkeys (Stoet & Snyder 2004;
2009).
There is general agreement that the functions involved in
executive control are used to coordinate and resolve conflicts
between more basic processes. There are a number of different
mechanisms that are part of the executive control family: (1) flexi-
bility – the capacity to switch attention between different tasks;
(2) goal setting – the capacity to set a goal; (3) planning, includ-
ing initiation and sequencing – the capacity to determine a series
of steps necessary to reach a goal; (4) inhibitory control – the
capacity to suppress distracting or irrelevant information and
thoughts; (5) monitoring – the capacity to monitor whether
actions result in their intended outcome; (6) adjustment – the
capacity to adjust a course of action even after it has been
initiated; and (7) maintenance – short-term maintenance of
information related to the above functions; for example, goal
setting implies that the brain can maintain the goal represen-
tation for a certain time.
Vaesen lists only some of these executive functions, namely,
inhibitory control, planning, and monitoring. Further, he lists
autocueing; that is, the capacity to think about things other
than those triggered by external stimuli. This use of autocueing
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was introduced by Donald (1993; cited by Vaesen), who states
that animals “are creatures of conditioning, and cannot ‘think’
except in terms of reacting to the present or immediately past
environment” (p. 146). Donald continues: “Humans alone
have self-initiated access to memory, or what may be called
‘autocueing’” (p. 146). The difficulty with the concept is that
autocueing has not received much attention from other
researchers; further, research in the past decade has unequivo-
cally shown that animals actually use internal representations to
guide the processing of external stimuli (often referred to as
endogenous control). Such internal representations can, for
example, encode which potential responses are relevant in a
certain task context; and such internal representations enable
animals to respond in ways that are quite different from the
nature of the external stimuli. A number of laboratories have
successfully recorded single neurons encoding endogenously
activated action and task representations (for a review, see
Stoet & Snyder 2009).
What is most important for this commentary, though, is that
there is a difference in the abilities of humans and monkeys to
switch between endogenously controlled task representations.
Extensive research has demonstrated that monkeys are more
flexible in rapidly switching between tasks than are humans,
who even with long training can still not switch as rapidly as
monkeys can (Caselli & Chelazzi 2011; Stoet & Snyder 2003;
2007).
Therefore, by some measures, monkeys outperform humans in
mental flexibility. We hypothesize that although humans are at a
disadvantage in laboratory task-switching experiments, this
limited flexibility might come as an advantage for cognitive devel-
opment associated with the construction and use of complex
tools. (With “complex tools” we mean constructed tools.)
Limited mental flexibility supports concentration. We know
that humans are good at concentration. The human skill to con-
centrate develops mostly before the age of 10, although it seems
to continue improving during adolescence. Concentration is a
necessary component of long-lasting and complex tasks, some
of which may have played an important survival role in prehis-
tory, including keeping a fire burning, cooking, hunting a herd
of animals for days, and designing and using complex tools.
Our ability to concentrate is likely to have co-evolved with and
may even have preceded our ability to use tools. Hence, a
human’s limited mental flexibility in comparison with a
monkey’s may actually be a key element in the causal chain
that led to tool use.
Evidence from convergent evolution and
causal reasoning suggests that conclusions
on human uniqueness may be premature
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Abstract: We agree with Vaesen that there is evidence for cognitive
differences between humans and other primates. However, it is too
early to draw firm conclusions about the uniqueness of the cognitive
mechanisms underlying human tool use. Tests of causal understanding
are in their infancy, as is the study of animals more distantly related to
humans.
Imagine if we had attempted to define the uniqueness of human
social cognition in the year 2000. Investigations examining
primate theory of mind had started more than 30 years before.
Despite this, researchers had still not developed experimental
paradigms with sufficient ecological validity to thoroughly test
the cognitive abilities of primates. We would have concluded
that there was a large gap between human and ape social cogni-
tion. Hare et al.’s seminal work (2001), where chimpanzees were
put into competitive situations rather than cooperative ones,
suggests that they can take the perspective of others, though as
always, this conclusion is controversial (see Vonk & Povinelli
2006). This work has been built on in the past 10 years, with a
number of novel paradigms being designed, where, for
example, food must be stolen from others or an ape must infer
which food item another individual has eaten (see Call and
Tomasello 2008 for review). Because of the high level of behav-
ioral sophistication uncovered by these recent findings, it is now
possible to make a case for the gap between human and ape social
cognition being far smaller than previously thought (Call and
Tomasello 2008; Schmelz et al. 2011; but see Penn & Povinelli
2007b; Penn et al. 2008).
What research on social cognition teaches us is that we have to
be careful that our paradigms are sufficiently fine tuned and eco-
logically valid before drawing strong conclusions.
Is the trap-tube, the current paradigm predominantly used in
physical cognition tests (and discussed by Vaesen in the target
article), sufficient for drawing conclusions about animals? We
suggest not. The trap-tube problem requires an animal to
extract food from an apparatus while avoiding a trap in its
surface. Slight changes to this test, such as whether an animal
is allowed to pull food out of the tube, leads to differences in per-
formance at test, and consequently, the conclusions drawn about
what the animal understands (Mulcahy & Call 2006a).
Furthermore, whereas great apes do fail to transfer infor-
mation between the trap-tube and trap-table tasks while using
tools, the same pattern is not seen when they do not need a
tool and can instead use their own finger (Seed et al. 2009). It
appears, then, that the tool-use aspect of the trap-tube problem
creates an additional cognitive load that interferes with
problem solving. Most important, adult humans fail to solve a
control condition where the trap-tube is inverted (Silva et al.
2005). Given that objects only fall down and not up, an animal
that understands why the trap works should treat an upside-
down trap as non-functional. In contrast, an animal that has
associatively learnt to avoid the trap should continue to avoid
it, irrespective of its position in the tube. Adult humans,
however, make the striking error, as some animals have done
(e.g., Visalberghi & Limongelli 1994), of continuing to avoid
the trap when it is in the upside-down position. In contrast,
apes, woodpecker finches, and New Caledonian crows do not
avoid the trap in an inverted tube (Mulcahy & Call 2006a;
Taylor et al. 2009a; 2009b; Tebbich & Bshary 2004).
It seems premature to draw strong conclusions about the
absence of inferential causal reasoning abilities from a test that
seems to be confounded by tool use and solved incorrectly by
adult humans.
Claims about human uniqueness also need to consider evi-
dence from evolutionary convergence. There is no reason why
distantly related species facing similar socio-ecological chal-
lenges as humans were could not have evolved cognitive mech-
anisms lacked by species more closely related to humans.
Imagine if we had stopped the clock in 1995 and attempted
then to draw a line between humans and animals. At that
point in time we would have thought that wooden hook tools,
experience projection, and planning for tomorrow were
capacities exclusive to humans. The reason for this is that few
scientists had investigated the possibility that convergent evol-
ution may have led birds to have evolved complex behaviors
and cognition.
Today, evidence from work on the Corvidae family has shown
that New Caledonian crows can manufacture hook tools by
sculpting wood (Hunt 1996; Hunt & Gray 2004) and can spon-
taneously solve multi-stage metatool problems (Taylor et al.
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2010), while scrub-jays have been shown to recall the past
(Clayton & Dickinson 1998) and plan for tomorrow (Raby et al.
2007). In the social sphere, ravens engage in play caching to
identify thieves (Bugnyar et al. 2007), and only scrub-jays with
experience of stealing food engage in sophisticated cache-protec-
tion strategies (Emery & Clayton 2001). The only non-human
evidence for experience projection and hook tool manufacture
in the wild comes from corvids, as does the strongest evidence
for future planning. Finally, although apes cannot transfer knowl-
edge between the trap-tube and trap-table while using tools, New
Caledonian crows can (Taylor et al. 2009a).
Evidence from convergent evolution, therefore, needs to be
considered if we are to draw the right conclusions about
human uniqueness. As the results from the trap-tube exemplify,
failure of the great apes on a cognitive task does not mean
that no other animal will succeed. We simply do not yet know
if, for example, New Caledonian crows have diagnostic learn-
ing. It may seem unlikely that a species with a brain the size
of a walnut may be capable of such cognition, but then in
1995, who would have predicted that members of the crow
family would manufacture wooden hook tools or plan for the
future?
This is not to say that we disagree with attempts to draw con-
clusions about what cognition is used by humans during tool use,
or with the highlighting of how weak the single-factor argument
for human uniqueness is. In contrast, summarizing the field to
date and suggesting the potential boundaries between humans
and other animals in the tool domain will drive and focus
research effort on understudied areas, such as diagnostic learn-
ing and functional representation. Our cherry-picking mental
time travel is simply to highlight that much may change in the
future. Who knows where the boundaries will lie in 10 years
time.
Cultural intelligence is key to explaining
human tool use
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Abstract: Contrary to Vaesen, we argue that a small number of key traits
are sufficient to explain modern human tool use. Here we outline and
defend the cultural intelligence (CI) hypothesis. In doing so, we
critically re-examine the role of social transmission in explaining human
tool use.
Vaesen presents a list of social and cognitive factors that he
believes, in concert, explain the differences between human
and chimpanzee tool use. We believe that Vaesen is too quick
to reject explanations based on a smaller number of key traits;
in particular, the traits outlined in the cultural intelligence
hypothesis.
Cultural intelligence (CI) can come about in two (potentially
complementary) ways. First, culture can enhance intelligence
during an individual’s lifetime (“ontogenetic” CI; Herrmann
et al. 2007; Tomasello 1999). The ontogenetic CI hypothesis pos-
tulates that growing up in a culturally rich environment enables
children to develop cognitive skills they would not otherwise
have done (Moll & Tomasello 2007). According to this perspec-
tive, human-unique forms of social learning and teaching are
responsible for qualitative changes in cognition – including
changes in the ways in which we use tools. Therefore, at least
some of the factors that Vaesen identifies as causes of human
tool use are, in fact, effects of growing up in rich cultural
environments.
Second, culture can play a role in the evolution of cognition
across generations (“phylogenetic” CI; see also van Schaik &
Pradhan 2003). Much less is known about this form of cultural
intelligence. However, van Schaik & Pradhan (2003) modeled
the co-evolution of culture and innovations and found that
“high intelligence will often be a by-product of selection on abil-
ities for socially biased learning.” In other words, selection
pressure for better social learning leads indirectly to the evol-
ution of individual learning (and not vice versa).
In defense of his claims, Vaesen argues that as culture became
more complex, greater intelligence was needed in order to deal
with increasingly sophisticated cultural artifacts. However, this
neglects the possibility that culture positively impacts on intelli-
gence – as posed by the two CI hypotheses. In support of this
perspective, Enquist et al. (2008) modeled cultural accumulation
and showed that culture would level off unless faithful forms of
social transmission impact on innovation levels. As culture has
increased exponentially in modern humans, the most plausible
view is that culture and intelligence form a feed-forward loop.
So far we have suggested that cumulative culture explains
human intelligence in general, and sophisticated forms of tool
use in particular. What then explains the existence of cumulative
culture? We believe that the answer lies in species-unique forms
of social learning and teaching.
Vaesen identifies a number of potential differences between
social learning in humans and in chimpanzees. Although these
differences may be accurate, we believe that the most basic
differences between human and chimpanzee social learning lie
elsewhere. Below we outline our alternate account of social
learning in chimpanzees and compare it with the case of
human children.
After critically reviewing the available evidence on social learn-
ing in chimpanzees, Tennie et al. (2009) argued that chimpanzee
cultures are best described as serial reinventions across multiple
generations. Social learning can still play some role in explaining
the distribution of behaviors over time and space (e.g., Whiten
et al. 1999), as it can increase the chance of reinvention. Social
learning could even be responsible for cases in which the best
target for a particular behavior is found and maintained over
time (e.g., the whereabouts of the most bountiful feeding
place). But the form that chimpanzee behaviors (including
these “cultures”) take is most strongly determined by biological
and ecological factors. This account is supported by evidence
suggesting that if chimpanzees copy behavioral forms (i.e.,
imitate) in the absence of training, then they do so rarely and/
or not very precisely (Tennie et al. 2009; Whiten et al. 2009).
In addition to this, teaching is virtually absent in chimpanzees
(although see Boesch 1991). Without teaching, and with imita-
tion severely limited, chimpanzees lack the transmission fidelity
necessary to sustain true cumulative culture (where the form of
behavior is transmitted). In turn, ontogenetic CI in chimpanzees
(at least in the wild) is probably severely limited.
In contrast to social learning in chimpanzees, human social
learning is typified by faithful transmission. Human children
often imitate the specific actions of a model. Indeed, they do so
even when it results in less efficient performance on their part
(Nagell et al. 1993) and when they have been explicitly instructed
not to (Lyons et al. 2007). This faithful transmission is at least par-
tially the result of the social motivations and pressure underlying
imitation (Over & Carpenter 2011). In contrast to chimpanzees,
human children experience a strong drive to be like their group
members (Nielsen 2009; Nielsen et al. 2008; Over & Carpenter
2009). This motivation can lead children to produce faithful
copies of modeled acts even when it appears irrational to do so.
Furthermore, humans often experience social pressure to
imitate in particular ways. One form of social pressure is teach-
ing. Gergely and Csibra (2006) have shown that even infants
are sensitive to teaching cues and that they copy actions more
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precisely when teaching cues are present. Social pressure to
imitate can also come from the group in general. Haun and
Tomasello (2011) have recently demonstrated that preschool
children conform to the behavior of their peers and that they
do so more in public than in private. Evidence from Rakoczy
et al. (2008) suggests that not only do children experience
social pressure; they exert it on those around them by enforcing
social norms.
Thus, in contrast to Vaesen, we emphasize that a small
number of key factors (e.g., imitation and teaching) render
human culture a more social enterprise than is chimpanzee
culture. Over time, these factors have played a causal role in pro-
ducing qualitative changes in human cognition, including in the
ways we use tools.
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Abstract: Investigation of the cerebral organization of cognition in
modern humans may serve as a tool for a better understanding of the
evolutionary origins of our unique cognitive abilities. This commentary
suggests three approaches that may serve this purpose: (1) cross-task
neural overlap, referred to by Vaesen; but also (2) co-lateralization of
asymmetric cognitive functions and (3) cross-functional (effective)
connectivity.
On several occasions in his systematic comparison, Vaesen refers
to neuroscientific data to make his argument. In some instances,
he underlines the absence of certain functional regions in the
brains of non-human primates that are relevant for tool manipu-
lation and production (Orban et al. 2006). In other sections the
author points to the human recruitment of the same specialized
cortical regions during different tasks of complex motor behavior
such as speech or tool manipulation (Higuchi et al. 2009; Stout
et al. 2008). The latter neuroscientific findings are taken as evi-
dence for a common origin of tool use and language.
The use of neuroimaging and neurobehavioral research to
speculate on evolutionary theories of cognition maybe tempting,
but for the moment the available information is limited. I suggest
that there are three major observations that can be employed in
the discussion of neurocognitive evolution in humans: (1) neural
overlap, (2) co-lateralization, and (3) cross-functional (effective)
connectivity.
Cross-task neural overlap, or neurofunctional overlap, refers to
the observation that a single brain region is recruited by different
cognitive tasks. In neuropsychological studies, neurofunctional
overlap is hinted at by the frequent co-occurrence of cognitive
deficits, such as aphasia with apraxia or finger agnosia with acal-
culia; but lesion research provides only limited spatial resolution.
Neuroimaging sparked a much more detailed investigation of the
brain’s functional organization, including clear cross-task acti-
vation in brain regions that can be measured at the 2–4 mm
scale. Increased spatial resolution also allowed for a more
detailed description of the match of cross-task neural overlap
(overlap correspondence), although I’m unaware of systematic
studies using this approach. The detection of overlapping neuro-
cognitive circuits in specific cortical locations has been inter-
preted in terms of a functional and even evolutionary link, for
example, between spatial and numerical processing (Hubbard
et al. 2005; Walsh 2003) or between language and tool use
(Arbib 2005; Higuchi et al. 2009).
The question remains whether overlapping neural responses
reflect activation of the same or different neuronal populations.
Separate neuronal populations may be interleaved in the same
cortical area on a spatial scale below the resolution of convention-
al fMRI, in which case the corresponding neural circuits may
function independently, yet show co-morbidity when this
region gets damaged or disrupted. Despite this caveat, we may
assume that the neural network activated by a given cognitive
function is not randomly distributed over the cortex, but that it
engages regions that are of strategic relevance for that function
given its connections with other regions. Co-activation of the
same region by different cognitive tasks therefore at least
suggests a strategic similarity in the recruitment of a specific cor-
tical area with its particular connections, that may or may not
share neuronal resources. The shared neural localization of
certain domain-general skills, such as hierarchical processing,
also enticed scholars to theorize on the specificity and chronology
of cognitive evolution (Arbib 2005). For the time being, these
valuable hypotheses remain to be tested.
Co-lateralization is defined here as the covariance in the side
and degree of hemispheric preference of two cognitive functions.
Although many functions are asymmetrically represented in the
brain, similarity in hemispheric preference as such is generally
not considered to reflect a specific functional link, and there
exists remarkably little research on the strength of lateralization
within, let alone across, cognitively induced neural activation pat-
terns (Pinel & Dehaene 2010). Significant correlations in the
degree of asymmetric activation on sites of neural overlap
would strengthen claims of biological association between cogni-
tive functions.
A potentially very interesting source of information may be
found in people with atypical language lateralization, such as in
some extreme left-handers or in patients who suffered early
brain damage. In these individuals it is possible to investigate
how the atypical language dominance impacts on other latera-
lized cognitive abilities (Kroliczak et al. 2011). Recently, we com-
pared a group of atypical language-dominant volunteers with a
matched group showing typical language dominance on a tool-
pantomiming paradigm while undergoing fMRI. In the group
with atypical right language dominance, all individuals also
demonstrated atypical right-hemispheric preference for praxis.
Activation patterns for the language and praxis tasks revealed
neural overlap in five cortical regions that showed highly corre-
lated lateralization indices within and across tasks (Vingerhoets
et al., in press).
So far, my arguments focus on the characteristics and inter-
actions of the neural responses induced by different cognitive
functions. Similarities in location and co-asymmetry should be
supplemented by behavioral evidence of a link between cogni-
tive traits. If two cognitive functions share an evolutionary
origin, it is plausible to assume that they exhibit a functional
bond over and above a common reliance on central resources
such as attention and working memory. If, for example, tool
use and linguistic tasks activate Broca’s area (neural overlap)
because they both require hierarchical structuring (underlying
cognitive process), then we might expect behavioral interference
between tool use and language tasks that manipulate hierarchi-
cal complexity.
Statistical dependencies in performance or neural activity only
suggest a functional relation between cognitive traits or neural
units, they do not entail causal information. Over the last years,
several methods have been devised to investigate effective
(causal) brain connectivity (Rubinov & Sporns 2010). In view
of evolutionary queries, directional effects are of importance, as
they may hint at the temporal order of cognitive evolvement.
Similarities in the directional interactions of networks of
related cognitive functions and causal effects of cross-task inter-
ference may help elucidate the chronological sequence of
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neurocognitive evolution, such as the link between gestures and
speech to explain the evolution of language.
I conclude that neuroscientific research on the cerebral organ-
ization of cognitive function in modern humans may contribute in
unraveling the evolutionary trace of unique abilities such as tool
use, language, and numerical cognition. Available methods for
this endeavor include (1) detailed analysis of the neural overlap
of activity patterns elicited by allied cognitive functions, (2) inves-
tigation of the correlation of co-lateralization in direction and
degree across cognitive abilities that have an asymmetric hemi-
spheric representation, and (3) comparison of the causal inter-
actions in the neural networks of related cognitive functions
and their cross-functional interference.
Motor planning in primates
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Abstract: Vaesen asks whether goal maintenance and planning ahead are
critical for innovative tool use. We suggest that these aptitudes may have
an evolutionary foundation in motor planning abilities that span all
primate species. Anticipatory effects evidenced in the reaching
behaviors of lemurs, tamarins, and rhesus monkeys similarly bear on
the evolutionary origins of foresight as it pertains to tool use.
In discussing the impact of executive control on cumulative
culture, Vaesen asks whether goal maintenance and planning
are crucial for innovative acts – in particular, for innovative
acts involving tool use. In this connection, we point to our work
on goal maintenance and planning in two groups of nonhuman
primates – cotton-top tamarin monkeys (Weiss & Wark 2009;
Weiss et al. 2007) and lemurs (Chapman et al. 2010). The work
we describe, as well as other research by us and others on antici-
patory effects in reaching and grasping by humans (for reviews,
see Rosenbaum 2010; Rosenbaum et al. 2006), may be
unknown to Vaesen. Our aim in this commentary is to draw atten-
tion to this research, hoping that doing so will provide more tools
with which Vaesen can evaluate and develop his hypothesis.
We have demonstrated that cotton-top tamarin monkeys
(Fig. 1a) and lemurs (Fig. 1b) show a surprising level of goal
maintenance and planning in a behavioral context. Our investi-
gations reveal that these species spontaneously alter their
object grasps depending on what they plan to do with the objects.
In these studies, the object to be moved was a cup with a piece
of food stuck inside its bowl. The cup was positioned in a way that
required manipulation of the cup to get the food out. The animals
were allowed to interact with the cups as they pleased. Therefore,
they could freely choose a canonical thumb-up initial posture fol-
lowed by a non-canonical thumb-down posture, or they could
freely choose a non-canonical thumb-down initial posture fol-
lowed by a canonical thumb-up posture. These animals, like
humans (Rosenbaum et al. 1990), chose the latter course of
action. They adopted the non-canonical initial posture when
grasping the cups to be inverted, thereby permitting the more
canonical posture at the end of the cup rotation. The final
thumb-up posture permitted greater control during the food
extraction phase.
The pictures shown in Figure 1 are not rare instances of behav-
ior, culled from video frames to finally find the poses we wanted.
The pictures in Figure 1 illustrate behaviors that were reliably
elicited whenever the cup needed to be turned to permit food
extraction. When the cup did not need to be turned, the
animals adopted canonical thumb-up postures right from the
start. The statistics from the carefully controlled studies we did
to test the hypothesis that the animals plan ahead supported
this claim. On this basis, we concluded that the evolutionary
foundation of human motor planning abilities as they relate to
tool use are likely shared across all primate species. The latter
inference is further supported by similar research with Old
World monkeys (Nelson et al. 2010).
Vaesen is interested in behaviors that take longer to complete
than the ones we have described here, so he could say we are
focusing on too narrow a slice of behavior. Still, it has been
argued that short-span motor abilities provide a scaffold for
the evolution of planning and goal maintenance over longer
durations. One proposal is that the cognitive capacities under-
lying anticipatory motor planning in reaching and grasping
provide a sufficient condition for the development of tool use
(Johnson-Frey 2004). We believe, contrary to Johnson-Frey,
that such cognitive capacities provide a necessary but not suffi-
cient condition for tool use. Our reason for this alternative view
is that tamarins and lemurs do not use tools in the wild or in cap-
tivity, at least as far as we know, yet they show the anticipatory
motor planning abilities needed to turn cups in ways that afford
maximal control during food extraction. The underlying cogni-
tive abilities indexed by our tasks require an appreciation of
means-end relationships as well as an ability to inhibit the
deployment of canonical postures in the service of better later
postures. Our appreciation of these facts leaves us skeptical of
Vaesen’s claim that humans possess unique abilities for inhi-
bition and foresight.
A last thought: In his discussion of foresight in the context of
prospective planning of action sequences (sect. 12.2), Vaesen
differentiates between novel solutions and action routines. We
question whether that distinction properly distinguishes
humans from non-human animals. The nonhuman primates in
our studies found novel solutions for the food extraction pro-
blems they faced. They had minimal experience with cups, yet
they spontaneously adopted non-canonical grasps when pre-
sented with inverted cups, even in first trials. If foresight requires
novel solutions to problems, as Vaesen asserts, then the behaviors
we have described provide evidence for prospective planning and
foresight in non–tool-using animals.
Figure 1 (Weiss). In (a), a cotton-top tamarin (Saguinus
oedipus) grasps the stem of a cup (a plastic champagne glass
with its base removed) to pull it from an apparatus and extract
a marshamallow stuck in the cup’s bottom. The tamarin uses a
thumb-down grasp that permits a subsequent thumb-up grasp
once the cup is pulled out and inverted (not shown). In (b), a
ring-tailed lemur (Lemur catta) uses a thumb-down grasp to
turn over a free-standing plastic champagne glass with a raisin
affixed to the bottom of the bowl. Sources: (a) Weiss et al. 2007
(Courtesy of Sage Publications), (b) Chapman et al. 2010
(Courtesy of The American Psychological Association).
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Abstract: In my response to the commentaries from a collection
of esteemed researchers, I reassess and eventually find largely
intact my claim that human tool use evidences higher social and
non-social cognitive ability. Nonetheless, I concede that my
examination of individual-level cognitive traits does not offer a
full explanation of cumulative culture yet. For that, one needs to
incorporate them into population-dynamic models of cultural
evolution. I briefly describe my current and future work on this.
Let me start with a somewhat obvious caveat. Given the
overwhelming amount of feedback I received, my response
will miss out on numerous topics worthy of further discus-
sion. I regret not being able to fully honor the careful
thought and work put into each commentary, and I sin-
cerely hope my response does not distort matters too much.
Below I do four things. First, I defend my methodology
against three points of critique (sect. R1). Second, I reas-
sess the nine cognitive capacities of the target article in
light of the open peer commentary (sects. R2–R8). I con-
clude that my original conclusion stands firm: Human tool
use still reflects a profound discontinuity between us and
chimps in matters of social and non-social wit. Third, I
briefly take up a topic underplayed in the target article,
namely, the evolutionary history of the cognitive traits
reviewed (sect. R9). Fourth, I reconsider a topic I found
underplayed in the commentaries, namely, the question
of technological accumulation (sect. R10). I sketch how I
am currently incorporating the cognitive assumptions
made explicit in the target article into existing popu-
lation-dynamic models of human cultural evolution; I
sketch, thus, how I am making the necessary move from
the individual level to the level where cumulative culture
must be studied eventually, namely, that of the population.
R1. Methodological notes
R1.1 Why chimpanzees?
In the target article, I justified my narrow focus on humans
and chimpanzees primarily on pragmatic grounds (see
target article Note 1): For reasons of space, and given
the wealth of data on primate tool use, I used chimps,
rather than crows, finches, dolphins, otters, or elephants,
as a contrast class for humans. Obviously, albeit implicitly,
my justification also assumed some argument by ancestry
(as Cachel observes). In the absence of direct evidence
of ancestral states, our closest relatives may serve as, be
it imperfect, models for reconstructing human cognitive
and technological evolution (McGrew 1993). Finally, my
focus on chimpanzees was justified by the second part
of the paper, where I attempted to explain the vast
discrepancy in technological accumulation between us
and our closest relatives. The choice for the latter was
not coincidental: Chimpanzees follow us on the techno-
logical accumulation list, so they offer a natural benchmark
for examining which add-ons may account for the techno-
logical complexity observed in our lineage.
However, several commentators – most notably
Patterson & Mann, Reader & Hrotic, and Taylor &
Clayton – question my approach and stress the impor-
tance of including data on other (tool-using) animals.
Such an extended comparative approach would allow
me: (1) to see that none of the nine traits is necessary for
tool use (Patterson &Mann); (2) to establish more realistic
ancestral states (Reader & Hrotic); and (3) to determine
the socioecological conditions under which tool use
emerges (Patterson & Mann, Reader & Hrotic, Taylor &
Clayton).
Although there is much to be said in favor of the two last
points, let me first briefly dismiss point one. Patterson &
Mann attribute to me the claim that I have identified a set
of necessary conditions for tool use. As the title of the
target article suggests, however, my actual concern was
explaining human tool use (rather than tool use, full
stop). Moreover, as stated in the abstract, my aim was to
identify traits that could help explain why technological
accumulation evolved so markedly in humans, and so mod-
estly in the great apes. In sum, identifying necessary con-
ditions for tool use was not one of the objectives of the
target article.
Regarding the second point, Reader & Hrotic remark
that contemporary chimpanzees likely misrepresent ances-
tral states. Differences between us and chimpanzees may
be due to loss of traits in chimpanzees, rather than – as
I assume – independent evolution of traits in us. There-
fore, to decide which course evolution has taken (loss of
the trait in chimps versus its acquisition by us) for any
trait, the ancestral state must be established, which
requires incorporating additional species. In this regard,
Reader & Hrotic cite as a fruitful example a study by de
Kort and Clayton (2006), who use phylogenetic analysis
to reconstruct the ancestral state for caching behavior in
corvids. de Kort & Clayton’s methodology seems promis-
ing indeed. At this point, however, I have two worries.
First, when it concerns a behavioral trait as cumulative
culture, phylogenetic analyses will not be very helpful,
given the apparent lack of the trait in other primate taxa –
except perhaps in chimpanzees. Second, supposing one
is interested in more basic traits (e.g., function represen-
tation, causal reasoning, theory of mind), phylogenetic
analysis allows one to reconstruct ancestral states only on
the condition that the trait in question has been properly
diagnosed in all taxa under consideration. Reader &
Hrotic’s favored approach therefore still calls for carefully
executed comparative work. The target article has done
some of that necessary preparatory work, even if just for
two species (i.e., humans and chimps).
Third, Patterson & Mann, Reader & Hrotic, and
Taylor & Clayton correctly point out that the inclusion
of other taxa may shed light on the socioecological con-
ditions under which tool use emerges. For example, the
fact that chimpanzees do not exhibit a certain trait may
be due not so much to the absence of the trait as to its
being unexpressed under current ecological conditions
(for a similar point, see also Nonaka). Comparisons with
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other taxa may prove valuable here – especially given the
declining number of habitats occupied by wild chimpan-
zees. But unfortunately, inter-taxa comparisons will not
suffice either. Much of what is said to be known about
human cognition is based on studies of Westerners (see
Note 44; see also Haun et al. 2006; Henrich et al. 2010).
To rule out that their behavior was prompted by their
specific ecological and/or cultural niche, many more
cross-cultural studies have to be performed. In other
words, in addition to inter-taxa comparisons, we also
need intra-taxa comparisons, within our species in particu-
lar. Therefore I am even more skeptical than Taylor &
Clayton are: I do not just believe that the conclusions of
my paper may be premature, I am certain that they are.
Still, they are as good as they can get given the present
state of the field.
R1.2 Why not the environment?
Some commentators argue that the environment not just
passively prompts certain behaviors, as just mentioned,
but often plays a more active role. The environment,
both natural and artificial, may scaffold cognition (Jeffares
and Blitzer & Huebner). Instead of being localized
exclusively in the head, cognition is an “intertwining
of neural, bodily, and [external] material resources”
(Malafouris). This kind of “ecological” approach to cogni-
tion is virtually absent in my story – much to the regret of
Jeffares, Blitzer & Huebner, and Malafouris.
The reason for this omission has nothing to do with
methodological prejudice, as I am very sympathetic to
the movement set afoot by Andy Clark and others (see
e.g., Clark et al., forthcoming). The omission is rather
due to a lack of comparative evidence. To date, research
on nonhuman species still works within an internalist
mindset. Consequently, little to nothing is known about
the scaffolds of the chimpanzee mind. Even our under-
standing of the importance of the external world in
human cognitive processes is limited. Consider an
example by Jeffares. He argues that the idea of a tool
need not be internally represented, because existing
tools can take over this role. The thought is that existing
tools can be used as a template for the production of
new ones; and this is presented as a clever strategy of
using the environment to store ideas that we otherwise
would need to store internally. However, before we
accept that this form of scaffolding decreases rather than
increases cognitive demands, Jeffares must show empiri-
cally that it does not depend on, for example: a capacity
to conceptualize the existing tool as being for a particular
purpose; a capacity for inferential reasoning to infer a pro-
duction process from the tool’s functional properties; or a
capacity for analogical reasoning to appreciate that the
principles governing the template also (should) govern
the copy. Relying on behavioral templates (also discussed
by Jeffares) seems a more elegant strategy; but this was
covered in the target article’s section on social learning.
R1.3 Why (only one sort of) neurology?
The claims of Malafouris, Jeffares, and Blitzer &
Huebner raise another methodological issue. If the
environment actively shapes cognition and, relatedly,
brains are profoundly plastic, what should we make of
the neurological evidence in the target article? Am I not
assuming too much that cognitive traits are “hardwired”
(Jeffares’s word), each corresponding to a piece of “phylo-
genetically novel wetware” (Blitzer & Huebner’s words)?
I think I am not. The target article points to only one (!)
suggestion of a humanique cortical specialization for a trait
(my discussion of Orban et al. 2006; Stout & Chaminade
2007). Apart from a suggestion of neural overlap
between language and tool use in human BA44 (my discus-
sion of Higuchi et al. 2009), everywhere else neurological
evidence concerns the recruitment of large brain struc-
tures: (pre)frontal cortex, (pre)motor cortex, parietal
cortex, parietotemporal cortex, (non)lateralized distribu-
ted networks. Evidently, I do not believe, and did not
suggest, that these large chunks of brain evolved specifi-
cally for the cognitive task in question. Finding out how
cognitive labor is preferentially distributed across the
brain does not entail a commitment to nativism nor
blank-slateism.
I agree, however, with Vingerhoets’ methodological
concerns. He remarks that I cover only one type of neuros-
cientific data used for speculating on the evolution of cog-
nition, namely, data from cross-task neural overlap (in my
discussion of Higuchi et al. 2009), thereby ignoring two
alternatives, namely, co-lateralization and cross-functional
connectivity analyses. His point is well taken that these
may be or may become just as useful.
R2. Hand-eye coordination
In her commentary, Dounskaia conjectures that differ-
ences in human and nonhuman primate motor control
may contribute substantially to the uniqueness of human
tool use. She offers compelling evidence for the idea that
some limb movements require much more cognitive
effort than others do. The ability to perform accurately
even these more effortful movements, Dounskaia suggests,
may have enabled humans to deploy much more sophisti-
cated tools.
At present, however, she lacks proper comparative
evidence. Although it seems true that the repertoire of
human motor actions greatly exceeds that of nonhuman
primates, Dounskaia still needs to establish that this
difference is attributable to a difference in the ability to
perform more complex gestures. Chimpanzees may have
such an ability but not, say, the creativity to exploit it. In
this respect, Dounskaia’s argument may benefit from an
observation made in the target article. Chimpanzees
have less neural tissue devoted to their locomotor
muscles (Walker 2009), so that they must recruit larger
numbers of motor units at once. This limits their ability
for fine motor control, and arguably, the level of move-
ment complexity they can achieve. Regardless, I certainly
find Dounskaia’s leading joint hypothesis promising
enough to warrant further research, especially in a com-
parative setting.
Jacquet, Tessari, Binkofski, & Borghi (Jacquet
et al.) argue that human tool use does not need to
involve the high-level cognitive skills I discuss, as it may
be based on much simpler detection systems. Their
primary example is affordance perception: Humans are
able to recognize manipulation opportunities, “matching
the perceived physical features of objects and the agent’s
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biomechanical architecture, goals, plans, values, beliefs,
and past experiences” (italics added). The text in italics
not only shows that Jacquet et al. deviate substantially
from J. J. Gibson’s original formulation of affordances, it
threatens to undermine their argument.
J. J. Gibson (1979) indeed introduced affordance per-
ception as a fairly low-level process. Affordance perception
referred to an animal’s unreflective capacity to discern in
the environment possibilities for action, only constrained
by its own physical constitution (e.g., that a rake can be
grasped; that it affords grasping). As such, affordance per-
ception was a capacity also exhibited by animals that did
not have goals, plans, values, or beliefs. Goals, plans,
values and beliefs were added as constraints only in the
work of Norman (1988), whose research primarily con-
cerned humans. Norman’s reformulation (which Jacquet
et al. adopt) is not merely terminological. It implies a
shift of focus from direct, low-level perception to indirect
perception; that is, perception dependent on interpret-
ation and background knowledge. With an example of
Norman’s, a knob on a refrigerator may be directly
perceived as turnable (per Gibson), but one needs a
Normanian conceptual model to perceive it as “to-lower-
the-temperature-with–able.” Likewise, the “Delete” key
on a keyboard may be directly perceived as pressable
(per Gibson), but one needs a Normanian conceptual
model to perceive it as “to-delete-a-character-with–able.”
In sum, Jacquet et al. face a dilemma. They either
endorse a Normanian notion of affordance, thereby
making affordance perception a conceptually rich, and
fairly demanding, enterprise (as the target article’s
section on function representation suggested). Or they
pursue a Gibsonian account, at the cost of being unable
to explain the humanique ways in which humans navigate
their humaniquely engineered environments.
R3. Body schema plasticity
Arbib and Longo & Serino find my conclusions regard-
ing body schema plasticity uncompelling. According to
these commentators, the question is not so much
whether nonhuman primates can extend their body
schema, but whether this happens as flexibly and rapidly
as in humans. That question, Arbib and Longo & Serino
believe, should be answered with a clear “no.”
I remain unconvinced. Let me start with Arbib. Arbib
refers to a study by Arbib et al. (2009) in support of his
argument. Now, Arbib and colleagues observe the facility
humans have in tool use, and infer from that fact that
human body schema plasticity has unique properties (p.
458). But this does not follow. Tool use in nonhuman pri-
mates may be cumbersome due to numerous other reasons
(limited grasp of causality, poor hand-eye coordination,
and so forth). To be fair, this point is conceded a bit
further in the text, when the authors suggest how future
studies could establish the difference between humans
and nonhuman primates as regards body schema plasticity.
But in and of itself, the paper by Arbib et al. (2009) does
not seem to provide the necessary evidence.
Longo & Serino’s comparative evidence is wanting,
too. They refer to a study by Quallo et al. (2009) in
support of the idea that the body schema of monkeys is
fairly rigid. Quallo and colleagues indeed demonstrate
fairly persistent increases of gray matter in, among other
places, the intraparietal sulcus of macaques that were
trained to use a tool. Still, what Longo & Serino do not
mention is that similar increases were observed in
human volunteers learning to juggle (reported by
Draganski & May 2008, as cited by Quallo et al. 2009).
R4. Causal reasoning
By and large, commentators propose three useful exten-
sions to the target article’s section on causal reasoning.
First, that the section would have benefited from discus-
sions of experimental paradigms other than trap-tube tasks
(Taylor & Clayton) and of experimental paradigms other
than those presented in the target article’s Figure 1
(Cachel). In light of the study by Seed et al. (2009),
Taylor & Clayton remark, for example (as I do), that the
reason for the modest performance of chimpanzees in
trap-tube tasks may be demands posed by the tool
aspect of the task; that is, that the extra cognitive load
may block the animals’ ability to properly assess the
task’s causal set-up. Other changes, such as allowing
animals to push rather than pull the food item in the
tube, may also yield different results (Mulcahy & Call
2006a). In sum, one should not draw too strong con-
clusions about great ape causal cognition from only one,
potentially confounded test. Perhaps Taylor & Clayton
are right that trap-tubes received too much attention in
my paper. On the other hand, I do shortly describe
three other of Povinelli’s (2000) seminal experiments
(see also Fig. 1): the flimsy-tool problem, the inverted-
rake problem, and the table-trap problem. Chimpanzees
performed poorly on these tests too; and, as Cachel is
right to point out, Povinelli’s book describes even more
experiments, which together are at the very least sugges-
tive of the fact that chimpanzees’ grasp of causality is
rather modest. There is little follow-up research based
on these other paradigms, which is rather unfortunate
indeed.
Second, Penn, Holyoak, & Povinelli (Penn et al.)
miss a treatment of non-mechanism approaches to causal
understanding. Indeed, in the target article I suggested
that causal understanding requires the cognizer to infer
a mechanism that relates the cause to the effect. This
mechanism account is associated most prominently with
Ahn and colleagues (Ahn & Kalish 2000; Ahn et al.
1995) and is fairly intellectualist:
We suggest that people’s beliefs about causal relations include
(1) a notion of force or necessity, (2) a belief in a causal process
that takes place between a cause and an effect, and (3) a set of
more or less elaborated beliefs about the nature of that mech-
anism, described in theoretical terms. (Ahn & Kalish 2000,
p. 302)
Penn et al. are right that there are other, less-demand-
ing accounts of causal understanding. For example, Wald-
mann and Holyoak (1992; Waldmann et al. 1995) argue
that human mental representations of cause-effect
relations are organized into causal models. Basic causal
models include representations of directionality (e.g., the
causal arrow between A and B goes from A to B, not the
reverse), strength (A impacts strongly/weakly on B), and
polarity (A makes B happen versus A prevents B from hap-
pening); they typically do not refer to the mechanisms
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responsible for the said cause-effect relation. A cognizer
may know that there exists a strong causal arrow from
eating rotten food to diarrhea without appreciating the
unobservable underlying mechanisms – say, how bacterial
toxins derange the normal bowel flora.
This position clearly conflicts with the view of Ahn &
Kalish (2000; with their third point in the quote above in
particular), but it can still be made to fit with the idea
that chimpanzee causal understanding is limited. Using
the terminology of Penn et al., chimpanzees may be
able to represent “first-order” causal models, but not
“higher-order” ones. That is, whereas chimpanzees may
be able to reason about the causal relationships between
observable contingencies, they do not generalize these
principles into higher-order “intuitive theories” (Penn
et al. 2008), which typically refer to unobservable causal
properties, such as gravity. Whereas for chimpanzees
causal arrows between A and B remain on a perceptual
level, no such limitations hold for the human case.
A third extension to my discussion of causal reasoning is
offered byOrban & Rizzolatti, and it concerns a putative
neuronal basis for the enhanced grasp of causality
observed in humans. They refer to a study by Peeters
et al. (2009), who found evidence that a specific sector of
left inferior parietal lobule (i.e., anterior supramarginal
gyrus, or aSMG) was activated in humans during the
observation of tool use, but not in monkeys. Importantly,
aSMG is not involved in understanding causal relation-
ships in general; it codes tool actions in terms of the
causal relationship between the intended use of the tool
and the result obtained by using it. This study is interesting
for at least two reasons. First, it may resolve some of the
uncertainties regarding production-level representations
of tool use skills (see Note 18). That is, aSMG may
support larger motor repertoires, thereby supporting
larger toolkits. Second, with the proviso that Peeters and
colleagues studied rhesus monkeys and not chimpanzees,
aSMGmay perhaps explain why, as observed above, chim-
panzees fail the trap-tube task when tools are implied. To
wit, human aSMG would provide the computational
power needed to overcome the additional demands
posed by the tool aspect of the task.
R5. Function representation
Commentaries on the target article’s section on function
representation reveal some confusion as regards the
notion of function. Several authors (i.e., Blitzer &
Huebner; Osvath, Persson, & Ga¨rdenfors [Osvath
et al.]; Patterson & Mann; Penn et al.) argue that
monkeys and apes are able to form functional represen-
tations, because these animals are capable of distinguish-
ing between “functional” and “non-functional” tools (see
e.g., Osvath & Osvath 2008) and are able to distinguish
between “functionally” relevant (e.g., the shape of a
rake) and “functionally” irrelevant (e.g., the color of the
rake) properties of a tool (see e.g., Santos et al. 2003).
Where these authors refer to functionality, I would
speak rather of causal efficacy: An ape may appreciate
that a certain rake is causally efficacious for food retrieval,
but this does not mean it attributes to the rake that func-
tion. For that to happen, the ape must somehow conceive
the rake as being for the said purpose. To get a feeling for
the distinction: I may appreciate that a cup is causally effi-
cacious to be used as a paperweight without attributing to
it that particular function.
How could we know whether nonhuman primates form
such permanent function representations? One way is to
see whether they stick to a tool when functionally equival-
ent alternatives become available. The target article
referred to a study by Cummins-Sebree and Fragaszy
(2005) suggesting that they do not. Patterson & Mann,
however, are right to point out that Whiten et al. (2005)
may count as counter-evidence. In that study, chimpan-
zees continued to use a tool for its function even in the
presence of functional equivalents.
Second, evidence of re-use of tools would support the
idea of stable function attributions. I suggested that
reports of tool re-use are scarce, with the exception of a
study by Carvalho et al. (2009). Thanks to Blitzer &
Huebner, I can here add a study by Sanz and Morgan
(2010).
Finally, observations of functional fixedness would indi-
cate that tools are conceptualized as being for one particu-
lar purpose rather than another. The target article
suggested that functional fixedness was a humanique
phenomenon. Yet, a study that was not available at the
time of writing the paper – performed by Hanus et al.
(2011) and pointed out to me by Patterson & Mann
and Rizzo – may prove me wrong. Hanus and colleagues
indeed provide suggestive evidence for functional fixed-
ness in chimps. What remains to be seen, however, is
whether chimpanzees’ fixedness attests to a conceptual
system storing functional information (as in humans),
rather than being the result of associative learning,
where repeated exposure to a tool’s function blocks
alternative, more creative uses.
For all three diagnostic features, it appears, commenta-
tors have raised quite forceful counter-arguments. Con-
trary to what I stated in the target article, it may
therefore well be that nonhuman primates attach particu-
lar functions to particular objects. Whether they hereby
rely on a conceptual system storing functional knowledge
remains uncertain, as well as the question of what differ-
ence that would make.
Incidentally, Gainotti makes an intriguing remark
about the conceptual system implied in human functional
representation. He observes that tool concepts are typi-
cally represented unilaterally in a left-sided fronto-parietal
network, because of their close link to actions, which are
typically performed by the contra-lateral right hand.
Living category concepts (e.g., about animals, plants), by
contrast, rely more on visual data and are therefore
stored in a bilateral network comprising rostral and
ventral parts of the temporal lobes.
R6. Executive control
The target article subdivides executive control into mech-
anisms of monitoring online action, inhibition, foresight,
and autocuing. Commentaries primarily take issue with
my treatment of the latter two. Weiss, Chapman,
Wark, & Rosenbaum (Weiss et al.) and Osvath et al.
challenge my views concerning foresight; Stoet &
Snyder add considerable refinement to my discussion of
autocuing. Finally, the commentary by Beck, Chappell,
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Apperly, & Cutting (Beck et al.) sheds new light on the
role that executive control plays in tool innovation. Let me
consider each commentary in turn.
Weiss et al. describe research evidencing anticipatory
effects in the reaching behaviors of lemurs, tamarins,
and rhesus monkeys. These monkeys were shown to
prefer non-canonical hand postures in preparation of a
subsequent grasping task. Such behavior, the authors
point out, indicates some form of planning ahead. I
agree. Still, the behavioral evidence does not meet the
standards of foresight set in the target article; that is, it
does not involve the formation of long-term goals, nor
the prospection of needs other than those experienced in
the immediate present. I certainly do not mean to down-
play the significance of more basic forms of foresight, as
those described by Weiss and colleagues. I believe
indeed that these may increase our understanding of the
evolution of planning and goal maintenance. To press
the issue, however, the target article focused on those
types of foresight where discrepancies between humans
and nonhuman primates might be most apparent. In a
search for discontinuities, I think, such an approach is jus-
tified. Nonetheless, I admit that to do right to the short-
span motor-planning abilities discussed by Weiss et al.,
one would need to start with a much finer grained subdivi-
sion of executive control than the fourfold subdivision I
deployed.
According to Osvath et al., the target article misinter-
prets a study on great ape foresight by Osvath and
Osvath (2008). They argue that I dismiss Osvath and
Osvath’s results too readily as a consequence of associative
learning rather than as a consequence of foresight. In light
of a paper by Osvath (2010) that Osvath et al. refer me to, I
am willing to concede (again) that the experiments by
Osvath and Osvath properly control for associative learn-
ing. Yet, my other observation still holds: The results of
Osvath and Osvath (2008) may be due to inhibitory
strength rather than to forethought – at least if we evalu-
ate their experiments by the standards they set themselves:
[T]o ensure that the self-control setting offers competition
between different desires, the stimuli in the choice situation
must represent different kinds of rewards. The immediate
reward must be qualitatively distinct from the future one;
otherwise the outcome of the choice would only be an
expression of inhibitory strength and not of the ability to dis-
tinguish the future oriented drive from the present oriented
one. (p. 664, italics added)
The rewards that Osvath and Osvath believe to be
tapping “different desires” are a grape and half a liter of
rosehip berry soup. Osvath et al. agree, and they justify
Osvath and Osvath’s assumption based on the idea that
“eating and drinking are dissimilar activities, with different
physiological outcomes.”’ This may be a salient distinction
when the comparison concerns, say, eating a grape and
drinking water, but much less so when it concerns eating
a grape and drinking rosehip berry soup. These latter
activities have at least one target in common: a craving
for fruity sugars. On this construal, subjects in the exper-
iments of Osvath and Osvath may well have exercised
inhibitory strength, but not have anticipated a drive differ-
ent from the present one.
Stoet & Snyder refer to a set of recent and fascinating
studies that demonstrate endogenous control – or as I
called it, autocuing – in monkeys. These animals appear
capable of letting internal representations act as cues for
their behavior, rather than merely reacting on external
stimuli. The reason why I believe autocuing to be relevant
for tool use differs from that of Stoet & Snyder. My
thought, which does not conflict with the observations of
Stoet & Snyder, is that it allows deliberate practice,
needed to achieve skill in complex tool use. Stoet &
Snyder also see a link with skill complexity, but spell this
out in terms of enhanced concentration in humans.
Humans appear less flexible to switch rapidly between
endogenously controlled task representations. That, in
turn, supports concentration, a necessary component of
long-lasting and complex tasks, such as developing skill
in complex tool use. Together, Stoet & Snyder’s and my
proposal make plausible why humans, compared with
other primates, seem to be capable of learning so much
more intricate tasks-sets.
Lastly, the commentary of Beck et al. targets one of the
outstanding questions formulated at the end of the target
article. There (sect. 12.2.1) I observed that executive
control appears critical for innovative tasks, such as
solving Tower of London problems, and I asked whether
the same would hold for other innovative acts, especially
those involving tools. Beck et al. report on evidence that
tentatively supports my suggestion. The authors tested
human children on a tool innovation task based on Weir
et al.’s (2002) wire-bending problem. Children up to 5
years old had great difficulties fashioning a straight piece
of wire to make a hook for retrieving a bucket from a ver-
tical tube. Given that the children displayed a proper
causal understanding of the task, Beck et al. suggest that
the children’s poor performance was due to the immatur-
ity of their executive system. It is unclear, however, how
much executive control is really needed for solving the
wire-bending problem. Prototypical tests of executive
function involve multi-step actions (e.g., the Tower of
London task, the Six Element Test), where a solution
must be planned ahead and kept in mind during each
step of the task. No such goal maintenance is implied, it
seems, in the single-step wire-bending problem, where
the ultimate solution of the task and its execution can
run almost in parallel. Future research on the perform-
ance of dysexecutive patients on similar single-step and
open-ended tasks could perhaps corroborate the hypoth-
esis of Beck et al.
R7. Social learning, teaching, social intelligence
Surprisingly few commentators seem to disagree with my
presentation of primate social skills (social learning, teach-
ing, and social intelligence). Osvath et al. find my treat-
ment of theory of mind too short – I agree, but referred
the reader to the much more detailed discussions by
Penn and Povinelli (2007b) and Call and Tomasello
(2008). Moerman points to the enormous impact of new
kinds of social organization on recent technological devel-
opments – I fully agree, and consider this topic more fully
in section R10. Finally, Tennie & Over believe that I too
quickly reject explanations based on a small number of
social traits. In particular, they make the following two
claims: (1) Humanique forms of social learning and teach-
ing are sufficient to explain cumulative culture; and (2)
cumulative culture positively impacts on cognition,
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giving rise to many of the non-social cognitive skills dis-
cussed in the target article.
In the target article, I provided two arguments that
undermine Tennie & Over’s first claim: the problem of
the Acheulean, and the fact that non-social skills are part
and parcel of sophisticated forms of social learning. This
may not have convinced Tennie & Over. Therefore, let
me provide an additional argument, which I draw, quite
ironically, from a study referred to by Tennie & Over
themselves, namely, Enquist et al. (2008).
Tennie & Over invoke that paper in support of their
second claim. Indeed, Enquist and colleagues show that
exponential cultural accumulation requires feed-forward
loops between culture and creativity (or “intelligence,” as
Tennie & Over call it). Whereas genetically evolved crea-
tivity may produce accumulation at a constant rate, only
culturally evolved creativity has the power to yield acceler-
ating accumulation. But what Tennie & Over omit to
mention is that, according to the very same models of
Enquist and colleagues, the process of accumulation can
get started only once genetically evolved creativity has
evolved. Genetically evolved creativity, not cultural trans-
mission, is the primary genetic bottleneck for cumulative
culture:
The evolution of cultural transmission is often considered the
main genetic bottleneck for the origin of culture, because
natural selection cannot favor cultural transmission without
any culture to transmit. Our models suggest that an increase
in individual creativity may have been the first step toward
human culture, because in a population of creative individuals
there may be enough non-genetic information to favor the
evolution of cultural transmission. (Enquist et al. 2008, p. 46,
italics added)
Put differently, for Enquist and colleagues, cultural
transmission is insufficient for sustaining processes of
cumulative culture – pace Tennie & Over. Incidentally,
Enquist and colleagues black-box the cognitive skills that
make up genetically evolved creativity. In the target
article I discerned at least two contenders: a capacity for
causal reasoning (sect. 12.1) and enhanced executive
control (sect. 12.2; see also Beck et al.).
Let me turn to Tennie & Over’s second claim. Here
the idea is that cultural environments are responsible
for qualitative changes in cognitive skills. Tennie &
Over write: “[A]t least some of the factors that Vaesen
identifies as causes of human tool use are, in fact,
effects of growing up in rich cultural environments.”
This may be right. To have bite, however, Tennie &
Over need to specify which traits are implied. And evi-
dently, they need to show for every single trait on the
list that it is culturally acquired rather than innate. I am
prepared to go for either option; but at present, especially
in the face of a disheartening scarcity of cross-cultural
data, I think it is more honest to admit that the science
is not settled yet.
R8. Language
IJzerman & Foroni provide an argument that is structu-
rally similar to the one of Tennie & Over. What social
learning is for Tennie & Over, language is for IJzerman
& Foroni. That is, IJzerman & Foroni argue that I under-
estimate the role of language in supersizing humans’
cognitive toolkit, and that I thereby overestimate the cog-
nitive discontinuity between chimps and humans.
In response, let me repeat what I did and did not do in the
target article. I compared humans and chimps with respect
to nine tool-related cognitive skills (including linguistic
ability, for that matter), and I found that humans excelled
in almost all of them. Thereby, I deliberately bracketed
questions of implementation. Our excellence may be hard-
wired, culturally acquired (as Tennie & Over propose), a
side effect of our linguistic ability (as IJzerman & Foroni
propose), or a bit of all three (see also sections R1.2, R7,
and R9). In my opinion, IJzerman & Foroni overestimate
how much we know about the impact of language on our
cognitive toolkit to be able to adjudicate among these four
scenarios, but I do not want to press that point. Instead,
let me formulate two further critical remarks.
First, to be able to make their argument, IJzerman &
Foroni must rely on a comparative assessment of the
sort that the target article gives. For example, IJzerman
& Foroni believe that language supersizes human planning
abilities and executive control (Blitzer & Huebner, by
the way, make a similar observation in passing). Such a
claim makes sense only if humans have superior planning
ability and superior executive control to begin with –
indeed, precisely what the target article attempted to
show. More generally, one does not need to prove a
trait’s independence from linguistic ability to be able to
judge whether humans have it and how good they are at it.
Second, there is something in IJzerman & Foroni’s
charges that I cannot help but perceive as a plain inconsis-
tency. The claim that language supersizes the human cog-
nitive toolkit at the very least suggests a profound cognitive
discontinuity between us and chimps; yet, IJzerman &
Foroni charge me with overestimating the cognitive dis-
continuity between humans and chimps.
The second strand of comments concerning language
comes from Holloway, Arbib, and Barcelo´-Coblijn &
Gomila. These commentators point out, either implicitly
or explicitly, that I have neglected the possibility that tool
use and language co-evolved. And indeed, it is rather unfor-
tunate that the target article examined only accounts
according to which the evolution of tool use played a
causal role in the subsequent evolution of language.
Holloway observes striking similarities between human
language and toolmaking. He refers to his seminal paper
“Culture: A Human Domain” (1969), where he described
the similarities as follows:
[A]lmost any model which describes a language process can also
be used to describe tool-making. . . . Both activities are concate-
nated, both have rigid rules about serialization of unit activities
(the grammar, the syntax), both are hierarchical systems of
activity (as is any motor activity), and both produce arbitrary
configurations which thence become part of the environment,
either temporarily or permanently. (p. 401)
Holloway’s co-evolutionary thesis appears a bit further on:
Tool-making and language are concordant. Selection favored
the cognitive structures dependent on brain organization and
social structure which resulted in both language and tool-
making. (p. 404)
These early ideas clearly resonate in the more recent
accounts of Arbib and Barcelo´-Coblijn & Gomila.
According to Arbib, the evolution of complex forms of imi-
tation underwrites the co-evolution of language and tool-
making. Complex imitation, here, involves increased
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capacities for recognizing and imitating hierarchically
structured processes, needed for assembling both words
(in the case of language) and actions (in the case of tool-
making) into superordinate structures.
Also Barcelo´-Coblijn & Gomila are keen to point out
the profound similarities between toolmaking and
language. In knotting, in particular, they see a formal
structure of similar complexity to a context-sensitive
grammar. Tying knots in nets and basketry, for example,
cannot be specified as an iterable sequence of steps at
the service of a higher-level constructive plan, because
“each single operation [e.g., tying one of the knots of the
net] is conditional on the state of the rest of the fabric
and the physical forces the knot is supposed to resist.”
There is much to be said in favor of the accounts ofHol-
loway, Arbib, and Barcelo´-Coblijn & Gomila. Still, I
have one worry, which is not sufficiently stressed in the
target article. Attempts at determining structural com-
monalities between language and toolmaking are easy
prey for charges of arbitrariness. Take Barcelo´-Coblijn &
Gomila’s claim that context-sensitive procedures
emerged very recently, only with the advent of knotting
in Homo sapiens. Now, compare this with Holloway’s
(1969) interpretation of Acheulean toolmaking:
Taking each motor event alone, no one action is complete; each
action depends on the prior one and requires a further one, and
each is dependent in another way on the original plan. In other
words, at each point of the action except the last, the piece is
not “satisfactory” in structure. Each unit action is meaningless
by itself in the sense of the use of the tool; it is meaningful only
in the context of the whole completed set of actions culminat-
ing in the final product. (p. 402, italics added)
As far as I can tell,Holloway here interprets Acheulean
toolmaking as a context-sensitive procedure, in which each
single blow is conditional on past and future blows. In the
absence of a rigorous method for making similarity judg-
ments, it is hard to decide whose interpretation is
correct, Holloway’s or that of Barcelo´-Coblijn &
Gomila. Even an analysis of hierarchical complexity in
stone toolmaking as detailed and systematic as that of
Stout (2011, referred to by Arbib) contains a fair
amount of arbitrariness (as Stout himself admits,
p. 1057); attempts to mirror his approach onto (proto)lan-
guage would only add more of it. Presumably, similarity
will keep residing in the eye of the beholder.
R9. Evolutionary issues
Even if one accepts my description of human tool-related
cognitive abilities, how did all these abilities evolve? I am
glad that so many commentators took up that pertinent
question in my stead. Broadly speaking, their hypotheses
fall into three groups.
First, Crabb endorses the view that human technologi-
cal ingenuity emerged in response to a process of techno-
logical selection. He argues that hominids, unlike other
tool-using species, depended on tools for their survival.
The increasingly dry and open landscapes made our ances-
tors extremely vulnerable to attacks by predators; the use
of weapons for protection would clearly confer fitness
advantage. Subsequent elaborations on these early tools
would have provided even more survival benefits, and as
such, favor even more cognitive sophistication.
Crabb’s hypothesis is reminiscent of, but interestingly
different from, earlier technological intelligence hypotheses
(for an elegant discussion, see Byrne 1997). According to
these, tool use skills are favored whenever there is a
premium on gains in efficiency with respect to (extractive)
foraging; on Crabb’s account, in contrast, the premium
would initially be on gains in efficiency with respect to pro-
tection. What puzzles me, however, is how Crabb’s account
would accommodate the fact that the earliest known tools
(i.e., Oldowan flakes) offer little protection against animal
attacks. In this respect, earlier versions of the technological
intelligence hypothesis seem to fare much better.
Second, several commentaries endorse some kind of
cultural intelligence hypothesis. Tennie & Over, as dis-
cussed earlier, argue that the evolution of humanique
forms of social learning and teaching subsequently drove
the cultural evolution of other tool-related cognitive
skills. Nielsen expresses a similar view, but adds quite a
forceful argument in its favor. He observes that humans
are the only species to have a childhood as a life stage,
which provides ample opportunities for the acquisition
of complex skills – including cognitive skills related to
tool use. Finally, the examples of niche construction
given by Blitzer & Huebner, Jeffares, Nonaka, and
Arbib seem consistent with a cultural intelligence hypoth-
esis, although not necessarily of the ontogenetic kind (as
the one of Tennie & Over).
Third, there is the view that technical and sociocultural
cognitive traits co-evolved, in concert with increasing
brain size and reflecting a general cognitive ability. On
this account – endorsed by Reader & Hrotic, Gibson,
and perhaps Penn et al. – neither social nor ecological
challenges alone account for human cognitive and brain
evolution. In support of this view, Reader & Hrotic point
to a very recent study by Reader et al. (2011), which I
find particularly compelling. Reader and colleagues com-
piled cognitive measures from multiple domains (social,
technical, ecological), examined their interrelations (for 62
primate species), and found strong cross-species associ-
ations. Rather than that each trait evolved in response to
species-specific social and ecological demands, it therefore
seems more likely that social, technical, and ecological
traits evolved in concert, as part of a highly correlated cog-
nitive suite.
R10. From individual cognition to
population-level culture
My primary reason for examining primate social and non-
social wit was the belief that doing so would help us to
explain why technological accumulation evolved so mark-
edly in us, and so modestly in chimps. To be sure, I was
fully aware that an examination of cognitive capabilities
alone would offer only half an explanation; that for the
other part, one would need to study how these abilities
play out at the aggregate level.
Therefore, I am in agreement with Ragir & Brooks
that human cultural evolution cannot be properly under-
stood if population and group dynamics are ignored. But
the reverse holds as well: One needs accurate micro-
level data to be able to give meaningful descriptions at
the macro level. Consider, for example, Ragir & Brooks’
contention that “changes in population density result in
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the specialization of labor and knowledge,” and that “as
communities increase in size, functional institutions
appear.” Without a proper micro-level foundation, these
explanations are highly unsatisfactory. Increasing popu-
lation densities will favor specialization and functional
institutions only in animals that meet certain cognitive
requirements; otherwise, the animal kingdom would
have been replete with species as cooperative and institu-
tionalized as humans are.
Moerman appreciates this complementarity well. He
finds my characterization of human tool-related cognitive
abilities exemplary but insufficient to account for such
astonishing achievements as cathedrals, iPhones, and
symphony orchestras. To explain these, Moerman
argues, one also needs to consider the novel ways in
which humans tend to organize themselves, acting collec-
tively towards otherwise impossible outcomes. Although
the target article described a set of micro-level mechan-
isms that enable these forms of cooperation (see e.g.,
sect. 12.3.1 and 12.3.2), I agree that their impact remained
somewhat elusive.
Therefore, as a natural follow-up, I already started
developing an agent-based model to assess the impact of
collective learning on cumulative culture. Preliminary
results indicate that at certain levels of technological com-
plexity, default mechanisms of individual and social learn-
ing are unable to sustain further accumulation; and that at
that point, only collective learning is able to reboot the
cumulative process. The model is also used to examine
the effects of certain population characteristics; for
example, how isolation and interconnectedness of sub-
populations play out at higher levels of aggregation.
In the present version of the model, complexity is
defined just in terms of the number of components that
a technology has. In a later stage, however, complexity
will also be a measure of the number of interactions
between components. Based on a paper by Rivkin
(2000), the prediction now is that, even given collective
learning, cumulation levels off at a critical level of com-
plexity; and that the process can recover once the causal
relationships between components are understood.
Thereby, the macro-level impact of another favored
micro-level trait, namely, causal reasoning, would have
been addressed.
R11. Conclusion
Despite a set of methodological worries and worries about
the details of my argument, the target article’s main con-
tention, namely, that human tool use reflects higher cogni-
tive ability, holds up pretty well. Only with respect to
function representation may have my conclusions
perhaps been too strong.
Evidently, there are plenty of topics worthy of further
investigation, to begin with the outstanding questions for-
mulated in section 12. Also, new experimental paradigms
will undoubtedly force us to reformulate or refine our
judgments about what humans and chimps can and
cannot do. Furthermore, the methodological and evol-
utionary issues pointed out by the commentators are in
need of clarification; and at various places I have said
that I would welcome more comparative evidence.
Finally, there is the question of how individual-level
cognitive processes scale up to population-level phenom-
ena. As suggested above, that question will concern me
most in the time to come. But whatever the results of
that future work, I hope my current efforts have already
contributed, even a little, to our understanding of our
humanique selves.
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